Speed and Power: Complements, Not Substitutes

AUSA Army Magazine ^ | William R. Hawkins

[xzins]

Speed and Power: Complements, Not Substitutes June 2004

By William R. Hawkins

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld wants to radically restructure the U.S. military, particularly the Army, to put even more emphasis on the speed of strategic deployment. Under the so-called "10-30-30 plan," major forces must be capable of deploying to a distant theater in 10 days, defeating an enemy within 30 days and then be ready for redeployment to a new battle somewhere else within another 30 days. This is a much more ambitious goal than the previous standard of being able to deploy a corps-sized force of up to five divisions in 30 days.

Yet at a time when 20,000 American soldiers have been told they are needed in Iraq for up to three months beyond their initial one year deployment, there is a serious question of whether the 10-30-30 objective matches the real world. One is reminded of Karl von Clausewitz’ distinction between "ideal" war, which is dominated entirely by operational considerations taken to the extreme, and wars as actually fought, bounded by politics and subject to "friction." The Iraq campaign has shown an abundance of both politics and friction.

It is not clear that higher speeds of strategic deployment are necessary beyond the occasional raid or evacuation operation conducted by special operations units, airborne forces or the Marines. The kind of major crisis that would lead to the commitment of corps-sized American forces does not materialize out of the blue, nor do the diplomatic foundations for large-scale intervention fall into place overnight. Though some chafe under these delays--especially when the pursuit of a peaceful resolution appears futile--planners should welcome the chance to better prepare for an impending test of arms and its aftermath.

The most telling example of the superior speed of military deployment compared to diplomatic preparation was the arrival of a fleet of ships carrying the heavy equipment of the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) (Mechanized) off the coast of Turkey well before the process of obtaining Ankara’s permission to unload had reached its disappointing climax. This diplomatic failure on the eve of the Iraq War prevented the opening of a major offensive on the northern front aimed at pacifying the Sunni areas and blocking the Syrian border. The too rapid initial deployment of the 4ID, one of the most technically advanced units in the Army and a test bed for new tactics and doctrine, kept the division out of the fight until it could be redeployed to the Persian Gulf.

Both the Gulf and Iraq wars have shown a two-step process involving military and diplomatic maneuvers. In the early stages, American air-transportable troops, prepositioned equipment, and Marine amphibious units--backed by airpower--are rapidly deployed to put down political markers. This first wave is not strong enough to fight a decisive campaign, but it does show national resolve and puts muscle behind diplomacy. As the situation deteriorates, diplomacy shifts to building military coalitions and securing local bases for the deployment of heavy units needed to fight and win the war. Because America’s superior strength is known to its adversaries, Washington is able to maintain the initiative and thus control the time when large scale military action will commence, which ought not to be until adequate forces are deployed to prevail.

The speed that counts is in the conduct of operations once forces are in the theater. Two centuries ago, Napoleon argued that to wage war "energetically and with severity" is the only way to "make it shorter." It takes an army with adequate strength and a solid operational plan, however, to actually pull off such a campaign in any era. Speed is an important capability, but not a magic bullet that can substitute for everything else, especially if other important capabilities such as combat power, logistics and unit depth are sacrificed to attain mere speed.

Great strides have been made in the rapid strategic deployment of heavy units through prepositioning of equipment and forward basing. One of the goals set forth in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was reorienting the global posture of U.S. forces so as "to render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary’s military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement." The QDR did recognize that in some cases "decisively defeating an adversary would likely require substantial reinforcement." More can be done by building fast sea transports to hurry the movement of reinforcements into or between theaters. To reach the pace Rumsfeld has called for, however, would require both a large increase in the procurement of air transports, a much more expensive option than sea transports, and the creation of ground forces that are much lighter in arms and armor so as to be air-transportable. This would inevitably lead to a trade-off of combat power for deployment speed at the cost of huge sums that could be spent on other defense projects.

The notion advanced by advocates of a lighter Army is that producing "chaos" on the battlefield through "agility" is the way to overcome large, heavily armed foes with a dedication to fighting. Asian foes, reportedly an important focus of the new Pentagon planning, are not assumed to be as fragile and inept as the Iraqis. In such an environment, small, lightly armed American troops could suffer high casualties and even an early defeat. The opening phase of the Korean War, when inadequately armed infantry ("light" not from design, but from neglect) were thrown into the path of tank-supported assault troops, was not encouraging.

