here's my vote:
Posted on 05/07/2005 9:14:09 AM PDT by VictoryGal
NEW YORK For much of the week, much of the U.S. press paid little attention to the highly classified British memo, leaked to a British newspaper, which seems to reveal that President Bush decided by summer 2002 to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and was determined to ensure that U.S. intelligence data supported his policy.
That changed on Friday, when Knight Ridder circulated a lengthy report on the memo by Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott.
The memo was first disclosed earlier this week by the Sunday Times of London. It has not been disavowed by the British government. A White House official told Knight Ridder that the administration wouldn't comment on the leaked document.
Meanwhile, Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich., the top Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, has gained 88 signatures on a letter among fellow Democrats asking the White House for an explanation of the memo. Among other things, he wants to know: “Did the Administration lie to the American people about its intentions with respect to Iraq? Did the Administration deliberately manipulate intelligence to deceive the American people about the strength of its case for war?”
The memo reports on a U.S. visit by Richard Dearlove, then head of Britain's MI-6 intelligence service. “The visit took place while the Bush administration was declaring to Americans that no decision had been made to go to war,” Knight Ridder observed today.
The MI-6 chief's account of his U.S. visit was paraphrased this way: "There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. ... There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."
Strobel and Wolcott noted that the White House has repeatedly denied accusations by top foreign officials that intelligence estimates were manipulated.
But they report that a former senior U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, called it "an absolutely accurate description of what transpired" during Dearlove's visit to Washington.
Russia is no longer the only country where the past is unpredictable
Do you know who's responsible for this bon mot? It's a wonderful summation of the problems of history.
Are you talking about the exposed fake of the CBS 60 Minutes document supposedly showing Bush was derelict in his National Guard duties? I'm sorry, but I don't recall another exposed fake document in regard to the President.
I have no clue whether this document here is fake or not. The White House said it would not comment on the leaked document. That is in the story. Well, if the WH simply refused comment, that tells me that they are not claiming the document is fake, at least not at this time.
However, some advice: your lib buddies hate President Bush and are just trying to bug you. They are not very good buddies, in my opinion, although you did not ask. I believe this is a NEW "scandal" (speaking of the leaked memo) they are trying to hurt Bush with now, and all such things take TIME to unravel.
My advice is to tell your so-called buddies that you are on to their game, that you know they grab any chance to hurt the President they hate, and to hurt you in the process, and that you don't appreciate it and you refuse to play their game. Tell them you will wait for all facts to come out and you know they don't really care about being fair to him or about waiting on all the facts, they just want to hurt the President.
Then if they kept bringing it up, I would tell them that you gave them your thoughts on it and you consider the subject closed.
Dan Rather strike again? This time during a British election?
"The article can be read at"
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002265205_intel06.html
By Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott
Knight Ridder Newspapers
WASHINGTON — A highly classified British memo, leaked during Britain's just-concluded election campaign, claims President Bush decided by summer 2002 to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and was determined to ensure that U.S. intelligence data supported his policy.
The memo, in which British foreign-policy aide Matthew Rycroft summarized a July 23, 2002, meeting of Prime Minister Tony Blair with top security advisers, reports on a U.S. visit by Richard Dearlove, then head of Britain's MI-6 intelligence service.
The visit took place while the Bush administration was declaring to Americans that no decision had been made to go to war. While the memo makes observations about U.S. intentions toward Iraq, the document does not specify which Bush administration officials met with Dearlove.
The MI-6 chief's account of his U.S. visit was paraphrased by the memo: "There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. ... There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."
No weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in March 2003.
The White House repeatedly has denied accusations by top foreign officials that intelligence estimates were manipulated. It instead has noted the conclusions of studies by the Senate Intelligence Committee and a presidentially appointed panel that cite serious failures by the CIA and other U.S. agencies in judging Saddam's weapons programs.
The memo can be read at:
www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
The principal U.S. intelligence analysis, called a National Intelligence Estimate, wasn't completed until October 2002, well after the United States and United Kingdom apparently had decided military force should be used to overthrow Saddam's regime.
The memo, first disclosed in full by the Sunday Times of London, hasn't been disavowed by the British government. A spokesman for the British Embassy in Washington referred queries to another official, who didn't return calls.
A White House official said the administration wouldn't comment on the leaked document.
However, a former senior U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, called it "an absolutely accurate description of what transpired" during Dearlove's visit to Washington.
Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich., the top Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, is circulating a letter among fellow Democrats asking Bush for an explanation of the charges, an aide said.
In July 2002, and well afterward, top Bush administration advisers were insisting that "there are no plans to attack Iraq on the president's desk."
But the memo quotes British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, a close colleague of then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, as saying "Bush had made up his mind to take military action."
Straw is quoted as having doubts about the Iraqi threat.
"But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran," Straw said, according to the memo.
The document said Straw proposed that Saddam be given an ultimatum to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors, which could help justify use of force. Powell in August 2002 persuaded Bush to push for such inspections.
