Posted on 04/08/2013 12:31:13 PM PDT by Kevmo
On Theory and Science Generally in Connection with the Fleischmann-Pons Experiment
Peter L. Hagelstein
6 INFINITE ENERGY • ISSUE 108 • MARCH/APRIL 2013
I was encouraged to contribute to an editorial generally on
the topic of theory in science, in connection with publication
of a paper focused on some recent ideas that Ed
Storms has put forth regarding a model for how excess heat
works in the Fleischmann-Pons experiment. Such a project
would compete for my time with other commitments,
including teaching, research and family-related commitments;
so I was reluctant to take it on. On the other hand I
found myself tempted, since over the years I have been musing
about theory, and also about science, as a result of having
been involved in research on the Fleischmann-Pons
experiment. As you can see from what follows, I ended up
succumbing to temptation.
Science as an imperfect human endeavor
In order to figure out the role of theory in science, probably
we should start by figuring out what science is. Had you
asked me years ago what science is, I would have replied
with confidence. I would have rambled on at length about
discovering how nature works, the scientific method, accumulation
and systematization of scientific knowledge, about
the benefits of science to mankind, and about those who do
science. But alas, I wasn’t asked years ago.
In this day and age, we might turn to Wikipedia as a
resource to figure out what science is. We see on the
Wikipedia page pictures of an imposing collection of famous
scientists, discussion of the history of science, the scientific
method, philosophical issues, science and society, impact on
public policy and the like. One comes away with the impression
of science as something sensible with a long and
respected lineage, as a rational enterprise involving many
very smart people, lots of work and systematic accumulation
and organization of knowledge—in essence an honorable
endeavor that we might look up to and be proud of. This is
very much the spirit in which I viewed science a quarter century
ago. I wanted to be part of this great and noble enterprise.
It was good; it advanced humanity by providing
understanding. I respected science and scientists greatly.
Today I still have great respect for science and for many
scientists, probably much more respect than in days past.
But my view is different today. Now I would describe science
as very much a human endeavor; and as a human activity,
science is imperfect. This is not intended as a criticism;
instead I view it as a reflection that we as humans are imperfect.
Which in a sense makes it much more amazing that we have managed to make as much progress as we have. The
advances in our understanding of nature resulting from science
generally might be seen as a much greater accomplishment
in light of how imperfect humans sometimes are, especially
in connection with science.
The scientific method as an ideal
Often in talking with muggles (non-scientists in this context)
about science, it seems first and foremost the discussion
turns to the notion of the “scientific method,” which muggles
have been exposed to and imagine is actually what scientists
make use of when doing science. Ah, the wonderful
idealization which is this scientific method! Once again, we
turn to Wikipedia as our modern source for clarification of
all things mysterious: the scientific method in summary
involves the formulation of a question, a hypothesis, a prediction,
a test and subsequent analysis. Without doubt, this
method is effective for figuring out what is right and also
what is wrong as to how nature works, and can be even more
so when applied repeatedly on a given problem by many
people over a long time.
In years past I was an ardent supporter of this scientific
method. Even more, I would probably have argued that pretty
much any other approach would be guaranteed to produce
unreliable results. At present I think of the scientific
method as presented here more as an ideal, a method that
one would like to use, and should definitely use if and when
possible. Sadly, there are circumstances where it isn’t practical
to make use of the scientific method. For example, to
carry out a test it might require resources (such as funding,
people, laboratories and so forth), and if the resources are
not available then the test part of the method simply isn’t
going to get done.
In practice, simple application of the scientific method isn’t
enough. Consider the situation when several scientists contemplate
the same question: They all have an excellent understanding
of the various hypotheses put forth; there are no
questions about the predictions; and they all do tests and subsequent
analyses. This, for example, was the situation in the
area of the Fleischmann-Pons experiment back in 1989. So,
what happens when different scientists that do the tests get
different answers? You might think that the right thing to do
might be to go back to do more tests. Unfortunately, the scientific
method doesn’t tell you how many tests you need to
do, or what to do when people get different answers. The
scientific method doesn’t provide for a guarantee that resources
will be made available to carry out more tests, or that anyone
will still be listening if more tests happen to get done.
Consensus as a possible extension
of the scientific method
I was astonished by the resolution to this that I saw take
place. The important question on the table from my perspective
was whether there exists an excess heat effect in the
Fleischmann-Pons experiment. The leading hypotheses
included: (1) yes, the effect was real; (2) no, the initial results
were an artifact. Predictions were made, which largely centered
around the possibility that either excess heat would be
seen, or that excess heat would not be seen. A very large
number of tests were done. A few people saw excess heat, and
most didn’t. A very large number of analyses were done,
many of which focused on the experimental approach and
calorimetry of Fleischmann and Pons. Some focused on
nuclear measurements (the idea here was that if the energy
was produced by nuclear reactions, then commensurate energetic
particles should be present); and some focused on the
integrity and competence of Fleischmann and Pons. How was
this resolved? For me the astonishment came when arguments
were made that if members of the scientific community
were to vote, that the overwhelming majority of the scientific
community would conclude that there was no effect
based on the tests.
I have no doubt whatsoever that a vote at that time (or
now) would have gone poorly for Fleischmann and Pons.
