Posted on 04/07/2005 5:04:22 PM PDT by Zivasmate
Four Broad Lessons from Iraq Print Mail
By Richard Perle Posted: Thursday, April 7, 2005
TESTIMONY House Committee on Armed Services (Washington) Publication Date: April 6, 2005
Mr. Chairman,
As always, I appreciate this opportunity to share with the Committee some ideas and observations about the situation in Iraq and, more specifically, some of the lessons we should take away from our experience there.
Within the Department of Defense, and among its many advisors and consultants there have already been several important "lessons learned" assessments. These cover everything from the effectiveness of specific weapons systems, procedures, organizations and training to the performance of individual units, flows of information, logistics, intelligence and the like. Our military lives or dies by the lessons it learns and for this reason it is deeply introspective.
Those who have made and continue to make these assessments are far more qualified than I to think about the next generation of plans, procedures, operations and guidance that will flow from this process of critical self examination. I wish simply to draw a few broad lessons that are likely to be applicable to future situations in which we find it necessary to use military forces to combat our terrorist enemies.
First, it is essential that we are clear about, and carefully align, our political and military objectives. Our achievement in applying force is the product of our effectiveness in pursuing both: if we succeed at one and fail at the other we will fail overall--or pay a heavy price to secure an eventual success after enduring the burdens of political miscalculation.
American forces, working with the indigenous opposition to the Taliban regime, went into Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, less than a month after the attack of 9-11. Our objective was to dislodge the Taliban regime that had sponsored and sheltered Osama Bin Laden and disrupt al Qaeda operations there and elsewhere so their capacity to carry out an attack on the scale of 9-11 would be greatly diminished. We went in with a small force--never more than 10,000--and despite the criticism that the force was too small and that we were facing a quagmire as a result, some of which appeared in as little as three weeks, we quickly achieved our objective. Since then we have seen the Afghans adopt a democratic constitution enfranchising women and conduct an open and fair election that empowered a government with broad support. The power of the war lords who once dominated the country has been greatly reduced and opinion surveys have shown that the approval of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is now around the 70-80% level, a degree of approbation that most institutions can only dream of.
In Iraq we succeeded in driving Saddam Hussein from office in three weeks. And while we were received in Iraq as liberators in the days following the collapse of Saddam's army and regime, we did not enjoy the benefit of a close collaboration with the indigenous opposition to his brutal, sadistic dictatorship.
This brings me to my second lesson: In aligning our political and military strategy, we should make sure we have the support of a significant segment of the local population. Even more, we should work with those whose interests parallel our own, taking them into our confidence and planning to operate in close collaboration with them. We did this in Afghanistan. But we did not do it in Iraq, despite the fact that we had a year to organize and prepare for hostilities that brought a hundred and thirty thousand Americans to a place they didn't know or understand. Even during the three weeks of fighting leading to the fall of the regime, we would have benefited from knowledge we did not have: the location of weapons caches, the importance and implications of looting, the nature and extent of the retreat--and potential reorganization--of elements of Saddam's regime, and the like.
More significantly, we were slow to recognize how central the Iraqis were to the post war stabilization of the situation on the ground. I believe we would have been wise to go into Iraq with several thousand Iraqis at our side. After all, the Congress, with the support of most and possibly all the members of this committee, approved the Iraq Liberation Act which authorized political, material and moral support for the Iraqi National Congress and other Iraqi opponents of Saddam's regime.
With thousands of Iraqis at our side, we might well have dealt more effectively with the turmoil and looting that followed the collapse of the regime and we might have jump started the transition to an emerging Iraqi democracy. But there was little support within the executive branch for implementing the Iraq Liberation Act, for taking the Iraqi opposition into our confidence, or for training Iraqis to fight alongside us. Central Command opposed serious, intelligent plans that could have provided thousands of Iraqi troops to help us evaluate the situation on the ground, interpret information about who was trustworthy, where hostile forces and weapons were hidden, otherwise to supply much needed intelligence. The State Department and the CIA actively opposed working with the Iraqi opposition with the result that very little of the material support voted by Congress before the war was actually spent. By the time those favoring a much closer collaboration between U.S. and Iraqi opposition forces got agreement to begin training some Iraqis, for example, we were on the verge of war. Sadly, as we went to war only a handful of Iraqis had graduated from a much delayed training program that had vastly more potential than we were able to realize.