But there were deep divisions in the White House over that course of action.
The memo says the National Security Council, then led by Condoleezza Rice, "had no patience with the U.N. route."
Supplemental information was provided by Seattle Times staff, based on a reading of the memo.
"Powell in August 2002 persuaded Bush to push for such inspections." I remember that Bush mentioned this already in his Sept 14, 2001 speach to Congress.
Even the British October surprise is on G.W.B... Dreaming impeachers... It will not end until ,08 ....
A Gun that Doesn't Smoke
Maybe I just missed it, but I haven't seen a lot of comment on the top secret British memo that was leaked just before this week's election. It apparently was written by Matthew Rycroft, and summarizes a meeting of Tony Blair and some of his top advisers on July 23, 2002. The memo is intensely interesting, so I am going to reproduce it in its entirety:
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
Left-wing professor Juan Cole is one who has tried to use this memo to feed the BUSH LIED! theme. Cole's discussion of the memo is, to put it politely, overheated:
Any "debate" was meaningless if the president had already decided. And he wasn't waiting to make his decision in the light of the intelligence. He was going to tell the intelligence professionals to what conclusion they had to come. "But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
Cole focuses on what is, obviously, a striking sentence. It isn't clear, however, what it was intended to mean. Cole's implication, and the constant implication of the BUSH LIED! lefties, is that the administration really knew that Saddam didn't have any WMDs, but fixed the intelligence to make it appear that he did. But we know that isn't true. The consensus estimate of the U.S. intelligence community has been made public, and it clearly says that, with a high degree of confidence, Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons. The Senate Intelligence Committee's report has confirmed that this is what the intelligence community believed and reported to the President, and that there is no evidence that the administration improperly influenced the gathering or reporting of intelligence ("The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities.")
And, whatever the British note-taker meant by the sentence quoted by Cole, he obviously didn't mean that there was any doubt on the part of British intelligence or Blair's government that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. On the contrary, the notes specifically refer to Iraq's WMDs, in sections not quoted by Cole:
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD...
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
Cole waxes even more hysterical on the issue of the Iraq war's legality:
Goldsmith was as nervous as a cat in a roomful of rocking chairs: "The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change."
The driness of the wit is unbearable. "The desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action"! Naked aggression is illegal, he could have said.
The Attorney General of the United Kingdom thought the reports Dearlove and Straw were bringing back from Washington reeked of an illegal war. People who plan out illegal wars are war criminals. He knew this. He was stuck, however. They were all stuck.
Professor Cole forgets an important bit of history here. Subsequent to this July meeting, the United States and Great Britain did go back to the U.N. for a new resolution, UNSCR 1441, which was adopted on November 8, 2002. When Iraq subsequently failed to comply with Resolution 1441, a new ground for military action existed. Thus, the Attorney General's concern about relying on a three-year-old resolution was satisfied; in the Attorney General's words, the situation changed. Consequently, when he wrote his official opinion shortly before the war began, he concluded that the war's legality was a "reasonably arguable case" that could be "reasonably maintained."
Is that a ringing endorsement? Of course not. But in our view, and that of most supporters of the war, a preemptive strike against a recidivist regime like Saddam's is clearly justified where there is reasonable apprehension of danger to our security. And, while it would be nice to have such a strike blessed by the U.N.'s Security Council, where members of the Security Council have been bribed and have promised to veto any resolution authorizing war, it is absurd to argue that such veto power means it is illegal to act in our own defense. Attorney General Goldsmith applied a narrower standard; but it is hardly a shock to learn that the Bush administration's view of what was necessary to legitimize the Iraq war was different from his or from Kofi Annan's.
In short, this British memo, while it does provide a fascinating glimpse into high-level decision making in Blair's government, is far from being a "smoking gun," as Cole calls it. It adds nothing to our knowledge of the important issues surrounding the Iraq war.
http://www.powerlineblog.com/
There's so many of these "former senior officials" around now they probably have their own 900 number.
CALL NOW!! Speak to a former senior official as he affirms all your Bush hating fantasies.Have your leftist world view stroked and massaged by our senior official's haughty sounding voice.
first minute $16.99, $3.49/minute, not legal in all states, we accept all major credit cards and press passes
Conyers, eh? Well, make sure we check the memo carefully to ensure that it isn't another clever forgery!
here's my vote:
Thanks.
"The principal U.S. intelligence analysis, called a National Intelligence Estimate, wasn't completed until October 2002, well after the United States and United Kingdom apparently had decided military force should be used to overthrow Saddam's regime.'
Is this supposed to be a bad thing?
Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
Well no body ever said he was stupid...just evil.
This article is very suspect and seems to be intentionally confusing and incomplete. The so-called memo is referred to as a 'paraphrase', the 'officials' visited by Dearlove are not identified, and there is the predictable 'former senior U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity.' Also, this "Bombshell" was suspiciously revealed at the perfect time to effect the British elections. I believe the story is bovine excrement.
Responsible for the bogus memo?
Nah. Not worth the energy.
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