Posted on 07/21/2007 6:42:50 PM PDT by Clive
GENERAL MAXIMS
It is the nature of war that what is beneficial to you is detrimental to the enemy and what is of service to him always hurts you. It is therefore a maxim never to do, or to omit doing, anything as a consequence of his actions, but to consult invariably your own interest only. And you depart from this interest whenever you imitate such measures as he pursues for his benefit. For the same reason it would be wrong for him to follow such steps as you take for your advantage.
The more your troops have been accustomed to camp duties on frontier stations and the more carefully they have been disciplined, the less danger they will be exposed to in the field.
Men must be sufficiently tried before they are led against the enemy.
It is much better to overcome the enemy by famine, surprise or terror than by general actions, for in the latter instance fortune has often a greater share than valor. Those designs are best which the enemy are entirely ignorant of till the moment of execution. Opportunity in war is often more to be depended on than courage.
To debauch the enemy's soldiers and encourage them when sincere in surrendering themselves, is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.
It is better to have several bodies of reserves than to extend your front too much.
A general is not easily overcome who can form a true judgment of his own and the enemy's forces.
Valor is superior to numbers.
The nature of the ground is often of nmore consequence than courage.
Few men are born brave; many become so through care and force of discipline.
An army is strengthened by labor and enervated by idleness.
Troops are not to be led to battle unless confident of success.
Novelty and surprise throw an enemy into consternation; but common incidents have no effect.
He who rashly pursues a flying enemy with troops in disorder, seems inclined to resign that victory which he had before obtained.
An army unsupplied with grain and other necessary provisions will be vanquished without striking a blow.
A general whose troops are superior both in number and bravery should engage in the oblong square, which is the first formation.
He who judges himself inferior should advance his right wing obliquely against the enemy's left. This is the second formation.
If your left wing is strongest, you must attack the enemy's right according to the third formation.
The general who can depend on the discipline of his men should begin the engagement by attacking both the enemy's wings at once, the fourth formation.
He whose light infantry is good should cover his center by forming them in its front and charge both the enemy's wings at once. This is the fifth formation.
He who cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops, if obliged to engage, should begin the action with his right and endeavor to break the enemy's left, the rest of his army remaining formed in a line perpendicular to the front and extended to the rear like a javelin. This is the sixth formation.
If your forces are few and weak in comparison to the enemy, you must make use of the seventh formation and cover one of your flanks either with an eminence, a city, the sea, a river or some protection of that kind.
A general who trusts to his cavalry should choose the proper ground for them and employ them principally in the action.
He who depends on his infantry should choose a situation most proper for them and make most use of their service.
When an enemy's spy lurks in the camp, order all your soldiers in the day time to their tents, and he will instantly be apprehended.
On finding the enemy has notice of your designs, you must immediately alter your plan of operations.
Consult with many on proper measures to be taken, but communicate the plans you intend to put in execution to few, and those only of the most assured fidelity; or rather trust no one but yourself.
Punishment, and fear thereof, are necessary to keep soldiers in order in quarters; but in the field they are more influenced by hope and rewards.
Good officers never engage in general actions unless induced by opportunity or obliged by necessity.
To distress the enemy more by famine than the sword is a mark of consummate skill.
Many instructions might be given with regard to the cavalry. But as this branch of the service has been brought to perfection since the ancient writers and considerable improvements have been made in their drills and maneuvers, their arms, and the quality and management of their horses, nothing can be collected from their works. Our present mode of discipline is sufficient.
Dispositions for action must be carefully concealed from the enemy, lest they should counteract them and defeat your plans by proper expedients.
This abridgment of the most eminent military writers, invincible Emperor, contains the maxims and instructions they have left us, approved by different ages and confirmed by repeated experience. The Persians admire your skill in archery; the Huns and Alans endeavor in vain to imitate your dexterity in horsemanship; the Saracens and Indians cannot equal your activity in the hunt; and even the masters at arms pique themselves on only part of that knowledge and expertness of which you give so many instances in their own profession. How glorious it is therefore for Your Majesty with all these qualifications to unite the science of war and the art of conquest, and to convince the world that by Your conduct and courage You are equally capable of performing the duties of the soldier and the general!
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bump
OK, I just had to know more about the author of this text...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publius_Flavius_Vegetius_Renatus
Interesting. I was just reading Grant's memoirs this afternoon as he criticized the failure to pursue following the victory at Molino del Rey outside Mexico City.
He had more than the failure to pursue to criticize about that battle. He questioned the need to assault Molino del Rey and Chapultepec and would have bypassed them. Of course he was speaking years later with the benefit of hindsight and senior rank and reputation.
I tend to agree with his thoughts on not assaulting the strong points when they could have been appointed, principles set out by Sun Tzu.
Grant seems to have had an axiom that it is always good practice to follow a retreating enemy. That axiom ought to be followed with a great deal of caution. It could lead you into an ambush. Hot pursuit might temp you to outrun your logistics. Intemperate hot pursuit could string out your forces such that you lose cohesion of command and control. OTOH, failure to follow up could lead to a failure to consolidate a victory. The field of battle is not a chess board.
On the subject, consider that Spruance was also criticized for failure to pursue Yamamoto at Midway. I submit that Spruance was correct.
Consider Wellington at Waterloo following the French sauve qui peut. His instructions:
"No cheering, my lads. Forward and complete your victory."
In the time of the "thin red line" and the "British square" as battle formations it was axiomatic that you never let your men run, especially in pursuit of a fleeing enemy.
This line
"I tend to agree with his thoughts on not assaulting the strong points when they could have been appointed, principles set out by Sun Tzu."
Should have been: I tend to agree with his thoughts on not assaulting the strong points when they could have been avoided, principles set out by Sun Tzu."
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