From your link...
"This rapidly developing Eurobeast will soon inflict stinging suffering. Whole cities will be destroyed by nuclear destruction (Dan. 8:24)."
Daniel knew about nukes?
They lost me when they got to 'Revelations' :-), but Germany's role in the conflict was a 'revelation' for me:-)
WAR IN THE BALKANS
A fine mess
At the start of the crisis there were two main objectives: to restore substantive autonomy to Kosovo and ensure that the Yugoslav government respected the Kosovars political, cultural, religious and linguistic freedoms. The plan at the Rambouillet conference was to achieve these two aims by peaceful means. The Serbs and the Kosovars (including representatives of the Kosovan Liberation Army) had reached a consensus on the two main objectives. The Rambouillet conference ended in failure because of the Wests stubborn insistence (the United States in particular) on a Nato presence in Kosovo to monitor the implementation of the agreements.
By Ignacio Ramonet
Five weeks on from the start of the bombing in Yugoslavia, it is impossible not to be appalled at the extraordinary recklessness with which the Nato countries became involved in this latest Balkan conflict. They entered the war totally unprepared.
At the start of the crisis there were two main objectives: to restore substantive autonomy to Kosovo and ensure that the Yugoslav government respected the Kosovars political, cultural, religious and linguistic freedoms. The plan at the Rambouillet conference was to achieve these two aims by peaceful means. The Serbs and the Kosovars (including representatives of the Kosovan Liberation Army) had reached a consensus on the two main objectives and Slobodan Milosevics government had specifically agreed to grant Kosovo a large measure of autonomy. After free elections the province would have self-government, its own parliament, president, judicial system and police (1).
So why, when the two sides had agreed on the essentials, did the Rambouillet conference end in failure? There was one reason and one reason alone: the Western powers stubborn insistence (the United States in particular) on a Nato presence in Kosovo to monitor the implementation of the agreements. They were well aware that the Belgrade government would object (see article by Paul-Marie de La Gorce) and its all too predictable refusal was seen as a casus belli. There was no suggestion that other intervention forces might be used or, for instance, the United Nations "blue berets". The choice was between Nato or war. So war it was.
There is no denying that the Serbian governments treatment of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo was deplorable. In 1981 in particular the Kosovo Albanians (the only non-Slav and non-Christian group in former Yugoslavia) had protested violently against their status, which they regarded as discriminatory. The removal of that status in 1989 was a provocation. The Kosovar parliament was dissolved, the teaching of the Albanian language banned and over 150,000 Albanian-speakers were sacked from their jobs in the civil service and state-owned companies. Martial law was introduced, giving the Belgrade forces of repression a free hand. In the last ten years they have stepped up their persecution of the Albanians to persuade them to leave the country. Inevitably the Albanians rebelled.
Whereas Ibrahim Rugovas supporters opted for passive resistance, the KLA militants became increasingly violent in their opposition. In the past two years they have carried out murderous attacks on the forces of law and order and the Serb minority. Such incidents, seized on by the mass media, have given government propagandists an excuse to play on Serbian nationalist sentiments and stir up racist feeling against the Albanians.
Like all Balkan geopolitical issues, the situation was clearly complex and had been going on for years. The search for a compromise was bound to be long and hard. That being so, the Rambouillet conference should have continued for several more weeks, especially since the few thousand OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) observers in Kosovo were to some extent keeping the violence against the Kosovars under control.
The lesson of history is that any ill-timed political changes in this explosive region set off a chain of consequences - as Milosevics unilateral removal of Kosovos and Vojvodinas autonomous status in 1989 and the over-hasty recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence by Germany and the Vatican in 1991 so tragically show. The Nato air offensive has once more made that lesson clear.
excerpt
http://mondediplo.com/1999/05/01leader
A geostrategy for Eurasia by Zbigniew Brzezinski
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/9709brzezinski.html