The third lesson is, by now, generally accepted: our intelligence is sometimes, dangerously inadequate. That was certainly the case as we went into Iraq. The appalling incompetence at the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community left us largely ignorant of such basic information as the state of Iraq's infrastructure (and therefore the pace at which basic services could be established when the fighting ceased) and the size, organization and tactics of elements of Saddam's regime, which later emerged as the core of the insurgency. There is reason to believe that we were sucked into an ill conceived initial attack aimed at Saddam himself by double agents planted by the regime. And as we now know the estimates of Saddam's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction was substantially wrong.
I wish I could share the optimism of those who have pushed through the "reforms" proposed by the 9-11 Commission that the structural changes enacted by the Congress will solve the problem. But I believe the problem will not be solved simply by reordering the broken parts of our intelligence establishment. Far more radical reform is required, but I see little prospect that it will occur. I have, on previous occasions urged this and other committees of the Congress to conduct a quiet retrospective analysis of the competence with which the intelligence community has rendered its analyses of the middle east region, and especially the Gulf, over the last 30 years. I believe such an analysis would show chronic failure: faulty estimates accompanied by smug confidence about future developments rendered in the face of repeated nasty surprises.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, a fourth lesson: we must do everything possible to avoid becoming an occupying power. The occupation of Iraq did much to vitiate the good will we earned--and deserved--as brave Americans risked, and in all too many cases sacrificed, their lives to liberate Iraq. We should have turned Iraq over to the Iraqis on the day Baghdad fell--or as soon thereafter as possible. I believe it could have been done in a few weeks, not the many months, stretching to years, that led inexorably to the insurgency that has caused so much death and destruction. A quick hand over would have given Iraqis an immediate stake in the establishment of order and a civil society. The Iraqis would have made some mistakes, of course. But we were not immune from mistakes--and ours were magnified many times over by our occupying presence. The grand ambition of the Coalition Provisional Authority was profoundly mistaken. The image on Iraqi television of an American pro consul informing the Iraqi people of the rules we made for them and the arrangement of their lives for which we assumed responsibility, contributed significantly to the difficulties we have had in Iraq. With the best of intentions and hard and admirable work by thousands of American administrators in Iraq, we simply got it wrong.
The Iraqi elections marked the end of the occupation and the beginning of what I am confident will be the successful transition to a decent, humane self government by and for the people of Iraq. Having watched more than eight million Iraqis risk their lives to exercise the vote we so often take for granted, there is only one lesson we can draw: the courage of the Americans who come to free them has been matched by the Iraqis who we have freed. And great honor belongs to both.
Richard Perle is a resident fellow at AEI.
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I agree with your last statement.
"All he's saying is that on the ground intelligence stunk. And he's right. Because the 'Rats spent years decimating our intelligence apparatus all over the world. But you'll NEVER hear that from the MSM. The problem is you don't hear it from the feckless Republicans either."
Fair enough. I have been reading the report. Clearly our Intel agencies must be modified with wisdom. And given whatever monies are required to rebuild what for years slowly went south. I was reacting to the literal wording set forth in the article,regarding his second statement. Perhaps I simply did not understand his wording. I'll give it another reading.
This article was actually taken verbatim from his statement prior to testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, so he probably had to pull his punches a little bit.
Again, we didn't have good enough advance intelligence on the ground in Iraq because we didn't know who was the real political opposition and who we should align ourselves with.
