The author, as is the wont of essentially all pundits except those who regularly post on “counter-jihad” sites like jihadwatch or Gates of Vienna, ignores Islamic history. Oh, he’s noticed the Sunni/Shia divide, but he doesn’t see the significance of Baghdad or the degree to which the DAISH* thinks not in terms of strategic categories the post-Clausewitz, post-Liddell-Hart West understands, but in terms of classical Islamic history and mythology.
Baghdad was the seat of the Ummayyad Caliphate, which to the extent there is any historical basis for the notion of an “Islamic Golden Age” provides that basis. Its capture would legitimize al-Baghdadi’s claim to the Caliphate in the eyes not just of already-jihadist Sunnis, but of Sunnis generally. Suddenly the “Caliphate” would control vast swaths of territory as all but the most Westernized Sunnis united behind it.
Big gains are worth big risks in war. The attempt to seize Baghdad says nothing about whether the DAISH is winning or losing — it is supported by the strategic calculus I just described, and they will attempt it when they think their chances are optimal whether they are winning or losing on other fronts.
*I prefer the transliterated Arabic acronym to either ISIS or ISIL. (I’m not sure why Muslim terrorist groups get their names translated then made into acronyms in American media and State Department usage, while Communist and nationalist terrorist groups don’t, but I think it’s silly — if it’s the FARC, ETA, and the PKK, not the RAFC, BHF and the KWP, it’s the DAISH, not ISIS or ISIL.)
The author also omits to remember that Saddam, a secularist operating through a Sunni powerbase/mafia managed to control Iraq including Shi’a dominated Baghdad. Iraq’s civil government has an existential problem. If it allows strong leadership to emerge in the military, it risks a coup and return to Saddam-style dictatorship. But military weakness makes ISIS viable and discredits the government. ISIS is flourishing precisely where the pre-existing states are internally divided. The Great Islamic Conquest that ISIS would like to emulate involved some bold military action, but a lot more capitulation and movement into a political vacuum. Traditionally US foreign policy would have been to close off the contemporary vacuum. Between Bush and Obama, we have helped create it.
bkmk