The idea of a vote among scientists seems to be very democratic;
in some countries leaders are selected and issues are
resolved through the application of democracy. What to me
was astonishing at the time was that this argument was used
in connection with the question of the existence of an
excess heat effect in the Fleischmann-Pons experiment.
In the years following I tried this approach out with students
in the classroom. I would pose a technical question
concerning some issue under discussion, and elicit an answer
from the student. At issue would be the question as to
whether the answer was right, or wrong. I proposed that we
make use of a more modern version of the scientific method,
which was to include voting in order to check the correctness
of the result. If the students voted that the result was
correct, then I would argue that we had made use of this augmentation
of the scientific method in order to determine
whether the result was correct or not. Of course, we would
go on only when the result was actually correct. The students
understood that such a vote had nothing to do with verifying
whether a result was correct or not. To figure out whether
a result is correct, we can derive results, we can verify results
mathematically, we can turn to unambiguous experimental
results and we can do tests; but in general the correctness of
a technical result in the hard sciences should probably not
be determined from the result of this kind of vote.
Scientific method and the scientific community
I have argued that using the scientific method can be an
effective way to clarify a technical issue. However, it could be
argued that the scientific method should come with a warning,
something to the effect that actually using it might be
detrimental to your career and to your personal life. There
are, of course, many examples that could be used for illustration.
A colleague of mine recently related the story of Ignaz
Semmelweis to me. Semmelweis (according to Wikipedia)
earned a doctorate in medicine in 1844, and subsequently
became interested in the question of why the mortality rate
was so high at the obstetrical clinics at the Vienna General
Hospital. He proposed a hypothesis that led to a testable prediction
(that washing hands would improve the mortality
rate), carried out the test and analyzed the result. In fact, the
mortality rate did drop, and dropped by a large factor.
In this case Semmelweis made use of the scientific method
to learn something important that saved lives. Probably you
have figured out by now that his result was not immediately
recognized or accepted by the medical and scientific communities,
and the unfortunate consequences of his discovery
to his career and personal life serve to underscore that science
is very much an imperfect human enterprise. His career
did not advance as it probably should have, or as he might
have wished, following this important discovery. His personal
life was negatively impacted.
The scientific community is a social entity, and scientists
within the scientific community have to interact from day
to day with other members of the scientific community, as
well as with those not in science. How a scientist navigates
these treacherous waters can have an impact. For example,
Fleischmann once described what happened to him following
putting forth the claim of excess power in the
Fleischmann-Pons experiment; he described the experience
as one of being “extruded” out of the scientific community.
From my own discussions with him, I suspect that he suffered
from depression in his later years that resulted in part
from the non-acceptance of his research.
Those who have worked on anomalies connected with the
Fleischmann-Pons experience have a wide variety of experiences.
For example, one friend became very interested in the
experiments and decided to put time into this area of
research. Almost immediately it became difficult to bring in
research funding on any topic. From these experiences my
friend consciously made the decision to back away from the
field, after which it again became possible to get funding.
Some others in the field have found it difficult to obtain
resources to pursue research on the Fleischmann-Pons effect,
and also difficult to publish.
I would argue that instead of being an aberration of science
(as many of my friends have told me), this is a part of
science. The social aspects of science are important, and
strongly impact what science is done and the careers and
lives of scientists. I think that the excess heat effect in the
Fleischmann-Pons experiment is important; however, we
need to be aware of the associated social aspects. In a recent
short course class on the topic I included slides with a warning,
in an attempt to make sure that no one young and naive
would remain unaware of the danger associated with cultivating
an interest in the field. Working in this field can
result in your career being destroyed.
It follows that the scientific method probably needs to be
placed in context. Although the “question” to be addressed
in the scientific method seems to be general, it is not. There
is a filter implicit in connection with the scientific community,
in that the question to be addressed through the use of
the scientific method must be one either approved by, or
likely to be approved by, the scientific community.
Otherwise, the associated endeavor will not be considered to
be part of science, and whatever results come from the application
of the scientific method are not going to be included
in the canon of science. If one decides to focus on a question
in this context that is outside of the body of questions of
interest to the scientific community, then one must understand
that this will lead to an exclusion from the scientific
community. Also, if one attempts to apply the scientific
method to a problem or area that is not approved, then the
scientific community will not be supportive of the endeavor,
and it will be problematic to find resources to carry out the
scientific method.
A possible improvement of the scientific method
This leads us back to the question of what is science, and to
further contemplation of the scientific method. From my
experience over the past quarter century, I have come to
view the question of what science is perhaps as the wrong
question. The more important issue concerns the scientific
community; you see, science is what the scientific community
says science is. This is not intended as a truism; quite the
contrary. In these days the scientific community has become
very powerful. It has an important voice in our society. It has
a powerful impact on the lives and careers of individual scientists.
It helps to decide what science gets done; it also helps
to decide what science doesn’t get done. And importantly, in
connection with this discussion, it decides what lies within
the boundaries of science, and also it decides what is not science
(if you have doubts about this, an experiment can help
clarify the issue: pick any topic that is controversial in the
sense under discussion; stand up to argue in the media that
not only is the topic part of science, but that the controversial
position constitutes good science, then wait a bit and
then start taking measurements). What science includes, and
perhaps more importantly does not include, has become
extremely important; the only opinion that counts is that of
the scientific community. This is a reflection of the increasing
power of the scientific community.
