There was more than one of those in the 1940s. In the past I’d read that Stalin finally realized he didn’t know anything about strategy or tactics, and stepped back to let his field generals do their thing. That of course was at best an exaggeration. He leaned on all of them, giving them objectives to meet or else, and Zhukov was not excepted. The commanders referred to the soldiers as “bayonets” or “effectives” (by which was meant, not dead), and they developed vivid hatred of the commanders up the line and the political leaders.
By contrast, Hitler never figured out that he had his head up his ass and constantly took contrary positions and kept operating from an unworkable strategy in his head. He wanted the Kursk salient eliminated, his generals said, fine, if we must, we’ll start as soon as possible. No, we’ll make the start date in the summer. But that will give them time to dig in and establish defenses in depth. Nonsense, I’ll come to the battle and direct it personally. And then just before we start the attack, I’ll shift three divisions to Italy for no good reason. What a lucky break for the allies, in a way.
“By contrast, Hitler never figured out that he had his head up his ass and constantly took contrary positions and kept operating from an unworkable strategy in his head.”
Sounds just like Obola, and Jonathan Gruber too!