Ok that makes sense, thanks.. The "political" in these political objectives refers to the politics of Iraq, not of the U.S. I had been imagining that Perle had in mind a domestic (U.S.) political-military disconnect, which would have been an intriguing claim.
This is a minor nit-pick, but under this interpretation, Perle's first and second "lessons" are really two sides of the same coin.
I might add that complaining that we didn't know exactly to whom to turn the country over after we conquered it, is something of a luxury in warfare :-) I would think a historical survey would show that this sort of political/military disconnect is the rule rather than the exception. To complain that we didn't know exactly who was on our side, who would enjoy legitimacy, who to ally with, etc., is sort of like complaining that we didn't know the precise locations of all the enemies. It's true, but this criticism only goes so far. :-)
I retain my original reaction to his "second lession". It is a bit adsurd to assume one can gain the trust and access to a potential enemy (country), via. polling it's constituents. As we all know it just don't work that way. I cannot understand why his "second lession" is worded as is. Perhaps it is my problem. No. He wrote in a literal form. Allow me to illustrate by example. How could we obtain say a 75% majority rule from the peoples of Iraq to enter their country as liberators prior to getting access to the masses of people? Now how can we apply his second lession to Iran or lets say North Korea? How do we gain access to the masses of peoples in those countries to see if they want us to invade them?
"To complain that we didn't know exactly who was on our side, who would enjoy legitimacy, who to ally with, etc., is sort of like complaining that we didn't know the precise locations of all the enemies. It's true, but this criticism only goes so far. :-)"
You're right, but to a point. Better on the ground intelligence and advance intelligence would have helped. But refer to my post #13 for the real reason.
From more effective on the ground and advance intelligence.
I must apologize a bit. In my last statements I did not quality the fact that in my belief, one cannot assume a few people, e.g. Chalibi comes to mind, represents the majority of peoples in question. Therefore may rants use the term "polling" in a literal sense. Just what we have seen happen in Iraq sort of validates in my mind why one cannot go by what a few disadents have to say. With all the Iraqi's that we must have had access to that now live in this country, some of a scholar level teaching in our universities for instance, indicates we did not obtain a solid bases of who we would have to work with once we liberated them. So perhaps with a bit of sarcasim I use the word polling in the literal. Intel got a tough job. I have a nephew in the Marine Corps on his second deploy to Iraq. I value what our POTUS and administration pulled off. I don't even have a bad feeling for any of our Intel orgs. I believe most given the resources and cooperation between agencies will come around and do one hell of a good job in the future. They must of course. So whether I agree with all what Pearle wrote or not, does not mean I am anti war, or against the admin on the Iraqi issue. I have been a stunch supporter for the need to invade and democracize Iraq.
Perhaps, but the term "intelligence" is being abused.
Bad intelligence would have meant massive American casualties and that just did not happen.
If the 3rd ID has shot through the Fallujah Gap only to find the Iraqi Medina Division had set them up in a rocket box and slaughtered hundreds of Americans, then we could have rightly said there was "a failure in on the ground intelligence."
If Tommy Franks had sent our troops up the Wadi into the teeth of Iraqi ZCU-23 AA guns, then we could have rightly said there was a failure in intelligence.
Throughout the entire defense of the country that is Iraq, in mid 2003, the Iraqi army failed to make a single militarily significant maneuver. That's an amazing achievement by our own armed forces that needs to be applauded and recognized as heroic on any measure.
MY own lessons learned:
1) If you have the chance to convince your opponent to dismantle his most lethal weapon (al-hussain sp? missile), do it, as Bush did without firing a shot in 2002-2003. It will save lives.
2) If you have the chance to lead a capitulation movement against your enemy, as Bush did with success in 2002-2003, do it, it will save lives.
3) If you have the chance to give sanctions time to work, and study your enemies weaknesses in detail, as Bush, Clinton, and Bush did from 1991 - 2003, do it. It will save lives.