In light of this, perhaps this might be a good time to think
about updating the scientific method; a more modern version
might look something like the following:
The question:
The process might start with a question like
“why is the sky blue” (according to our source Wikipedia for
this discussion), that involves some issue concerning the
physical world. As remarked upon by Wikipedia, in many
cases there already exists information relevant to the question
(for example, you can look up in texts on classical electromagnetism
to find the reason that the sky is blue). In the
case of the Fleischmann-Pons effect, the scientific community
has already studied the effect in sufficient detail with
the result that it lies outside of science; so as with other areas
determined to be outside of science, the scientific method
cannot be used. We recognize in this that certain questions
cannot be addressed using the scientific method.
The hypothesis:
Largely we should follow the discussion
in Wikipedia regarding the hypothesis regarding it as a conjecture.
For example, from our textbooks we find that the sky
is blue because large angle scattering from molecules is more
efficient for shorter wavelength light. However, we understand
that since certain conjectures lie outside of science,
those would need to be discarded before continuing (otherwise
any result that we obtain may not lie within science).
For example, the hypothesis that excess heat is a real effect
in the Fleischmann-Pons experiment is one that lies outside
of science, whereas the hypothesis that excess heat is due to
errors in calorimetry lies within science and is allowed.
Prediction:
We would like to understand the consequence
that follows from the hypothesis, once again following
Wikipedia here. Regarding scattering of blue light by molecules,
we might predict that the scattered light will be polarized,
which we can test. However, it is important to make
sure that what we predict lies within science. For example, a
prediction that excess heat can be observed as a consequence
of the existence of a new physical effect in the
Fleischmann-Pons experiment would likely be outside of science,
and cannot be put forth. A prediction that a calorimetric
artifact can occur in connection with the experiment
(as advocated by Lewis, Huizenga, Shanahan and also by the
Wikipedia page on cold fusion) definitely lies within the
boundaries of science.
Test:
One would think the most important part of the scientific
method is to test the hypothesis and see how the
world works. As such, this is the most problematic. Generally
a test requires resources to carry out, so whether a test can be
done or not depends on funding, lab facilities, people, time
and on other issues. The scientific community aids here by
helping to make sure that resources (which are always scarce)
are not wasted testing things that do not need to be tested
(such as excess heat in the Fleischmann-Pons experiment).
Another important issue concerns who is doing the test; for
example, in experiments on the Fleischmann-Pons experiment,
tests have been discounted because the experimentalist
involved was biased in thinking that a positive result
could have been obtained.
Analysis:
Once again we defer to the discussion in
Wikipedia concerning connecting the results of the experiment
with the hypothesis and predictions. However, we
probably need to generalize the notion of analysis in recognition
of the accumulated experience within the scientific
community. For example, if the test yields a result that is
outside of science, then one would want to re-do the test
enough times until a different result is obtained. If the test
result stubbornly remains outside of acceptable science, then
the best option is to regard the test as inconclusive (since a
result that lies outside of science cannot be a conclusion
resulting from the application of the method). If ultimately
the analysis step shows that the test result lies outside of science,
then one must terminate the scientific method, in
recognition that it is a logical impossibility that a result
which lies outside of science can be the result of the application
of the scientific method. It is helpful in this case to
forget the question; it would be best (but not yet required)
that documentation or evidence that the test was done be
eliminated.
Communication with others, peer review:
When the
process is sufficiently complete that a conclusion has been
reached, it is important for the research to be reviewed by
others, and possibly published so that others can make use
of the results; yet again we must defer to Wikipedia on this
discussion. However, we need to be mindful of certain issues
in connection with this. If the results lie outside of science
then there is really no point in sending it out for review; the
scientific community is very helpful by restricting publication
of such results, and one’s career can be in jeopardy if
one’s colleagues become aware that the test was done. As it
sometimes happens that the scientific community changes
its view on what is outside of science, one strategy is to wait
and publish later on (one can still get priority). If years pass
and there are no changes, it would seem a reasonable strategy
to find a much younger trusted colleague to arrange for
posthumous publication.
Re-evaluation:
In the event that this augmented version
of the scientific method has been used, it may be that in
spite of efforts to the contrary, results are published which
end up outside of science (with the possibility of exclusion
from scientific community to follow). If this occurs, the simplest
approach is simply a retraction of results (if the results
lie outside of science, then they must be wrong, which
means there must be an error—more than enough grounds
for retraction). If the result supports someone who has been
selected for career destruction, then a timely retraction may
be well received by the scientific community. A researcher
may wish to avoid standing up for a result that is outside of
science (unless one is seeking near-term career change).
There are, of course, many examples in times past when a
researcher was able to persuade other scientists of the validity
of a contested result; one might naively be inspired from
these examples to take up a cause because it is the right thing
to do. But that was before modern delineation, before the
existence of correct fundamental physical law and before the
modern identification of areas lying outside of science.
There are no examples of any researcher fighting for an area
outside of science and winning in modern times. The conclusion
that might be drawn is of course clear: modern
boundaries are also correct; areas that are outside of science
remain outside of science because the claims associated with
them are simply wrong.
Such a modern generalization of the scientific method
could be helpful in avoiding difficulties. For example,
Semmelweis might have enjoyed a long and successful career
by following this version of the scientific method, while getting
credit for his discovery (perhaps posthumously). Had
Fleischmann and Pons followed this version, they might
conceivably have continued as well-respected members of
the scientific community.