When Turkey denied access to the 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was parachuted into Iraq to open a northern front. Though crack troops with air support, this light unit had a rough go of it because it lacked integral armor, adequate artillery and sufficient numbers. The offensive got moving after M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles from the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) were flown into captured airfields by C-17 cargo planes to reinforce the paratroopers two weeks after their dramatic airdrop.

Much can be done to improve the readiness and capabilities of units earmarked for rapid deployment. This is the proper role of the Future Combat System (FCS), to strengthen the combat power of light forces. However, vehicles whose primary design parameter is that they be small enough to fit inside a C-130 transport plane cannot be reasonably expected to substitute for the heavy forces that will continue to be needed to win the decisive battles that take the war into the heartland of the enemy.

Converting one-third of the active force, 15 brigade-size units of action, to the FCS and related systems would cost an estimated $92 billion.

Recently, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker told Defense News, "The current force we have today, the heavy force, for instance, is still going to be around in this Army out to 2030--M1 tanks, Bradleys and all the rest of them." New technologies, including those developed for the FCS, can and should be used to upgrade the Army’s heavy units, which are unmatched in combat power by any other military on the planet.

The doctrine of regime change has been a major contribution to strategic policy by Secretary Rumsfeld. To fulfill this objective, however, requires a lengthy postwar commitment of troops, including heavy combat units. The "10-30-30" emphasis on getting out fast is even more illusionary than the desire to intervene fast. Failure to adequately prepare for the rigors of occupation in Iraq is at the core of the low-level conflict that had been building into the insurrection that broke out in April. By attacking lightly armed and armored patrols and supply convoys, militants were able to engage American infantry and paratroopers on more equal terms in hit-and-run gun battles.

Creating a new regime requires a variety of security forces, including special operations forces, police/paramilitary/infantry units and hard-hitting mechanized forces. Central Command’s Gen. John Abizaid has recognized this last requirement and wants two heavy brigades as a mobile strike force in Iraq. The 1st Armored Division has been playing this role, giving the Marines valuable support. This penultimate heavy division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment are the main units being kept in Iraq beyond their scheduled withdrawal.

This leaves the third element, the need for units to be ready to fight again in 30 days. It seems the demand for this stressful goal is to make up for the failure to reconstitute the force levels cut during the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney stated that 14 Army divisions was the "irreducible minimum" requirement. The Army was reduced to only 10 divisions during the Clinton Administration. The last time the Army had only 10 divisions was before the Korean War. Regular, Reserve and National Guard units are already being pushed beyond their design limits. The proper response is to expand the number of troops that can be deployed in accordance with America’s global responsibilities, with a balanced force--that is capable of dealing with the variety of contingencies a turbulent world is likely to produce. There is substantial Congressional interest in rebuilding Army force levels, but Secretary Rumsfeld has opposed making an expansion of the ground forces part of his "10-30-30" program.

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WILLIAM R. HAWKINS is senior fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council, Washington, D.C.

[xzins]

Interesting article.

While it disagrees with Rumsfeld's vision for the Army, it lays the blame for Army problems squarely at the Clinton Administration's feet:

In such an environment, small, lightly armed American troops could suffer high casualties and even an early defeat. The opening phase of the Korean War, when inadequately armed infantry ("light" not from design, but from neglect) were thrown into the path of tank-supported assault troops, was not encouraging.

It seems the demand for this stressful goal is to make up for the failure to reconstitute the force levels cut during the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney stated that 14 Army divisions was the "irreducible minimum" requirement. The Army was reduced to only 10 divisions during the Clinton Administration. The last time the Army had only 10 divisions was before the Korean War. Regular, Reserve and National Guard units are already being pushed beyond their design limits. The proper response is to expand the number of troops that can be deployed in accordance with America’s global responsibilities, with a balanced force--

[xzins]

I understand that Rumsfeld and Schoomaker are taking 10 divisions with 3 maneuver brigades each and transforming that Army into an army of 52 "brigade-sized units of action" without increasing force structure?? That sounds like the equivalent of about 17 divisions.

