[antiRepublicrat]

I guess this would be a good place to push a somewhat Open Source model in voting. If everyone in the world can see the source code of the software, then we KNOW it does what it says it will do.

I'll still want coded paper ticket recepts on any electronic system though.

[sigSEGV]

I guess this would be a good place to push a somewhat Open Source model in voting. If everyone in the world can see the source code of the software, then we KNOW it does what it says it will do.

And don't forget, the source to all compilers used, system libraries, and hardware also. Any one of those things can be modified to change the actions of voting code that may be correct.

[HangThemHigh]

"If everyone in the world can see the source code of the software, then we KNOW it does what it says it will do. "

Electronic voting seems nearly impossible to monitor to me. For secure voting, every single copy of the voting executable software and hardware needs to be verified, as well as every tabulating computer, network node, or anything else that touches the votes. Even with paper ticket receipts, how do you know your ticket matches the recorded vote unless it's the paper that is counted?

A paper receipt in machine & human readable form (old fashioned punch cards?) that is collected (after verification by the voter) for potential recount seems reasonably accountable, but loses much of the advantage of the electronic vote.