Where delineation is not needed
It might be worth thinking a bit about boundaries in science,
and perhaps it would be useful first to examine where
boundaries are not needed. In 1989 a variety of arguments
were put forth in connection with excess heat in the
Fleischmann-Pons experiment, and one of the most powerful
was that such an effect is not consistent with condensed
matter physics, and also not consistent with nuclear physics.
In essence, it is impossible based on existing theory in these
fields. There is no question as to whether this is true or not
(it is true); but the implication that seems to follow is that
excess heat in the Fleischmann-Pons experiment in a sense
constitutes an attack on two important, established and
mature areas of physics. A further implication is that the scientific
community needed to rally to defend two large areas
firmly within the boundaries of science.
One might think that this should have led to establishment
of the boundary as to what is, and what isn’t, science in the
vicinity of the part of science relevant to the Fleischmann-
Pons experiment. I would like to argue that no such delineation
is necessary for the defense of either science as a whole,
or any particular area of science. Through the scientific
method (and certainly not the outrageous parody proposed
above) we have a powerful tool to tell what is true and what
is not when it comes to questions of science. Science is robust,
especially modern science; and both condensed matter and
nuclear physics have no need for anyone to rally to defend
anything. If one views the Fleischmann-Pons experiment as
an attack on any part of physics, then so be it. A robust science
should welcome such a challenge. If excess heat in the
Fleischmann-Pons experiment shows up in the lab as a real
effect, challenging both areas, then we should embrace the
associated challenge. If either area is weak in some way, or has
some error or flaw somehow that it cannot accommodate
what nature does, then we should be eager to understand
what nature is doing and to fix whatever is wrong.
The current view within the scientific community is that
these fields have things right, and if that is not reflected in
measurements in the lab, then the problem is with those
doing the experiments. Such a view prevailed in 1989, but
now nearly a quarter century later, the situation in cold
fusion labs is much clearer. There is excess heat, which can
be a very big effect; it is reproducible in some labs; there are
not commensurate energetic products; there are many replications;
and there are other anomalies as well. Condensed
matter physics and nuclear physics together are not sufficiently
robust to account for these anomalies. No defense of
these fields is required, since if some aspect of the associated
theories is incomplete or can be broken, we would very
much like to break it, so that we can focus on developing
new theory that is more closely matched to experiment.
Theory and fundamental physical laws
From the discussion above, things are complicated when it
comes to science; it should come as no surprise that things
are similarly complicated when it comes to theory.
Perhaps the place to begin in this discussion is with the
fundamental physical laws, since in this case things are
clearest. For the condensed matter part of the problem, a
great deal can be understood by working with nonrelativistic
electrons and nuclei as quantum mechanical particles,
and Coulomb interactions. The associated fundamental laws
were known in the late 1920s, and people routinely take
advantage of them even now (after more than 80 years).
Since so many experiments have followed, and so many calculations
have been done, if something were wrong with
this basic picture it would very probably have been noticed
by now; consequently, I do not expect anomalies associated
with Fleischmann-Pons experiments to change these fundamental
nonrelativistic laws (in my view the anomalies are
due to a funny kind of relativistic effect).
There are, of course, magnetic interactions, relativistic
effects, couplings generally with the radiation field and
higher-order effects; these do not fit into the fundamental
simplistic picture from the late 1920s. We can account for
them using quantum electrodynamics (QED), which came
into existence between the late 1920s and about 1950. From
the simplest possible perspective, the physical content of the
theory associated with the construction includes a description
of electrons and positrons (and their relativistic dynamics
in free space), photons (and their relativistic dynamics in
free space) and the simplest possible coupling between
them. This basic construction is a reductionist’s dream, and
everything more complicated (atoms, molecules, solids,
lasers, transistors and so forth) can be thought of as a consequence
of the fundamental construction of this theory. In
the 60 years or more of experience with QED, there has accumulated
pretty much only repeated successes and triumphs
of the theory following many thousands of experiments and
calculations, with no sign that there is anything wrong with
it. Once again, I would not expect a consideration of the
Fleischmann-Pons experiment to result in a revision of this
QED construction; for example, if there were to be a revision,
would we want to change the specification of the electron
or photon, the interaction between them, relativity, or
quantum mechanical principles? (The answer here should be
none of the above.)
We could make similar arguments in the case of nuclear
physics. For the fundamental nonrelativistic laws, the
description of nuclei as made up of neutrons and protons as
quantum particles with potential interactions goes back to
around 1930, but in this case there have been improvements
over the years in the specification of the interaction potentials.
Basic quantitative agreement between theory and
experiment could be obtained for many problems with the
potentials of the late 1950s; and subsequent improvements
in the specification of the potentials have improved quantitative
agreement between theory and experiment in this picture
(but no fundamental change in how the theory works).
But neutrons and protons are compound particles, and
new fundamental laws which describe component quarks
and gluons, and the interaction between them, are captured
in quantum chromodynamics (QCD); the associated field
theory involves a reductionist construction similar to QED.
This fundamental theory came into existence by the mid-
1960s, and subsequent experience with it has produced a
great many successes. I would not expect any change to
result to QCD, or to the analogous (but somewhat less fundamental)
field theory developed for neutrons and protons—
quantum hadrodynamics, or QHD—as a result of
research on the Fleischmann-Pons experiment.
