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MOTION FOR Texas Rules of Evidence (TRE), 705(b) VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

MOTION FOR Texas Rules of Evidence (TRE), 705(b) VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION


DEFENDANT (ZIRAVAN), pro se, hereby moves to set aside the complaint with prejudice. Defendant states that this is a good faith motion for good cause and prays the Court’s consideration and indulgence. Defendant believes that, due to the informal procedures of Municipal Court, that the issues raised in this motion can be disposed of in a timely manner and Defendant prays to not unduly take up the Court’s time in this matter.
In support of this motion, Defendant states:
The case arose on the 16th day of May, 2003; the Defendant, (ZIRAVAN), was stopped and cited by a Calvert Police Officer for allegedly exceeding an alleged lawfully POSTED 55 MPH SPEED LIMIT on Texas State Highway 6, allegedly within the northern boundary of the City of Calvert; a violation of TX § 545.351 et. al., Transportation Code.
Any alleged infraction occurred north of the Municipal line of the City of Calvert, TX. As such, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this complaint. The posting of the 55mph Speed Limit sign at the northern corridor of Calvert, TX, is not in accordance with the Texas Prima Facie Speed Limit Law. Regardless, any such prosecution raises considerable Constitutional issues. Finally, Federal guidelines sufficiently rebut any prima facie burden imposed by the State, in this case.
Any alleged infraction occurred well north of the Municipal line of the City of Calvert, TX. Defendant moves to request a TRE 705(b) VOIR DIRE examination prior to trial in order to determine the underlying facts of the prosecution’s expert witness testimony regarding the specific location of the alleged infraction for the purposes of determining if the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.
Defendant requests this VOIR DIRE Examination in order to resolve jurisdiction issues prior to trial. Any testimony given during VOIR DIRE Exam would likely be brought up at trial, and, because this is a trial by Judge, no jury manipulation will be necessary for this exam. The purpose for this request is not to lengthen the trial; rather it is to change the order of trial so that jurisdictional issues are heard first.
Texas Law establishes a prima facie speed limit of 70mph (65 at night) at this stretch of State Hwy 06. As such the posted speed limit of 55mph is in violation of the State Prima Facie Speed Limit Law.
TX § 545.352 (2) establishes the following prima facie speed limit: “70 miles per hour in daytime and 65 miles per hour in nighttime if the vehicle is a passenger car . . . on a highway numbered by this state or the United States outside an urban district ...”
That same law defines an urban district as follows: TX § 545.352 (d)(3): “Urban district” means the territory adjacent to and including a highway, if the territory is improved with structures that are used for business, industry, or dwelling houses and are located at intervals of less than 100 feet for a distance of at least one-quarter mile on either side of the highway.”
Immediately after Tidwell Creek Rd and extending for 0.842 miles to the municipal border, the City of Calvert is undeveloped and does not meet the legal definition of “Urban District”. In accordance with State Law, the Prima Facie Speed limit should return to 70mph (65mph at night) approximately .25 miles after Tidwell Creek Rd., and not at the northern Municipal border!
This creates an area of approximately 0.6 miles within the northern Municipality of Calvert, along State Hwy 06, in which the 55 mph speed limit is erroneously extended, according to State Law. (This is the same exact area in the citation of this case.)
While the State does give municipalities some authority to alter speed limits, that law, TX § 545.356, requires any such alteration to be “from the results of an engineering and traffic investigation”. TxDot specifically denies the existence of any such currently valid investigation (see attached email #2).
Because the prosecution’s prima facie case is based upon an erroneous extension of a 55mph Speed Limit Sign, the prima facie burden imposed by the prosecution’s case is legally corrupted and as such, should be ruled inadmissible by this Court, in this case.
Texas prima facie speed limits raise considerable Due Process concerns with regard to the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution in regards to this specific case.
It is necessary at this point to briefly discuss the following concept in Texas Law: Texas Administrative Code (TAC) TITLE 43 PART 1 CHAPTER 25 SUBCHAPTER B RULE §25.23 (See Appendix 1 to this motion for a fuller reading of the Law –
“Theory. Use of the 85th percentile speed concept is based on the theory that:
(A) a speed at or below which 85 percent of people drive at any given location under good weather and visibility conditions may be considered as the maximum safe speed for that location; and . . .
(E) Experience proves these findings valid and shows that the 85th percentile speed is the one characteristic of traffic speeds that most closely conforms to a speed limit which is considered safe and reasonable.”
