As the article points out, however, there were options other than simply staying there.
In his book "A Bright Shining Lie", Neil Sheehan made reference to several battles during WWII that were completely unnecessary; he cited Peleliu, Tarawa, and Cape Gloucester. The intelligence about the sites had been incorrect and the errors were not discovered until the battles had commenced or after their completion. Interestingly, he wrote, "But in the end, the victory redeemed them all." (In other words, as long as we won the war, we would simply justify the loss of American lives as being somehow necessary for the greater cause of the American victory at the end.)
I've read several articles about the Hurtgen Forest fight; I know that there are tours in Germany where one can see the battlefield (and pull shrapnel from the trees). But to Neil Sheehan's list, I would add the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest.
The problem with all battle plans is that the enemy gets uncontrolled input.
And I would add the battle for Monte Casino. Why was it no bypassed and starved out? it would have taken fewer troops than died to isolate it. The place had to be a miserable existence after it was bombed so heavily. Why were the german defenders not just left to rot in that festering mountain top mess? I would have bombed them randomly and heavily until they simply gave up.
Peleliu, I knew a Marine Aviator who was there. He was also at Guadalcanal and onward after that. He told me about it all. I asked where he went after Peleliu. He said they shipped him home, he said Peleliu finished him and he hung his head. He was nearly 90 by then, we both cried. When I would visit him at the home I always addressed him the same way, “How you doin’ today Marine!?” and he always responded by sitting up a little taller, stuck out his hand and gave a big grin. It was always good to see him. He went down fast and hard at the end.
Knowing when to leave or bypass is not even in the minds of some. Pity.
I recall hearing a lecture by General Trevor Dupuy, a military historian, in which he likened our victory over the Germans in WWII to the Mexicans’ victory over the Texans at the Alamo. In both cases, the winning side won not because of superior strategies or tactics but because of sheer power that eventually overpowered their opponents.