Do each of these have their own aviation, ada, engr, etc. or do those slices have to provide double or triple time with a couple of these brigades?

[endthematrix]

"Though crack troops with air support, this light unit had a rough go of it because it lacked integral armor, adequate artillery and sufficient numbers. The offensive got moving after M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles from the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) were flown into captured airfields by C-17 cargo planes to reinforce the paratroopers two weeks after their dramatic airdrop."

The objective was to secure the secure the airfield for incoming C-17's, they performed FLAWLESSLY!

CNN correspondent Brent Sadler is in northern Iraq and talked to paratroopers. He told CNN anchor Aaron Brown about the operation.

SADLER: About 1,000 troops dropped out of the sky in a very dramatic parachute drop into this airstrip, which was built in the early 1980s. It's actually a disused airstrip, and the paratroopers are within a mile of the actual tarmac. They are coming from many directions, coming in from the drop line and gathering and looking very pleased with themselves. They came down in groups of 100. They're called sticks. So ten sticks, 100 men in each stick. That's 1,000.

I'm looking to the distance, it's quite incredible. I can see groups of paratroopers coming in from the drop line, where they came in several hours ago. Groups of about 50 men, 30, 40, 50 men coming from many directions in front of me, carrying their parachute packs and their equipment and starting to establish a foothold on the ground here.

I was just talking to some soldiers from the 173rd, and they told me it was a clean drop. They said that they were very -- the adrenaline was rushing and it was high even before they jumped out of the aircraft.

They came down. No hostile fire, obviously, because this is friendly territory. But it is a very rock-strewn area. So the troops on the ground were telling me that they had bumps and bruises.

It is a very calm situation as I'm watching these paratroopers dig into their positions. I've just been shaking hands with some of the troopers. They look very, very happy, very relaxed.

It is really quite remarkable to see just how well this operation is going. And the calm, methodical way, the way the training works here. The boys on the ground came in here six hours ago, and now are digging heavy mud to get themselves organized. Amazing.

It's also interesting to see that Kurdish forces are picking them up and shipping them out in three- ton lorries and taking them off to unknown destinations. This has been going on during the hours of darkness here and is continuing as I speak to you.

Certainly, what we have here now, given that we saw series of airstrikes against northern front positions in this sector, we're clearly seeing the northern front beginning to go open.

[Pukin Dog]

It is an interesting article indeed. Interesting in how wrong it is. Last time I checked, Koreans blow up in just the same ways as Iraqis do. The point is that we don't need so many people shooting, because the shooters DONT MISS ANYMORE. Attrition is no longer the game when you can cut off their heads on the first strike, box them in and kill them before the sun sets.

[xzins]

We shouldn't assume an impotent enemy.

Assume we're fighting the Brits.

[Pukin Dog]

We shouldn't assume an impotent enemy.

We never do.

Were we fighting the Brits, we would destroy them just as fast as we did the Iraqi resistance. We would blockade their sea lanes and destroy their subs in 48 hours. We would wipe out their air capability in another 72 hours. Their infantry would be turned to swiss cheese by our CBUs with no air cover to defend them. We would inform their leaders of the targeting of their manufacturing infrastructure and await their surrender.

There is no force on Earth that can resist our Armed Forces. Not in the air, land or sea. Iraq saw only a fraction of what we can do.

[Criminal Number 18F]

Yeah, this whole "airborne forces can't stand against armor" thing is a bit over-the-top, too. A group of ~200 lightly armed Kurdish peshmerga with one SF ODA advising were attacked by an Iraqi tank battalion (-).

End state: all tanks & APCs destroyed or withdrawn, no USSF KIA, light casualties to the Kurds. What made the difference was the Javelin missile which allowed the tanks to be decisively engaged from beyond the range of their weapons.

Yeah, paratroops and light infantry can't stand against tanks. That's why the Germans overran Bastogne, right?

d.o.l.