4) If you know your opponent can be defeated in 3 weeks, do it, before their neighbor does.
5) If you are the CIC of Americas armed forces do not seek the advice Richard Pearl.
First, I also am a staunch supporter of Bush's move into Iraq. That does not mean that there are not some lessons to be learned. Over all, I think it's been far more successful than given credit for.
More importantly, G-d bless your nephew for fighting for our country and freedom.
I think when we go into Iran, which someone eventually is going to have to do, these lessons and especially an upgrade in intra-intelligence cooperation will greatly help our cause. And of course, we have to have the proper amount of money to get the job done with as little cost to American lives as possible. G-d bless.
I'm not sure I understand #4.
I like your good points. Your statement:
"Throughout the entire defense of the country that is Iraq, in mid 2003, the Iraqi army failed to make a single militarily significant maneuver. That's an amazing achievement by our own armed forces that needs to be applauded and recognized as heroic on any measure."
During those opening days of the war, my nephew was attending Intellegience school at Damn Neck Virginia, at Oceana NAS. His MOS being Intel.
After his MOS training, and a visit home, he gave me some very interesting observances. They had been getting pre-processed "real time" reports as to the actions in Iraq, both Army and Marine movements as they went north, using the data in their course description. That is, formulating their battle condition reports to hand over to a fictitious G3. This of course went on for a few weeks.
Steve said they (his class and instructors) where a bit amazed at how quickly our guys where always a step ahead of the butcher's troops. We where taking out mostly by air, Battallions of them at a time with them never seeing a yankee in site. We where reducing their ability to fight to well below the prescribed levels in very short frames of time. Our "military ground Intel", was apparantly excellant based on what I have read and heard. We in almost all those battles where many steps ahead of the enemy for all practical concerns. So I hope no one construes that our miitary ground intel where not on top of things. Ground intel by the spook works, well that is a different story.
Thank you for your kind words. I hope a majority of Americans and all good peoples in other lands continue to hold up all the coalition forces for the almighty hand of the Lord to watch over them and keep them in often dire situations. And that should include all those brave new Iraqi security forces, army and police. They sure have one hell of a job on their hands. We can't stay there forever.
I pray we shall not have to go into Iran. Surely the current administration is trying it's best with the "little help" of some of our EU semi-friends (allies...hmmmmmm) to avert the need for military action(s). Surely for those that have followed the Iranian situation, do realize there are a great number of delusioned ex-revolutionaries that have in recent years come to see just how evil the Mullah ran government is. And obviously throngs of the younger generation really want a westernized democratic country to take hold.
If anything, my sarcastic wording about taking a national poll is almost a reality in the case of Iran. The Persians are not like the Arabs in some ways. I truly believe if the yolk of Islam was lifted off their backs they would fit in with much of the westernized world. Probably much better then the say,the Turks. I hope my comments did not appear to indicate I did not feel there was a need for "learning lessons". That should be solidly entrenched in the mind of any rational human being.
Given that the Iran-Iraq war went from 1980 to 1989 and cost both countries hundreds of thousands of needless deaths, If Iran/Syria really knew how easy Iraq was to defeat after a decade of sanctions they would have taken advantage of the power vacuum.
Either way, we would have been looking at another 20 years of Uday/Qusay dictatorships, or more mad Iranian mullahs. Neither is acceptable.
If you step back for a moment and look at the big picture, The USA and our wonderful allies took the worlds 4th largest army, who had purged their border to the east in the 80s and again to the south and west in the 90s, and defeated them completely.
But that brings us to the second point, and it must be understood in the context of the results of Gulf War I and the unconscionable betrayal shortly thereafter of those elements of the domestic resistance that we had encouraged and then watched idly as they were systematically butchered. After this the well was poisoned - what indigenous resistance leader in his right mind would deal with the U.S. after that? It is that incident that I believe disallowed any effective buildup of a domestic arm to our intervention.
