Posted on 03/03/2003 8:27:25 AM PST by general_re
I thought a new thread was a good idea, and here seems to be a good place to put it, so as not to clutter up "News". The only topic available was "heated discussion", though. ;)
If any clarification about the pictures is needed, just say so, and I will try to at least highlight the part that I am interested in for you. Remember that I'm interested in the objects or structures or artifacts being represented, so don't be thrown off if the illustrations seem abstract.
Well forsnax5, to say and to know are not necessarily the same things. Yes, we do have to accept certain things in order to make sense of the world. But my larger point in this exercise is to draw attention to the main differences between the historical sciences and the natural sciences.
In the natural sciences, you can set up an experiment and test something in real time, by means of direct observation. You cannot do that in the historical sciences. Still, we need to have some sense of the past, and this is the task of the historical sciences, as with any form of history. But the kind of "rigor" you get with the natural sciences is simply not to be expected from the historical sciences.
As I mentioned earlier, the historical sciences are about the construction of "likely stories" or, in the technical language, of myths. That technical language is as old as Plato, who first devised it. So, I'm thinking, if what you have to accept as the "best effort" of an historical science is a likely story, you want to make as sure as possible that it is the most likely story that we can get, given the current state of knowledge.
It is probably very upsetting to the post-modern sensibility to even use the word "myth" in connection with this problem. Today, that term is understood as synonymous with "falsehood." But I have to believe that no myth, no matter how fanciful or improbable it might seem to us today, could have long survived if it didn't have something "true" about it.
So what it all boils down to, for me, is this: If the historical sciences are going to present to us myth or legends under the color of science, at least let them make sure that they have considered all the angles, all the available evidence, and to entertain in good faith potential alternative hypotheses. This approach keeps the problem open, rather than just shutting it down to all further inquiry because it has become a "closed" question.
On that score, of particular concern to me would be to find a way to come up with some kind of objective assessment as to how long it might have taken to build these things (and when the expert consulting firm speaks to this issue, they say ten years; but I'd bet, given my recent experiences with the fruits of expert consulting engineers -- I live in Boston, and have seen the Big Dig -- I find it highly doubtful that even they could meet this schedule); then, I would like to see that finding correlated to what can be known about about average human life expectancy during the relevant period. (From what I have read, this would be something like 35 years, based, I gather, on mummy forensics.) I would also like to know what connection, if any, exists between the pyramids and the Sphinx -- which I have read dates at least 10,000 years older than the pyramids themselves. Does the Sphinx have any kind of bearing on the question of who built the pyramids? Or should we just rule that out, right up-front? Other people might have other questions.
I think there are still thing we need to learn more about before we shut the door on the investigation and simply say that we know something that can never really be known, in principle, at all -- at least not in the manner of the natural sciences.
Do you see what I mean? Thank you so much forsnax5 for writing.
Well forsnax5, to say and to know are not necessarily the same things. Yes, we do have to accept certain things in order to make sense of the world. But my larger point in this exercise is to draw attention to the main differences between the historical sciences and the natural sciences.
In the natural sciences, you can set up an experiment and test something in real time, by means of direct observation. You cannot do that in the historical sciences. Still, we need to have some sense of the past, and this is the task of the historical sciences, as with any form of history. But the kind of "rigor" you get with the natural sciences is simply not to be expected from the historical sciences.
As I mentioned earlier, the historical sciences are about the construction of "likely stories" or, in the technical language, of myths. That technical language is as old as Plato, who first devised it. So, I'm thinking, if what you have to accept as the "best effort" of an historical science is a likely story, you want to make as sure as possible that it is the most likely story that we can get, given the current state of knowledge.
It is probably very upsetting to the post-modern sensibility to even use the word "myth" in connection with this problem. Today, that term is understood as synonymous with "falsehood." But I have to believe that no myth, no matter how fanciful or improbable it might seem to us today, could have long survived if it didn't have something "true" about it.
So what it all boils down to, for me, is this: If the historical sciences are going to present to us myth or legends under the color of science, at least let them make sure that they have considered all the angles, all the available evidence, and to entertain in good faith potential alternative hypotheses. This approach keeps the problem open, rather than just shutting it down to all further inquiry because it has become a "closed" question.
On that score, of particular concern to me would be to find a way to come up with some kind of objective assessment as to how long it might have taken to build these things (and when the expert consulting firm speaks to this issue, they say ten years; but I'd bet, given my recent experiences with the fruits of expert consulting engineers -- I live in Boston, and have seen the Big Dig -- I find it highly doubtful that even they could meet this schedule); then, I would like to see that finding correlated to what can be known about about average human life expectancy during the relevant period. (From what I have read, this would be something like 35 years, based, I gather, on mummy forensics.) I would also like to know what connection, if any, exists between the pyramids and the Sphinx -- which I have read dates at least 10,000 years older than the pyramids themselves. Does the Sphinx have any kind of bearing on the question of who built the pyramids? Or should we just rule that out, right up-front? Other people might have other questions.