Criminal Number 18F

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Mobility and the UA

A Heavy UA consists of a headquarters company, an MI (military Intelligence) Company, a Signal (communications) Company, MP (Military Police) Platoon, two Balanced Combined Arms Battalions (each with two Tank and two Mechanized Infantry companies), a reconnaissance Squadron (battalion), a Field Artillery Battalion, and a Support Battalion.

An “old” division controlled 3 maneuver brigades whereas the new Division (also called a Unit of Employment, or UE) will control up to four maneuver UAs, as well as an Aviation UA, a Strike UA, and probably a Support UA.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

There is no force on Earth that can resist our Armed Forces.

Our troops are getting killed by extraterrestrials?

You have Victory Disease. Thinking like yours will get our ass handed to us.

[Arthur Wildfire! March]

I agree with the need for light, swift troops, able to globe trot on board planes. But variety is the spice of a powerful military.

1. Powerful, heavilly armored mech forces should be stationed at key points. We should not mothball what we've already built. If they need to be divided into brigades, so be it. Blackhawk Down was a perfect example of what a lack of armor can cause. We are putting armor on our humvees in Iraq. If detachable armor is the wave of the future, I'm all for it. But we need armor.

2. We need to make tough decisions about what we must prioritize. Europe, for example, should take care of itself, the moment Tony Blair is voted out. As soon as England turns its back on Blair, we should pull every single soldier out of Europe-- ESPECIALLY Yugoslavia. We can keep a sinle base in Yugoslavia for the purpose of crushing any al qaida links, and quietly hint to the Serbs we are at that point helpless to stop them from wiping out the Islamics there. Europe would resist us regarding that kind of attitude, defying the UN, but we do not have the manpower to both fulfill the UN's demands and fight terror effectively.

3. We need to resolve problems more permanently. Take Africa for example. We have been playing babysitter to a bunch of thugs there. Forget it. No more babysitter. Regarding Africa, we should send our troops to kill people and break things, picking the worst problem first and then moving down the list, particularly with an emphasis on Islamo-facism. The UN will hate that, of course-- even condemn us.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Victory Disease and Defining Victory in Iraq

June 20, 2004: America has a strange problem with Victory Disease, being unsure if it has the affliction and uncertain what the cure is if it does. Victory Disease is a common problem for nations after they have won a war, especially when they have had an overwhelming victory. This disease is characterized by arrogance, tendency to believe myths as to the underlying reasons for the victory, and a firm conviction that future wars should be fought the same way as the last one.

[Arthur Wildfire! March]

You are correct regarding the end result. Our only danger is all the entangling alliances that the Father of Our Country, George Washington, warned us about. The UN is nothing but an entangling alliance machine, accelerating rapidly. That's what is bogging us down.

Al qaida targeted us. It's our war. If other nations want to jump on board, great. But we are working too hard to accomodate their fears. A small, well led force is almost always superior to some diplomatic piece of sausage lumbering around, with no element of surprise and few shifts in its course.

[Arthur Wildfire! March]

"Victory Disease is a common problem for nations after they have won a war, especially when they have had an overwhelming victory."

We need a little more victory disease and a lot less diplomatic compromise.

[AmericaUnited]

the Army’s heavy units, which are unmatched in combat power by any other military on the planet.

Does anyone have bookmarked the article posted maybe a year ago that contained a summary of US military power?

[meenie]

There are solid reasons for having a rapid deployment capability. There are also reasons why we need so much rapid deployment. If we are going to continue to be the world's policeman and social services international, while stationing troops in 180 countries around the world, we need stability as much as rapid deployment. Our civilian reservists and national guard could attest to this I am sure.

Another item that needs attention is the rapid deployment during our policy of preemption and then years of occupation, reconstruction, and policing. It is not necessary to have our entire force structure synchronized for rapid deployment and then agonizing slow withdrawal. Another consideration that needs our attention is the capability of our economy to support the continued drain on our resources.

The USSR was beaten not by military force but the failure of their economy to support the huge costs associated with their military build-up. We have to be smart enough to fight the war on terror without allowing this to happen. We also have to have a foreign policy that does not rely so heavily on military force and more on cooperation between alliances we can form.

[Ragtime Cowgirl]

Didn't we hear this report as our troops were defeating the enemy (even from within a raging sandstorm) on the way to Baghdad, March 2003?