Exceeding posted speed limits, per se, is not a violation of Texas Law. TX § 545.351, states that “An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing.” The Texas Administrative Code adds the following insight: (TAC),TITLE 43, PART 1, CHAPTER 25, SUBCHAPTER B “PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING SPEED ZONES”, RULE §25.21 (Q)3 - “To exceed a prima facie speed limit does not automatically constitute an infraction of the law, as reasonable and prudent driving behavior is, at times, possible at speeds in excess of the posted limit.”
That same code, in justification of the prima facie law, states “However, the burden of proof of reasonable and prudent conduct under the existing conditions rests with the driver.” That is an Unconstitutional shift in the burden of proof in a criminal case. An essential element of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ is that the prosecution has a Constitutional obligation to prove all the elements of its case ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, regardless whether State legislators deem otherwise.
It isn’t mere prima facie legislation that violates due process. By its own admission in the TAC, the State of Texas concedes that traveling in excess of the posted speed is not necessarily a violation of law. An essential element of a prosecuting authority’s case must address that possibility, to wit: proving that a particular speed above the posted speed limit is neither reasonable nor prudent. Transferring to defendant the obligation to disprove an essential element of a criminal complaint breaches procedural due process.
Defendant believes that this is a good faith argument. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) agrees. According to the FHWA, an essential element of prosecution in a prima facie state includes proving the unreasonableness of speed, regardless of the posted limit: “In States with prima facie speed limits, the challenge from the enforcement and adjudication perspective is that law enforcement officers have to be prepared to prove that the speed was unreasonable and imprudent for road conditions regardless of the posted speed limit.” http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/03jan/10.htm
Simply put, how many times everyday in Texas Courts does guilt or innocence in moving violations comes down to some form of “Were you exceeding the speed limit?” When the law states that exceeding the speed limit is not necessarily a violation of the law, then determining guilt or innocence on an issue that doesn’t conclusively prove or support the prosecution’s legislated prima facie allowance is a violation of procedural due process. The defendant in such a case is not afforded the procedural due process of reasonable doubt when such doubt is a matter of law.
More to the point, exactly how can a defendant prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he/she was indeed operating a motor vehicle above the posted speed limit but in a reasonable and prudent manner? Is operating a motor vehicle under clear weather conditions, with no other traffic on the road, at or near the 85th percentile speed (a speed determined by State Law TO BE a reasonable and prudent speed), in an undeveloped, non-urban area of a State Highway sufficient proof? Or is the standard of proof by which a defendant may establish reasonable doubt so impossibly high that no defense would suffice? This is the core of procedural due process in this case: a defendant must have a reasonable and fair opportunity to substantiate reasonable doubt when the law clearly and specifically states that such doubt can exist.
Far more compelling is the substantive due process concerns of this specific case.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on numerous occasions, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 US 516, 527, that “Protection against governmental arbitrariness is the core of due process.”
The stated and implied object of the legislation in the cited Texas Law, § 545.351 “Maximum Speed Requirement” et. al. is public safety. In order to avoid arbitrariness, a law that purports to be in the interest of public safety must, must actually be in the interest of public safety. A simple look at both the TAC and established engineering rules substantially proves that this is not the case.
Since it is part of Texas Law, a well-grounded place to start is the section of TAC referenced in Appendix 1. The relevant question regarding arbitrariness of the law in this specific case is this: Is the posted speed limit a safe speed?
In the case of this stretch of State Hwy 06, a traffic study was secured in 1993. The 85th percentile speed within the municipality of Calvert, TX, along it’s northern boundary along State Hwy. 06 for the northern direction of traffic was documented in that study at 66 mph! (See Attached Study). That speed doesn’t even take into account a 2mph accepted variance [TAC TITLE 43 PART 1 CHAPTER 25 SUBCHAPTER B RULE §25.238. (b)]. And yet, this still doesn’t tell the whole story.
The Public Information Office from TxDOT Bryan District specifically states (see attached emails) that the 1993 study is no longer valid on this stretch of Highway because of the increase of speed from 55-70mph at the northern boundary of the Municipality.