I think there are still thing we need to learn more about before we shut the door on the investigation and simply say that we know something that can never really be known, in principle, at all -- at least not in the manner of the natural sciences.
Do you see what I mean? Thank you so much forsnax5 for writing.
Terminology quibble. Usually, the term "historical science" -- which includes astronomy, geology, anthropology, paleontology, climatology, archaeology, cosmology, criminology, and of course, evolution -- is used in contrast to "experimental science." Your use of the term "natural science" (instead of "experimental science") makes it seem as if the historical sciences are somehow un-natural. They are not.
Well PH, of course the historical sciences are not "unnatural!!!" Human beings engage in them far too much to say that they could in any way be regarded as unnatural. Engaging them is a huge part of what it is to be a thinking human being.
So if you prefer the term "experimental science," I don't have the least quibble. In fact if anything, IMHO it affords greater clarity.
Earlier you wrote to suggest that once you know the tools that were available to work on a [historical] problem, then you can deduce all the rest.
Let's see. Let's say I own a hammer. Let's say you can ascertain that I, in fact, do own a hammer; and more, you can ascertain that, indeed, I do know how to use a hammer. Now, from that secure knowledge base, how do you get to the knowledge that allows you to state what projects on which I have actually used that hammer? Or how long it took me to complete those projects?
I really liked the article general_re bumped me to. I thought it was a very rational attempt to explain how a thing could be done, based on the set of evidence selected for the purpose. But that is not what it takes to show that that was how a thing actually was done. See what I mean? We have a big "gap" here.
Thanks for writing, PH.
For instance, I think it is perfectly possible that, in our age of high-speed computers, pyramid construction might well be "modelable," given a strong enough hypothesis. That would lead to the problem of constructing data sets that would be relevant to the problem. We can't bring back third millennium Egyptians as constituents of such experimentation. But we could harnass up 20-man teams comprised of presently existing mortals to test the amounts of time it takes to transport stones of various "pyramid-class" weights, by means of various conveyances (simple "log-rolling," or sleds), from point A to point B within a specified time frame. Then we could even be so generous as to test the 15-degree inclined ramp model (which seems to be of quite modern origin) to see how that would work out. Etc.
The trick would be to outline the major construction challenges, then see how any number of ways such challenges could be solved, given what we know about the capabilities of the era in view.
I imagine we could get a whole lot of fresh insight into our current problem, provided we were willing to get set aside the reigning "doctrines" on the subject, at least for the duration of the experiment.
JMHO FWIW.
Not at all what I was getting at. I should have said "un-scientific," or maybe "supernatural." The point I was making is that the historical sciences (astronomy, geology, etc.), although non-experimental, are nevertheless natural and scientific, and your usage of the term "natural" when referring only to the experimental sciences could give someone the wrong impression.
Earlier you wrote to suggest that once you know the tools that were available to work on a [historical] problem, then you can deduce all the rest.
I didn't write that -- not precisely that. We were talking about how it can be deduced what technology was available to the pyramid-building Egyptians. I gave a range of evidence, from tools to texts to artwork to examining the actual artificats that were constructed. And I told you I'm not an expert in this area. We can never literally know how the Egyptians built the pyramids, because there are no witnesses left alive, and no contemporaneous writings have been found. So it's detective work (or "historical science"), which is never 100% convincing, but it applies reason to all the available evidence. What else can we do?
This is worth elaborating on: no scienctific theory, historical or experimental, is "100% convincing" in the sense that we can know it to be a completely accurate model of reality. All scientific theories are held tentatively. Thus, when one says that a historical science is "not 100% convincing" it in no way reduces the stature of that science to level beneath "experimental" sciences.
In point of fact, Popper specifically opined that historical sciences are no less scientific than the experimental sciences, in that theories in either of them can satisfy the requirement of falsifiability.
In conclusion, "historical science" does not mean "less scientific" than experimental science.
Indeed. Consider:
1. In our lab experiments starting tomorrow, the speed of light tests different from what it has been. Physics (the exemplar of an experimental science) was thus wrong to assume that "c" is a constant, and the old theory must be revised.One example is of an experimental science, the other is an historical science. Either can have its theories disproved by evidence. Both are scientific.2. In some historical science (why not use evolution as an example?) new evidence shows up that reveals a previously-held notion to be incorrect, so the old theory must be revised.
A-Girl, I must quibble with your choice of terminology too. The historical sciences -- including but not limited to astronomy, geology, anthropology, paleontology, climatology, archaeology, criminology, cosmology and evolution -- do not (in BB's words which you endorse) "present to us myth or legends under the color of science," nor do the professionals in such fields fail to consider "all the angles, all the available evidence, and to entertain in good faith potential alternative hypotheses," nor do they fail to keep "the problem open, rather than just shutting it down to all further inquiry."