Because nuclei can undergo beta decay, to be complete we
should probably reference the discussion to the standard
model, which includes QED, QCD and electro-weak interaction
physics.
In a sense then, the fundamental theory that is going to
provide the foundation for the Fleischmann-Pons experiment
is already known (and has been known for 40-60 years,
depending on whether we think about QED, QCD or the
standard model). Since these fundamental models do not
include gravitational particles or forces, we know that they
are incomplete, and physicists are currently putting in a great
deal of effort on string theory and generalizations to unify
the basic forces and particles. Why nature obeys quantum
mechanics, and whether quantum mechanics can be derived
from some more fundamental theory, are issues that some
physicists are thinking about at present. So, unless the excess
heat effect is mediated somehow by gravitational effects,
unless it operates somehow outside of quantum mechanics,
unless it somehow lies outside of relativity, or involves exotic
physics such as dark matter, then we expect it to follow
from the fundamental embodied by the standard model.
I would not expect the resolution of anomalies in
Fleischmann-Pons experiments to result in the overturn of
quantum mechanics (there are some who have proposed
exactly that); nor require a revision of QED (also argued for);
nor any change in QCD or the standard model (as contemplated
by some authors); nor involve gravitational effects
(again, as has been proposed). Even though the excess heat
effect by itself challenges the fields of condensed matter and
nuclear physics, I expect no loss or negation of the accumulated
science in either area; instead I think we will come to
understand that there is some fine print associated with one
of the theorems that we rely on which we hadn’t appreciated.
I think both fields will be added to as a result of the
research on anomalies, becoming even more robust in the
process, and coming closer than they have been in the past.
Theory, experiment and fundamental physical law
My view as a theorist generally is that experiment has to
come first. If theory is in conflict with experiment (and if the
experiment is correct), then a new theory is needed. Among
those seeking theoretical explanations for the Fleischmann-
Pons experiment there tends to be agreement on this point.
However, there is less agreement concerning the implications.
There have been proposals for theories which involve
a revision of quantum mechanics, or that adopt a starting
place which goes against the standard model. The associated
argument is that since experiment comes first, theory has to
accommodate the experimental results; and so we can forget
about quantum mechanics, field theory and the fundamental
laws (an argument I don’t agree with). From my perspective,
we live at a time where the relevant fundamental physical
laws are known; and so when we are revising theory in
connection with the Fleischmann-Pons experiment, we do
so only within a limited range that starts from fundamental
physical law, and seek some feature of the subsequent development
where something got missed.
If so, then what about those in the field that advocate for
the overturn of fundamental physical law based on experimental
results from the Fleischmann-Pons experiment?
Certainly those who broadcast such views impact the credibility
of the field in a very negative way, and it is the case
that the credibility of the field is pretty low in the eyes of the
scientific community and the public these days. One can
find many examples of critics in the early years (and also in
recent times) who draw attention to suggestions from our
community that large parts of existing physics must be overturned
as a response to excess heat in the Fleischmann-Pons
experiment. These clever critics have understood clearly how
damaging such statements can be to the field, and have
exploited the situation. An obvious solution might be to
exclude those making the offending statements from this
community, as has been recommended to me by senior people
who understand just how much damage can be done by
association with people who say things that are perceived as
not credible. I am not able to explain in return that people
who have experienced exclusion from the scientific community
tend for some reason not to want to exclude others
from their own community.
Some in the field argue that until the new effects are
understood completely, all theory has to be on the table for
possible revision. If one holds back some theory as protected
or sacrosanct, then one will never find out what is wrong if
the problems happen to be in a protected area. I used to
agree with this, and doggedly kept all possibilities open
when contemplating different theories and models.
However, somewhere over the years it became clear that the
associated theoretical parameter space was fully as large as
the experimental parameter space; that a model for the
anomalies is very much stronger when derived from more
fundamental accepted theories; and that there are a great
many potential opportunities for new models that build on
top of the solid foundation provided by the fundamental
theories. We know now that there are examples of models
consistent with the fundamental laws that can be very relevant
to experiment. It is not that I have more respect or more
appreciation now for the fundamental laws than before;
instead, it is that I simply view them differently. Rather than
being restrictive telling me what can’t be done (as some of
my colleagues think), I view the fundamental laws as exceptionally
helpful and knowledgeable friends pointing the way
toward fruitful areas likely to be most productive.
In recent years I have found myself engaged in discussions
concerning particular theoretical models, some of which
would go very much against the fundamental laws. There
would be spirited arguments in which it became clear that
others held dear the right to challenge anything (including
quantum mechanics, QED, the standard model and more) in
the pursuit of the holy grail which is the theoretical resolution
of experiments showing anomalies. The picture that
comes to mind is that of a prospector determined to head
out into an area known to be totally devoid of gold for generations,
where modern high resolution maps are available
for free to anyone who wants to look to see where the gold
isn’t. The displeasure and frustration that results has more
than once ended up producing assertions that I was personally
responsible for the lack of progress in solving the theoretical
problem.
Theory and experiment
We might think of the scientific method as involving two
fundamental parts of science: experiment and theory.
Theory comes into play ideally as providing input for the
hypothesis and prediction part of the method, while experiment
comes into play providing the test against nature to
see whether the ideas are correct. My experimentalist colleagues
have emphasized the importance of theory to me in
connection with Fleischmann-Pons studies; they have said
(a great many times) that experimental parameter space is
essentially infinitely large (and each experiment takes time,
effort, money and sweat), so that theory is absolutely essential
to provide some guidance to make the experimenting
more efficient.