Why the study is no longer valid is relevant:
The Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) at Texas A&M University compared speeds and crash frequency data for the first nine months of 1996 (after repeal of national speed limit laws) and found that the speed driven by 85% of drivers on Texas interstates—the standard measure used to set speed limits—increased from 72.3 mph to 74 mph. The percentage of drivers exceeding the speed limit jumped from 16.3% to 27.2%. (URL:www.tti.tamu.edu)
When speed limits increase within a stretch of road, the 85th percentile speed also marginally increases. This is the case even at the posted 55mph speed within the northern municipal boundary of Calvert, TX. The reason is clear and reasonable – as motorists understand and anticipate higher approaching speed limits, they operate their vehicles taking that expectation into account. (as a reminder, those same operational habits are the primary means the State of Texas uses to establish the safest roadway speed, see excerpts of the TAC – Appendix 1). No study has been done since the 1993 study, but the current 85th percentile speed for this stretch of road, the one characteristic of traffic speeds that most closely conforms to a speed limit which is considered safe and reasonable, has almost certainly changed in a marginally increased manner. The actual, current 85th percentile speed reasonably approaches or even surpasses 70mph within the municipality! (66mph +/-2 (accepted variance) + an expected but as yet unmeasured marginal increase in the 85th percentile since the 70mph speed limit was established at the boundary)
From USDot, Speed Management Workshop, June 12, 2002, Engineering Issues:
Keith Harrison, Design Engineer, (FHWA):
The design speed is also intended to reasonably accommodate the driving skills and behavior of the vast majority of drivers. In practice, this vast majority has come to mean 85 percent, and that value (the 85th percentile speed) is often used as an initial
benchmark in setting realistic speed limits.”
Understandably, reasonable conditions exists that would require setting maximum speed limits below the 85th percentile, in the interest of safety. The TAC specifically mentions those conditions. School zones, construction zones, high accident zones (not a factor in this area according to the lastest,1993, study, see attached), are examples of when the established speed limits should be lower than the 85th percentile. All these conditions, however, would require lower speed limits to notify the driver of conditions not readily apparent to the driver. None of these conditions exists in this case.
The most reasonable and prudent safe speed at this stretch of highway, within the municipality along its northern boundary on State Highway 06 is much more likely to be at or even exceed 70mph than 55mph! But, if 70mph is the safest speed, wouldn’t 55mph be safer? Simply put, no.
Several studies have proven that the safest speed occurs within the nadir of a U shaped graph, where both lower and faster speeds have a direct contribution on a decrease in safety (see graph, below).

This graph is from the Office of Traffic Injury Control Programs, a department of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in a landmark study, “Synthesis of Safety Research Related to Speed and Speed Management” (7/98 – Pub No. FHWA-RD-98-154). In that report, the Federal Government found that “The likelihood of being in a crash was extremely flat, with little difference in crash risks for vehicles traveling within 15mph of the mean speed”, but that “The crash risks for vehicles traveling much faster or slower was six times the average rate”. Note that the mean or average speed of motorists is not necessarily the posted speed but is closer to the 85th percentile speed within which the majority of motorists travel.
In the case of this stretch of highway, the maximum speed limit (55mph) is set at or near 15mph lower than the average speed of motorists. The result is that, on this section of highway, the posted speed limit is six times more likely to cause a crash than the actual safest speed of approximately 70mph. Setting a speed limit so much lower than the optimal safe speed has been proven to be unsafe!
To refer to the previous discussion, the actual speed limit along this stretch of State Hwy should be 70/65 mph. The 55mph speed limit sign is erroneously extended to the Municipal border. Either the sign is placed wrong and unsafe, or the State Law is unsafe. In either case, this is the core of substantive due process. For a law to be legal, there must be a correlation between the design of the law and the intent. In this particular case, with this particular speed limit sign, there is no correlation: the design of the law directly opposes the intent! This speed limit sign is therefore a breach of substantive due process: the speed limit dictates that motorists must operate their vehicles at an unsafe speed, in the interest of safety.
The Texas Law raises substantial Equal Protection concerns.
To review an earlier cited study, The Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) at Texas A&M University compared speeds for the first nine months of 1996 (after repeal of national speed limit laws) and found . . . the percentage of drivers exceeding the speed limit jumped from 16.3% to 27.2%. (URL:www.tti.tamu.edu)
Under the new Texas prima facie speeding laws, implemented in 1996 and amended in 1999, 27.2% of highway motorists violate the law at any given moment. When more than a fourth of the population are routinely in violation of a criminal statute, no amount of enforcement can ensure that even a fraction of violators can be prosecuted.