 

Good comments from informed FReepers - including those who remind us not to underestimate the enemy - though most of us who were awake on 911 do not underestimate the potential destruction from even one misled lost soul, inflamed by hatred in the modern world  (still knowing our military is the best-equipped, best-trained, most versatile, courageous, faithful military in the world - freely fighting on behalf of the most precious gifts in the free world, a more powerful incentive than the hatred and lies motivating our enemies. (^: ).

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~                 

From the Army, the DoD - SOD Rumsfeld and a few thousand others directly involved with planning and fighting the war today full-time (who have been very up front with both their plans and their reasoning from very early on):

 http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/foreword.html

 

 

 

(click pics for more info)

[Pukin Dog]

Victory Disease? I don't think so, son.

I am a graduate of the Naval War College. I think I have some idea what our forces can do if unleashed. Our boys are being killed in Iraq by timid leadership out of the State Dept, and our honorable desire to protect civilian life. If we wanted to destroy Iraq or any enemy, our forces could do so without much of a problem.

[Alamo-Girl]

Bump!

[Criminal Number 18F]

I am a graduate of the Naval War College.

I'm impressed. (no sarcasm, I'm serious). The question is, "When we have control of an AO, say Iraq, but continue to lose troops to pinprick attacks, is that the victory a professional warrior calls it, or the defeat the press does?"

We can't "nuke em all and let God sort 'em out," as emotionally saftisfying as it is to fantasize about that. That is unacceptable to a moral nation, which we still are, the best efforts of Hollywood and Clinton having availed little in that direction.

When I expound on strategy, I am playing in leagues above my formal military education, most of which was oriented to identifying, finding, and killing terrorists, or operating in strictly denied areas in all conditions and climates. I've never planned an operation beyond a few hundred guys, and was never the man whose signature was on the final plan. But I read the same stuff y'all do at the War College, and probably more of it, in all modesty.

What I keep coming up with for Iraq is:

1. Build Iraqi institutions so they can take on more of the burden themselves.

2. Protect our troops, especially our logistics "tail," to the degree we can.

3. Conduct an aggressive, active intel, active CI, and special operations campaign against the insurgent cells, and especially THEIR leadership and logistics.

4. Conduct ongoing and sophisticated information operations on multiple targets:
   1. The insurgents: make them despair and give up.
   2. The public: encourage them to turn in the insurgents
   3. The Iraqi security forces: stiffen their spine
   4. Other Arab nations' populations: to undermine their support for the insurgency.
   5. The US population and media: to make them understand that Rome wasn't built in a day.

Of all these, I think we are doing most of them. The IO war could be conducted with more verve, panache and imagination; there needs to be one leader in charge (and if there already is, a head should roll [probably a bad metaphor to use here]) and there needs to be one unified plan, and if that is happening I don't see the indicators.

Things we could add to the mix:

1. The shooters need to understand that there is no percentage in taking these guys alive.

2. The SJAs need their collective asses kicked, and they need to go back to the books. The ununiformed, non-observant-of-the-laws-of-war guerillas are not protected as combatants by the laws of land warfare, and by extending them a protection they don't deserve, we are undermining ourselves. We need to put out the word that if you are caught with military arms in your hand, or your house, or your yard, the sentence is death by hanging and every corporal in the occupation army has the authority to carry it out. If the lawyers don't like it, we should hang a few of them pour encourager les autres. It would work well to shake down the hanging process before we inflict it on the hapless terrorists, too.

3. We should remove bodies of insurgents and burn them unshriven in the landfills with the other garbage. We can probably find some tame clerics to bless this -- Islam is whatever any geezer with a biker beard wants it to be, anyway.

4. if we haven't got the national balls to execute this plan, we ought to encourage the Iraqis to do it. From their standpoint, these insurgents are traitors and I doubt they'll have any trouble with hanging 'em.

Some people may think I am not a nice guy. Oh, well. I don't recommend we play hardball at random, or inflict mass punishment, but the bad guys that run up against us need to know they lost. Nothing like a hanging to get that point across.

d.o.l.

Criminal Number 18F

[windchime]

Bump!