If so, then has there been any input from the theorists?
After all, the picture of the experimentalists toiling late into
the night forever exploring an infinitely large parameter
space is one that is particularly depressing (you see, some of
my friends are experimentalists...).
As it turns out, there has been guidance from the theorists—
lots of guidance. I can cite as one example input from
Douglas Morrison (a theorist from CERN and a critic), who
suggested that tests should be done where elaborate calorimetric
measurements should be carried out at the same time
as elaborate neutron, gamma, charged particle and tritium
measurements. Morrison held firmly to a picture in which
nuclear energy is produced with commensurate energetic
products; since there are no commensurate energetic particles
produced in connection with the excess power, Morrison
was able to reject all positive results systematically. The
headache I had with this approach is that the initial experimental
claim was for an excess heat effect that occurs without
commensurate energetic nuclear radiation. Morrison’s
starting place was that nuclear energy generation must occur
with commensurate energetic nuclear radiation, and would
have been perfectly happy to accept the calorimetric energy
as real with a corresponding observation of commensurate
energetic nuclear radiation. However, somewhere in all of
this it seems that Fleischmann and Pons’ excess heat effect
(in which the initial claim was for a large energy effect without
commensurate energetic nuclear products) was implicitly
discarded at the beginning of the discussion.
Morrison also held in high regard the high-energy physics
community (he had somewhat less respect for electrochemist
experimentalists who reported positive results); so
he argued that the experiment needed to be done by competent
physicists, such as the group at the pre-eminent
Japanese KEK high energy physics lab. Year after year the
KEK group reported negative results, and year after year
Morrison would single out this group publicly in support of
his contention that when competent experimentalists did
the experiment, no excess heat was observed. This was true
until the KEK group reported a positive result, which was
rejected by Morrison (energetic products were not measured
in amounts commensurate with the energy produced); coincidentally,
the KEK effort was subsequently terminated (this
presumably was unrelated to the results obtained in their
experiments).
There have been an enormous number of theoretical proposals.
Each theorist in the field has largely followed his own
approach (with notable exceptions where some theorists
have followed Preparata’s ideas, and others have followed
Takahashi’s), and the majority of experimentalists have put
forth conjectures as well. There are more than 1000 papers
that are either theoretical, or combined experimental and
theoretical with a nontrivial theoretical component.
Individual theorists have put forth multiple proposals (in
my own case, the number is up close to 300 approaches,
models, sub-models and variants at this point, not all of
which have been published or described in public). At ICCF
conferences, more theoretical papers are generally submitted
than experimental papers. In essence, there is enough theoretical
input (some helpful, and some less so) to keep the
experimentalists busy until well into the next millennium.
You might argue there is an easy solution to this problem:
simply sort the wheat from the chaff! Just take the strong
theoretical proposals and focus on them, and put aside the
ones that are weak. If you were to address this challenge to
the theorists, the result can be predicted; pretty much all
theorists would point to their own proposals as by far the
strongest in the field, and recommend that all others be
shelved. If you address the same challenge to the experimentalists,
you would likely find that some of the experimentalists
would point to their own conjectures as most
promising, and dismiss most of the others; other experimentalist
would object to taking any of the theories off the
table. If we were to consider a vote on this, probably there is
more support for the Widom and Larsen proposal at present
than any of the others, due in part to the spirited advocacy
of Krivit at New Energy Times; in Italy Preparata’s approach
looms large, even at this time; and the ideas of Takahashi
and of Kim have wide support within the community. I note
that objections are known for these models, and for most
others as well.
To make progress
Given this situation, how might progress be made? In connection
with the very large number of theoretical ideas put
forth to date, some obvious things come to mind. There is
an enormous body of existing experimental results that
could be used already to check models against experiment.
We know that excess heat production in the Fleischmann-
Pons experiment in one mode is sensitive to loading, to current
density, to temperature, probably to magnetic field and
that 4He has been identified in the gas phase as a product
correlated with energy. It would be possible in principle to
work with any particular model in order to check consistency
with these basic observations. In the case of excess heat in
the NiH experiments, there is less to test against, but one can
find many things to test against in the papers of the Piantelli
group, and in the studies of Miley and coworkers. Perhaps
the biggest issue for a particular model is the absence of commensurate
energetic products, and in my view the majority
of the 1000 or so theoretical papers out there have problems
of consistency with experiment in this area.
There are issues which require experimental clarification.
For example, the issue of the Q-value in connection with the
correlation of 4He with excess energy for PdD experiments
remains a major headache for theorists (and for the field in
general), and needs to be clarified. The analogous issue of
3He production in connection with NiH and PdH is at present
essentially unexplored, and requires experimental input
as a way for theory to be better grounded in reality. I personally
think that the collimated X-rays in the Karabut
experiment are very important and need to be understood in
connection with energy exchange, and an understanding of
it would impact how we view excess heat experiments (but I
note that other theorists would not agree).
