Wasn't that part of Hannibal's tactic in the Second Punic, to force the Romans to chase him into Iberia?
Robert E. Lee used it too, during the Seven Days chase down the Virginia countryside.
Hannibal forced Roman armies to attack him in his prepared positions, which was unusual in that he maintained the initiative for basically his entire 16 year campaign in Italy. He wasn’t able to take fortified towns, lived off the land where possible, and had a reliable line of communication, supply, reinforcement by sea, thanks to the Carthaginian navy. I believe his brother was the one who was run out of Spain after being chased around and finally beaten by, hmm, one of the Scipio family. The path to Africa and the Carthaginian homeland lay open after that, and the attack there sobered up the Carthaginian oligarchy in a big hurry. They’d been in favor of the Barca family staying on campaign outside of Carthage proper, because of family rivalries not that unlike those going on in Rome (especially late in the Republican period), but when the Romans started marching toward them, the Carthaginian regime never wanted anyone back home so fast. Carthage relied on mercenaries for both land and sea campaigns, officers were perhaps 50-50 native-foreign.
I’m not a Hannibal worshipper; his reputation appears to be based on Cannae for the most part. His approach in that battle relied on active cavalry support on the flanks, without which he’d probably have been beaten back and forced to beat a hasty retreat. It’s interesting that Pompey used cavalry in that fashion at Pharsalus, and Caesar anticipated it, and prepared a response relying on guile, surreptitious deployments, and audacity. Both were great generals, Pompey being just a few years Caesar’s senior. That time the flanking cavalry didn’t work, or rather, it worked, but against the ‘wrong’ side.
Alexander the Great not only used a flanking cavalry maneuver at Issus, he led the charge I believe, and shattered the entire Persian left flank, then rolled up the entire Persian line in a mass of terror and confusion. I think the portrayal of Issus is one of the screwups in that awful movie.
Somewhere (can’t find it) I read an anecdote — Hannibal was asked by Scipio Africanus how he would rate various historical generals. He ranked himself second to Alexander, explaining, “had I been victorious over Scipio, I’d rank myself above Alexander,” a profound compliment from one fighting man to another, as well as a paradox.
Lee vs McClellan, heh, matchup for the ages, eh? I’m surprised McClellan could make such good time with piss-soaked drawers. Lee was attacking a numerically superior and probably better-armed foe, and taking tremendous casualties all the way along. Also, he had the best corp commander of the war, Jackson, attacking on one flank. The tactic of maintaining a skeleton line to hide their much smaller numbers was successfully used, and again at Chancellorsville (which some people, including yours truly, regard as Stonewall’s masterpiece).
At Gettysburg, the Union commander Meade picked his ground, dug in, and let Lee attack, a classic counterpuncher approach. Had Jackson been alive at that time, I doubt that would have been the approach, he’d have talked Lee out of it. The afternoon skirmishes that preceded the ‘official’ first day of that battle helped lay out the set-pieces to come. Leaving their camp fires burning to simulate, what was left of the ANV slipped out under cover of darkness.
Meade’s failure to counterattack on what would have been day four (or five I guess) was prudent, and more within his comfort zone, and to do other than that was probably not feasible. They also couldn’t maneuver much. Mounting pursuit probably wouldn’t have worked, as the ANV had a big head start and was rolling light.
The Union analogue to Seven Days was not long after — Grant took over, crossed the river with a huge army, and met Lee’s regrouped forces day after day, slamming together, with both sides eating up ammo and manpower, and settling into almost 300 days of siege and combat. Full mobilization of the Union didn’t really arrive until 1864; by the time of Appomatox, there were fully reinforced, fully manned infantry and artillery units, there was a large navy, and a vast (compared with earlier times) telegraph and rail network. The overall strategy of the Union was able to be carried out everywhere for the first time, and it was.