I strongly disagree with all those phrases which are used to single out the historical sciences as being somehow inferior to the experimental sciences. The same criticisms can, on occasion, apply to all of the sciences. The historical sciences are sciences. Tell me, in terms of your knowledge and your degree of confidence in that knowledge, the difference between:
1. Going into the lab and watching, for the zillionth time, water being broken down into hydrogen and oxygen, which supports the fundamental theories that underlie chemistry; andIn each case, one experimental and one historical, you are presented with persuasive information that supports the theories of the respective sciences. In each case you see the evidence with your own eyes. In each case the theories can be disproved if new evidence comes along which is inconsistent with the theories. In each case, in other words, the theories can be falsified. So in each case, what's going on is "science." The nature of the data is different, because some data gets preserved in museums, and some has to be produced over and over again. But it's all data. And it's all science. Myths are something else.2. Going into a museum and observing, for the zillionth time, the chronologically arranged collection of fossils and DNA material that supports the theory of evolution.
Costruct a model that would permit us to get some greater precision with respect to how long it would have taken Egyptians to have constructed the pyramids (as I sketched out, above), and cross-correlate that with Egyptian life-expectancy data. If it were to be learned that it likely took longer to construct the Great Pyramid than the reign of Khufu, or even his total lifespan, then this would be helpful information. The converse, BTW, is also true. It seems the best way that I can think of to settle the matter.
Below are two examples, but there are many others, e.g. Stonehedge, Easter Island, location of Solomon’s Temple, David as a historical figure.
You are certainly welcome to your views. IMHO, it is very helpful to know our differences to facilitate better understanding! Hugs!!!
I. Mathematics, Geometry, Statistics, et alNice list. Certainly your category I deserves to be ranked above the others. Math and geometry are deductive, and will always be ahead of any inductive systems in the confidence we place in their conclusions. Your last category properly deserves to be at the bottom, as those topics are riddled with subjectivity.
II. Physics, Information Science, et al
III. Chemistry, Biology, Medicine, et al
IV. Astronomy, Cosmology, Geology, Climatology, Criminology, et al.
V. Anthropology, Paleontology, Archaeology, Evolution, History, et al
VI. Metaphysics, Philosophy, Psychology, Politics, et al
All the stuff in the middle, it seems to me, really depends on the quantity and quality of the evidence that we have to work with, and on the sophistication of our instruments. (I think evolution deserves to rank well ahead of archaeology, by the way.) Compared to physics, for example, archaeology seems primitive, but I suspect it's because in the field of archaeology we have so little information to go on that the resulting theories sometimes do seem more like myths than science. But it's not for lack of rationality, or application of the scientific method. The difference, in my always humble opinion, lies in the quality of the data, not in the "experimental vs. historical" disjunction.
Massive hugs.
evolution, as I have said many times is ANTI-SCIENCE.
The central point of science is the discovery of causes and effects and materialist evolution denies it. It proposes random events as the engine of the transformation of species.
This is totally unscientific, it is an attack on science which in order to expand human knowledge and human health and living standards needs to find the causes and effects of how our Universe functions.
Randomness answers nothing and leads to no discoveries.
In fact it opposes scientific inquiry and is a philosophical know-nothingism.
That is why evolution has been popular with the masses and virtually ignored by scientists.
It is ... pseudo-science --- for morons.
With a few words such as 'survival of the fittest' and 'natural selection' it seeks to make idiots think they are knowledgeable.
We see the idiocy of evolution and evolutionists daily on these threads. That is why they all repeat the same stock phrases, throw a few links (because they cannot even understand the concepts being discussed), but never give any facts showing their theory to be what they claim it is - the center of science. If it was, they should have no problem doing so. It is not, that's why they cannot.
sop ...
The theory of evolution is just that - a theory.
g3 ...
It may be a theory, but it is not a scientifically supported theory which is what evolutionists claim it to be. Anybody can have a theory about anything. It is whether a theory is valid that is the point. So you have not given any evidence for your side. All you have done is indulge in rhetoric, but you have not shown that evolution is science or have in any way refuted my statement that evolution cannot in fact be science because of its central proposition that 'evolution just happens'.
Such is not science.
539 posted on 03/13/2003 8:59 PM PST by gore3000
Consequently, the further down the list, the greater the demand for subjective analysis - and therefore, in my case, the lower my confidence in the results.
Me either, A-G. And for the same reason: "I find them highly differentiated by their epistemological zeal."
Something that concerns me very much is a seemingly growing tendency within the sciences -- more pronounced in the social and historical sciences than in the "hard" sciences, but sometimes present even in the latter -- for the creators of the various theories to so fall in love with their creations that they will defend them against any and all challenges "from outside." With a passion reminiscent of devout Muslims defending a mosque against the infidel. (If anybody doubts this assessment, check out any CREVO thread around here.)
I remember Marx. I remember his "forbidding of questioning." Marx had to forbid all questioning, in order for his system to survive. His system is perfectly internally consistent -- on its own terms. So, no other terms allowed! Especially not those that relate to the "real world."
I loved your ranking system!!! I mainly agree, though do feel a tad chagrined that you generally dumped philosophy on the lowest rung. :^) Yet the system is not static: math penetrates down through all the inferior ranks, and epistomology bubbles up from below, from philosophy.
Thanks so much for writing, Alamo-Girl. It's always such a pleasure to hear from you. Hugs girl!
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