As a purely practical matter, rather than requiring a complete
and global solution to all issues (an approach advocated,
for example, by Storms), I would think that focusing on
a single theoretical issue or statement that is accessible to
experiment will be most advantageous in moving things forward
on the theoretical front. Now there are a very large
number of theoretical proposals, a very large number of
experiments (and as yet relatively little connection between
experiment and theory for the most part); but aside from the
existence of an excess heat effect, there is very little that our
community agrees on. What is needed is the proverbial theoretical
flag in the ground. We would like to associate a theoretical
interpretation with an experimental result in a way
that is unambiguous, and which is agreed upon by the community.
Historically there has been little effort focused in
this way. Sadly, there are precious few resources now, and we
have been losing people who have been in the field for a
long time (and who have experience); the prospects for significant
new experimentation is not good. There seems to be
little in the way of transfer of what has been learned from
the old guard to the new generation, and only recently has
there seemed to be the beginnings of a new generation in
the field at all.
Concluding thoughts
There are not simple solutions to the issues discussed above.
It is the case that the scientific method provides us with a
reliable tool to clarify what is right from what is wrong in
our understanding of how nature works. But it is also the
case that scientists would generally prefer not to be excluded
from the scientific community, and this sets up a fundamental
conflict between the use of the scientific method and
issues connected with social aspects involving the scientific
community. In a controversial area (such as excess heat in
the Fleischmann-Pons experiment), it almost seems that you
can do research, or you can remain a part of the scientific
community; pick one.
As argued above, the scientific method provides a powerful
tool to figure out how nature works, but the scientific
method provides no guarantee that resources will be available
to apply it to any particular question; or that the results
obtained using the scientific method will be recognized or
accepted by other scientists; or that a scientist’s career will
not be destroyed subsequently as a result of making use of
the scientific method and coming up with a result that lies
outside of the boundaries of science. Our drawing attention
to the issue here should be viewed akin to reporting a measurement;
we have data that can be used to see that this is so,
but in this case I will defer to others on the question of what
to do about it.
The degree to which fundamental theories provide a correct
description of nature (within their domains), we are able
to understand what is possible and what is not. In the event
that the theories are taken to be correct absolutely, experimentation
would no longer be needed in areas where the
outcome can be computed (enough experiments have
already been done); physics in the associated domain could
evolve to a purely mathematical science, and experimental
physics could join the engineering sciences. Excess heat in
the Fleischmann-Pons experiment is viewed by many as
being inconsistent with fundamental physical law, which
implies that inasmuch as relevant fundamental physical law
is held to be correct, there is no need to look at any of the
positive experimental results (since they must be wrong);
nor is there any need for further experimentation to clarify
the situation. From my perspective experimentation remains
a critical part of the scientific method, and we also have
great respect for the fundamental physical laws; the
headache in connection with the Fleischmann-Pons experiment
is not that it goes against fundamental physical law,
but instead that there has been a lack of understanding in
how to go from the fundamental physical laws to a model
that accounts for experiment. Experimentation provides a
route (even in the presence of such strong fundamental theory)
to understand what nature does. In my view there
should be no issue with experimentation that questions the
correctness of both fundamental, and less fundamental,
physical law, since our science is robust and will only
become more robust when subject to continued tests.
But what happens if an experimental result is reported
that seems to go against relevant fundamental physical law?
Since the fundamental physical laws have emerged as a consequence
of previous experimentation, such a new experimental
result might be viewed as going against the earlier
accumulated body of experiment. But the argument is much
stronger in the case of fundamental theory, because in this
case one has the additional component of being able to say
why the outlying experimental result is incorrect. In this
case reasons are needed if we are to disregard the experimental
result. I note that due to the great respect we have for
experimental results generally in connection with the scientific
method, the notion that we should disregard particular
experimental results should not be considered lightly.
Reasons that you might be persuaded to disregard an experimental
result include: a lack of confirmation in other experiments;
a lack of support in theory; an experiment carried
out improperly; or perhaps the experimentalists involved are
not credible. In the case of the Fleischmann-Pons experiment,
many experiments were performed early on (based on
an incomplete understanding of the experimental requirements)
that did not obtain the same result; a great deal of
effort was made to argue (incorrectly, as we are beginning to
understand) that the experimental result is inconsistent with
theory (and hence lies outside of science); it was argued that
the calorimetry was not done properly; and a great deal of
effort has been put into destroying the credibility of
Fleischmann and Pons (as well as the credibility of other
experimentalists who claimed to see the what Fleischmann
and Pons saw).
Whether it is right, or whether it is wrong, to destroy the
career of a scientist who has applied the scientific method
and obtained a result thought by others to be incorrect, is
not a question of science. There are no scientific instruments
capable of measuring whether what people do is right or
wrong; we cannot construct a test within the scientific
method capable of telling us whether what we do is right or
wrong; hence we can agree that this question very much lies
outside of science. It is a fact that the careers of Fleischmann
and Pons were destroyed (in part because their results
appeared not to be in agreement with theory), and the sense
I get from discussions with colleagues not in the field is that
this was appropriate (or at the very least expected). I am generally
not familiar with voices being raised outside of our
community suggesting that there might have been anything
wrong with this. Were we to pursue the use of this kind of
delineation in science, we very quickly enter into rather dark
territory: for example, how many careers should be
destroyed in order to achieve whatever goal is proposed as
justification? Who decides on behalf of the scientific community
which researchers should have their careers
destroyed? Should we recognize the successes achieved in
the destruction of careers by giving out awards and monetary
compensation? Should we arrange for associated outplacement
and mental health services for the newly delineated?
