We are where we are. Lets move forward and not make stupid mistakes again. Hypotheticals and early assessments are interesting over a good scotch, but what does a candidate say they will do now on todays burning issues?
This has already been dissected in previous posts of the same article subject matter.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/archive/lifestyle/2003/03/25/hollywood-partyers-soldiering-on/06327347-83d3-44c4-ab7b-dcd6fbda5437/?resType=accessibility
Looking as pensive as a "Nightline" talking head, the Donald concludes, "The war's a mess," before sweeping off into the crowd.
Trump had several discussions with Sean Hannity prior to the Iraq war and from what I remember he did oppose our invasion. He felt that there was a balance between Iraq and Iran that would be tilted in Iran’s favor. I have searched for links unsuccessfully. Maybe others remember?
Old news.
How many times does someone need to post this stuff? Ok, we get it, he was sort of kind of I guess in support of the war in 2002, but now he claims he was against the war by the time the war began in 2003. A lot of people were forming their opinions of the war in 2002-03. Some people changed their minds later.
The truth is that we went to war under George W’s leadership in 2003 and it didn’t turn out to be anything that was promised, it cost billions of dollars, many lives, and we have nothing to show for it except more chaos than ever in the ME.
If we wait long enough he will change his position again. Trump is a code pink republican
How many times does the same thing need tp be posted? Do a search before you post.
As long as he’s a candidate, the Stern tapes are going to continuously keep popping up to undermine Trump. In his recurring appearances back then, Trump came across as arrogant and sleazy, particularly his attitudes towards the women he was banging. Stern is uniquely talented in getting his guests to reveal their true selves. And Stern archives and indexes every minute of every show he’s ever done. They are a time bomb for team Trump.
Taken out of context, It was 2002, he’s not a politician, had not yet formed his views on the question, had not collected enough information to form a solid opinion, first time asked the question and his response was “I guess, maybe ...”. By 2003/2004, he had collected enough information and was solidly against invading Iraq.
If Trump based his conclusion on data coming from governments that was a false and possibly a lie, then you can’t fault him for his conclusion at the time.
Here's some campaign advice, Cruz, talk about the issues as they are now. And btw, why don't you talk about bringing jobs back and renegotiating trade. Because your sponsors won't let you? Like TPA maybe:
Volumes could not say more.
Trump did not have access to secret military intelligence. Bush did and his team molded the intelligence (propagandized) to fit their plan. More hair raising is that there were additional plans to go after IRAN and LIBYA. The NeoCon handiwork is quite evident.
Below is the “Downing Street Memo” written by our allies contemporaneously who also believe that the intent was to invade Iraq no matter what.
“Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”.....”the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.”
Below is the memo in its entirety.
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article91033.ece
As originally reported in the The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER’S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam’s regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
[end text - emphasis added]
You get three guesses.
It seemed at the time the task of finding and getting Bin Laden and Al Queda took a back seat and was not the priority it was supposed to be.
In retrospect we see that the Iraq War was a contrived thing and I think we were all lied to about it. The Intel for going was almost manufactured to fit the narrative Bush and Neocons wanted us to think.
SO I am not surprised Trump may have said what he did but what is important is that he saw that it was a crock earlier than the rest of us and said so.
Yeah, OK. Put it to bed. I know for a fact that Bush wishes he’d done some things differently and so, I’m sure, did Eisenhower, Patton, MacArthur, Lee, Washington, Hannibal, Xerxes and Alexander the Great.
While I may question some of Trump’s (and all the others’) “modification of memory” and positions, this ain’t one of them.
But meanwhile Trump is also the only GOP candidate who says NOW that invading Iraq was a mistake.
September 11 2002 was six months before the war began.
Stern gets an obviously hesitant response to his question, do you support going to war against Iraq. Trump says, “I....guess...so...but they should have fought it correctly the first time.”
That is obviously not a glaring endorsement of going to war. In the intervening 6 months his attitude did not become MORE supportive. It became less supportive. He objected to the way it was being fought in 2003 and called it a mess.
BTW, we were cleaning Saddam’s clock at the time.
What could he possible have meant?