Posted on 11/19/2018 7:00:01 AM PST by Magnatron
Indonesian investigators said on Monday more training was needed for Boeing 737 MAX pilots after discovering the situation believed to have faced the crew of a doomed Lion Air jet was not contained in the aircraft’s flight manual.
U.S. pilots were also not aware of potential risks, two U.S. pilot unions told Reuters.
The comments shed further light on the areas under scrutiny as investigators prepare to publish their preliminary report on Nov. 28 or 29, one month after the Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX dived into the Java Sea, killing all 189 on board.
Until now, public attention has focused mainly on potential maintenance problems including a faulty sensor for the ‘angle of attack’, a vital piece of data needed to help the aircraft fly at the right angle to the currents of air and prevent a stall.
Now the investigation’s focus appears to be expanding to the clarity of U.S.-approved procedures to help pilots prevent the 737 MAX over-reacting to such a data loss, and methods for training them.
Dennis Tajer, a 737 captain and spokesman for Allied Pilots Association (APA), which represents American Airlines Group Inc pilots, said his union was informed after the crash about a new system Boeing had installed on 737 MAX jets that could command the plane’s nose down in certain situations to prevent a stall.
(Excerpt) Read more at reuters.com ...
More info here:
Indonesia 737 crash caused by “safety” feature change pilots weren’t told of
U.S. Pilots Say Boeing Didn’t Warn of 737 Feature Tied to Crash
Boeing Statement on Operations Manual Bulletin
Boeing is providing support and technical assistance to the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee and other government authorities responsible for the investigation into Lion Air flight 610.
The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has indicated that Lion Air flight 610 experienced erroneous input from one of its AOA (Angle of Attack) sensors.
Whenever appropriate, Boeing, as part of its usual processes, issues bulletins or makes recommendations regarding the operation of its aircraft.
On November 6, 2018, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) directing operators to existing flight crew procedures to address circumstances where there is erroneous input from an AOA sensor.
The investigation into Lion Air flight 610 is ongoing and Boeing continues to cooperate fully and provide technical assistance at the request and under the direction of government authorities investigating the accident.
More contributory than Boeing’s actions is that pilots being trained today are not taught basic airmanship and aerodynamic skills.
You can fly an airplane quite well with all the magic turned off, without basic instruments like airspeed.
But the emphasis now is on automation. Like the Air France crash over the South Atlantic, these pilots had no clue on how to handle the problem when the magic failed, and crashed a perfectly good flying airplane into the sea.
Most of these new hires have never been above 30 degrees of pitch or 60 degrees of bank, and panic when there is an upset or stall.
And it’s getting worse.
Things go wrong all the time. That is why experienced navigators and aviators are crucial.
The faulty sensor was replaced the day before. Did they replace it with another faulty sensor?
This bulletin directs flight crews to existing procedures to address this condition. In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the Runaway Stabilizer NNC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputs and both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT.
Additionally, pilots are reminded that an erroneous AOA can cause some or all of the following indications and effects:
- Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
- Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
- Increasing nose down control forces.
- Inability to engage autopilot.
- Automatic disengagement of autopilot.
- IAS DISAGREE alert.
- ALT DISAGREE alert.
- AOA DISAGREE alert (if the AOA indicator option is installed)
- FEEL DIFF PRESS light.
In the event an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim is experienced on the 737 - 8 / - 9, in conjunction with one or more of the above indications or effects, do the Runaway Stabilizer NNC ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight.
Yep. Airbus designs their planes to be flown by pilots with very little experience.
Seems like there is more than one AOA sensor.
It's because our idiotic Trump-obsessed media doesn't care about any story not involving Trump. This, along with the UK government turmoil, should be the biggest story in the news. But it's being ignored because it's not about Trump.
Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the Runaway Stabilizer NNC.
...
So if pilots don’t know about the new AOA system, there’s a good chance they would disable the stabilizer trim system anyway if there’s problem with it.
The tone of the media reports is, well...just media being media.
Still unknown is whether the system operated as designed or if it is faulty (sensor or otherwise). Lending to the fact that the aircraft have not yet been grounded and Boeing released a new pilot procedure for training in the feature, I would say there’s nothing wrong with the plane or the system itself. The investigation is far from over.
I don’t like blaming pilots, but if it turns out to be the case, this wouldn’t be the first time pilots might have simply failed to ‘fly’ the aircraft.
I say all glass cockpits should contain analog versions of the half dozen instruments required to ‘fly’ an aircraft. Had those instruments been present, this tragedy might have been averted. On the 737 MAX, these instruments appear to have been discarded.
I, for one, don’t care to have mere computer operators with flight simulator experience at the controls of a commercial aircraft; I want a pilot who can fly in an emergency.
Trump said “little Adam Schitt” in a Tweet. That’s clearly more important than any of the items you named.
Nearly 100% of them caused by people not knowing how to drive in snow and thinking that because they have all-wheel drive, stability control, and other features in their $30,000+ car, that they are invulnerable and can continue driving as normal.
Saw a lot of these high-performance cars in ditches.
“How about letting experienced pilots fly their planes instead of having some pimply faced know it all software “genius” do it for them?”
YES! The Asiana Air Lines crash at San Francisco brought to light the fact that Asian Culture was partially the cause. The new pilots don’t really know how to fly their planes when faced with inoperative electronics. I read a piece by a retired American pilot who was fired from both of the Korean airlines because he was failing some of their in-training pilots. The other thing is that their log books are really bull$hit. They log ten hour flights from the US to Asia when, in reality, the planes fly themselves for more than nine hours of each crossing. So they show up in SF to land and the CAT III ILS is inoperative and they can’t get their plane established on a proper glide slope without the navaid. The pictures of their vertical decent and airspeed on approach showed that these “pilots” really didn’t know how to fly by reference to basic instruments. I would NEVER fly a foreign flag airline knowing that their pilots are more like video game participants.
And it’s getting worse.
I woulden't have open heart surgery preformed by a new-be surgeon....I want the one who has miles and miles and miles of open-heart surgery AND I want the same thing in my pilot AND his crew. Don't charge me a fortune then put me on a plane with a half-baked pilot at the yoke......
One on each side of the fuselage, usually just aft and below the flight deck window.
Tell me again how great it is to have automation
This. Exactly. They figure the computer does all the flying so they don’t need any real expertise
Only ex military pilots are going to have real flight hours and situational awareness any more. The fact that airlines pay pilots like bus drivers isn’t helping either.
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