And what happens if a mistake is made? Should the
scientific community issue an apology (and what happens if
the researcher is no longer with us when it is recognized that
a mistake was made)? We are sure that careers get destroyed
as part of delineation in science, but on the question of what
to do about this observation we defer to others.
Arguments were put forth by critics in 1989 that excess
heat in the Fleischmann-Pons effect was impossible based on
theory, in connection with the delineation process. At the
time these arguments were widely accepted—an acceptance
that persists generally even today. From my perspective the
arguments put forth by critics that the excess heat effect is
inconsistent with the laws of physics fall short in at least one
important aspect: what is concluded is now in disagreement
with a very large number of experiments. And if somehow
that were not sufficient, the associated technical arguments
which have been given are badly broken.
In my view the new effects are a consequence of working
in a regime that we hadn’t noticed before, where some fine
print associated with the rotation from the relativistic problem
to the nonrelativistic problem causes it not to be as
helpful as what we have grown used to. If so, we can keep
what we know about condensed matter physics and nuclear
physics unchanged in their applicable regimes, and make
use of rather obvious generalizations in the new regime.
Experimental results in the case of the Fleischmann-Pons
experiment will likely be seen (retrospectively) as in agreement
with (improved) theory.
Even though there may not be simple answers to some of
the issues considered in this editorial, some very simple
statements can be made. Excess heat in the Fleischmann-
Pons experiment is a real effect. There are big implications
for science, and for society. Without resources science in this
area will not advance. With the continued destruction of the
careers of those who venture to work in the area, progress
will be slow, and there will be no continuity of effort.
❑ ❑ ❑
You can say that again
Science is the endeavor to discover what you don’t know using precise measurements, reason and logic.......
When HE has his setup refined to the point where he gets the same results every time, or at least gets results well outside the realm of random chance, THEN he gets to publish, describing accurately how to reproduce his results.
If another scientist has trouble getting the result, then the description of the apparatus was inadequately rigorous. The original scientist may, at that point, offer to work with the other scientist, perhaps offering a copy of his apparatus, until they can work out how to rigorously specify how to reproduce the effect.
However the author writes: “In the
case of the Fleischmann-Pons effect, the scientific community
has already studied the effect in sufficient detail with
the result that it lies outside of science; so as with other areas
determined to be outside of science, the scientific method
cannot be used. We recognize in this that certain questions
cannot be addressed using the scientific method.”
Then what method would he use to examine cold fusion? studying the entrails of goats?
“We recognize in this that certain questions
cannot be addressed using the scientific method.”
But why would THIS question not be able to be addressed?
Kevmo's Method which is spamming and hyping this nonsense all over FR.
Nothing says "nutcase science" like "Infinite Energy."
Typically the important question of why researchers have not been able to produce cold fusion consistently hasn’t been brought up.
The fact is that experiment rules...theory be damned.
I put that in there just for you. I knew that you would read as far as you could to find something negative to say. I could have left it as just LENR-CANR.ORG but then you might actually have to read some of the article. I gave you the excuse you needed to not read the article, which is what you’ve shown you’re so reluctant to do.
Thanks 4 Bumping The Thread T4BTT
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/2965392/posts?page=19#19
It is the responsibility of the scientist to do his best to get reliably reproducible results before publishing. His research is not complete until he does. When HE has his setup refined to the point where he gets the same results every time, or at least gets results well outside the realm of random chance, THEN he gets to publish, describing accurately how to reproduce his results.
***Cloning the sheep named Dolly only got something like 1/30,000 tries. LENR beats this standard by a mile. Current replications are about 1/3 tries.
You consistently ignore the fact that the Anomalous Heat Effect has been replicated more than 14,700 times.
If a researcher has an occasional positive result against mostly negative results then either his experimental conditions vary in some subtle way or his method of examination cannot yield a consistent answer.
***First of all, this is a classic fallacy of false dilemma reasoning. It only takes ONE positive result to replicate it, and this effect has been replicated more than 14,700 times. Consistent answers are NOT required, otherwise you’d have to wait 30 years before you can acknowledge that Dolly the sheep has been cloned. Typical skeptopath reasoning includes lowering the bar for other researchers while raising it for LENR researchers.
so as with other areas
determined to be outside of science, the scientific method
cannot be used.
***He’s talking about how scientists us a priori reasoning, which is another classic fallacy. You really don’t know how to spot fallacies, do you?
Thanks 4 Bumping The Thread T4BTT
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/2965392/posts?page=19#19
I don't think sarcasm is going to help the bad image of cold fusion.
It doesn't help Hagelstein either:
From Wiki:
In 1989 he started investigating low-energy nuclear reactions, with the hope of making a breakthrough similar to the X-ray laser.[2] The field has since been discredited in the eyes of most scientists, and due to his involvement he has never achieved full professorship and he has lost his own laboratory.[2]
Wow, you're so clever, yet the real source is still INFINITE ENERGY (LOL!).
LENR-CANR.ORG is nothing more than someone's personal website.
His sarcasm was too subtle for most readers. Personally, I enjoyed it, and find that a huge part of his criticism is especially valid when pointed towards the fraud known as "global warming climate change".
But why would THIS question not be able to be addressed?
***Duhh, just how dim are you? To point out the obvious, if scientists engage in a-priori reasoning, the question at hand will not be able to be addressed. I mean, really. Huge duhh factor.
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