Intelligence was the third topic. Most of the controversy surrounds strategic intelligence, and the WMD's were only part of that. Others have mentioned this so I shall comment only briefly - there was a vogue in the intelligence community during the Clinton administration (and to be honest, before) to force a code of ethics onto the intelligence community that precluded our cultivation of such characters as drug smugglers, terrorists, and other known or suspected criminals. This had the effect of crippling the HUMINT portion of the equation; a simultaneous starry-eyed attraction to technology further gutted the HUMINT arm and by the time Gulf War I rolled around we were vastly overdependent on "national means" (i.e. satellites, SIGINT, overflights, etc.). In the field this meant that where there still were relationships with local power brokers (as in Afghanistan, those relationships having been developed through the Soviet occupation) we ended up meshing fairly quickly with an established resistance. That was not the case in Iraq; rather the opposite for the reasons I mentioned above. As the invasion became imminent tactical intelligence improved, and we have seen it improve greatly since the election to our great advantage and the disadvantage especially of foreign terrorists.
I cannot overemphasize the difficulty the refusal of the Turkish government to allow an incursion by the 4th ID from the north placed the overall grand tactics of the operation in. It was that more than anything else that allowed the resistance to fall back, regroup, and settle in for the long fight. I suspect that Perle was exaggerating a bit when he called for the turning over of the government to the Iraqis as soon as Baghdad fell; we hadn't, actually, secured the country yet for the simple reason that we were restricted to a south-to-north line of advance. But it may have been an option had the Turkish government decided otherwise.
Finally, occupation. Our role as an occupier was a necessary consequence of an early decision to disband the Iraqi army rather than risk incorporating suspect and unreliable elements of it into an overall security scheme. That decision has been greatly criticized since; I am still personally not certain that it was not the correct one. Certainly where the former government's intelligence organs were able to penetrate the newly-fledged security organization the results have been bloody. It may well be that keeping Saddam's army in place would have exacerbated that. Or perhaps not, I truly do not know.
We should address these areas whether Perle's analysis is correct or not. But we can be certain that if there is a "next time" it will not resemble the last, and we will find a new set of problems to address. He who falls into the trap of fighting the last was often loses the present one.
"If you step back for a moment and look at the big picture, The USA and our wonderful allies took the worlds 4th largest army, who had purged their border to the east in the 80s and again to the south and west in the 90s, and defeated them completely."
That's why there is so little talk about our "failures" in Iraq among the MSM anymore. The focus has now shifted to how Bush and the Repubs are trying to undermine the American Justice system.
You wrote: "This isn't a "lessons learned"... its a wish-list for a different reality than we faced."
I second that thought. The generalities brought forth in his statements just does not totally represent the realities. It may sound nice to some, hey congressional hearings are not all about knashing of teeth, after all both parties comprising both houses, signed on to go in to take the butcher out of action. Now they will have to start to somewhat console one another on occasions, and appear that they are are united on improving our "long time" broken Intellegience Organizations. All the talk for instance about "cold war" intel. Yea. We did a pretty poor job back then to. CounterIntellegience. An almost complete failure in many respects. I did not have to read the report to voice this opinion. But no one is perfect. And at least on the outward surface, it appears our POTUS and his advisors do truly recognize the need to at least try to reform all our various Intel groups into a viable cohesive entity for future requirements. Taint' going to be easy. How does one make any headway in say NK. It is so closed. Spitballs, slowballs, and fastballs are probably hard to extract out of that country. Perhaps only curveballs are available on the world market.
Ping !
I think one aspect is a lesson learned.
When he talks about the Iraqi Congress and a quick hand off to an Iraqi government, you have to relize that that was a plan. Just like we had a French government in exile ready to take control after we liberated France, we had a "government in exile" that was there to put an Iraqi face on the effort much earlier. Infighting between State and Defense department derailed this. Perhaps things would have gone better, now its hindsight. If Bush had a failure it was not resolving this conflict.
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