Equal Protection ensures that any law must hold an equal and reasonable chance of enforcement. The Texas Law doesn’t even purport to live up to that standard. No reasonable lawman or Court would stipulate that the law, in design, has a reasonable chance of catching all or even most speeding motorists. The actual usual and customary practice of the statutes is to enforce speed by randomly prosecuting the alleged criminal actions of a fourth of the population.
This is not to say that, because a significant percentage of the population may violate a law, that that law should be held to be Unconstitutional. It isn’t mere high non-compliance with a law that violates due process, but the reason for such high non- compliance. The State has purposely devised a law that criminalizes the safe and prudent actions of a significant plurality of its citizens. As a result, its agents can or must only discriminately or randomly enforce the statute. Such a scheme breaches Equal Protection precisely because, under this scheme, prosecution of the law is not dependent upon guilt, but upon the discretional acts of agents of the State. This ability and necessity to discriminate, by any and whatever standard, deprives the population as a whole, and 27.2% of the population particularly, of Equal Protection under the Law.
This is the quintessential trade-off in enforcement vs. safety. The highest reasonable speed to allow safe movement of the population should be regulated in order to ensure better compliance with the law. The standard for this relationship, as previously discussed, is the 85th percentile speed – the speed at which 15% of drivers would violate the law at any given moment. Federal and State (see appendix 1) standards declare that the 85th percentile speed (criminalizing at the 15% level) is the most reasonable trade-off between safety and enforcement.
The old National Speed Limit Law came quite close to the 15% standard with 16.3% violations (enforcement at the 83.7 percentile). The new Texas Law criminalizes 27.2% of motorists (enforcement at the 72.8 percentile!). That is a 40% increase in non-compliance. The result is that approximately 45% of speeding motorists are operating their vehicles safely above the speed limit (12.2% - motorists in violation of the law but driving at or under the 85th percentile divided by the total number of violators – 27.2%)!
Under this scheme, even though 45% of speeding drivers are operating their vehicles safely at or below the 85th percentile, the State resolutely grants itself prima facie evidence to enforce at the 72.8 percentile level!
This is the essence of Equal Protection concerns with the State’s scheme. At what point is the State randomly enforcing law regardless of guilt versus enforcement for actual unsafe and imprudent driving?!
The State’s obligation should be to legislate standards that allow for the highest percentage of compliance with the law as possible. It can be reasonably argued that this is simply not the case in current law.
In 1966, Congress passed the HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT that required all traffic
control on public roadways in the nation be based on sound engineering principles,
practices and have a common “basis in fact” determination, appearance and
application. These mandates are found in Title 23, United States Code. Under Title 23, this act mandates conformity with The National Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).
It is this law that creates national safety signs, signals, markings, and devices (the speed limit signs posted in Texas are exactly similar to signs posted nationwide). This federal law, MUTCD, was created to do more than just standardize signs and highway devices; the law was created to standardize road conditions, to include speed and speeding limits.
The 1995 repeal of national speed limits removed federal penalty for non-compliance to MUTCD, but it did not repeal the directive for compliance with MUTCD.
MUTCD 2b.11 sets forth the following guidance: “When a speed limit is to be posted, it should be the 85th percentile speed of free flowing traffic, rounded up to the nearest 10km/h (5mph) increment.”
Taking into account the last engineering study on the relevant section of State Hwy 06, that speed, based at the 85th percentile, should be 70mph. A new study would certainly validate that finding and might even push the speed limit to 75mph on this stretch of Hwy. Since 1995, Texas has not been required to follow Federal guidance on speed limits, but this guidance, in itself, is a sufficient rebuttal of a 55mph prima facie burden on this stretch of State Hwy 06! That is especially true in that, the State of Texas concurs with that guidance (see appendix 1)!
Federal guidance requires speed limits to be based upon engineering studies. This provides a more accurate basis in fact determination of true safe speeds. Although State prima facie speed limits generally apply, they do not sufficiently address safe speeds at this specific location as would the Federal guidance of an 85th percentile speed. Because of its specificity, the Federal guideline should be held to sufficiently rebut the State’s prima facie case.

The four-year old, 1999 Texas Law that frequently sets arbitrary speed limits has been the subject of consistent enforcement in its customs and usage. That fact has no bearing on the inconsistency of the law in many places along the State Highway System.
CUSTOMS AND USAGES DO NOT DEFINE OR CREATE LAW. In law, “what ought to be done is fixed by a standard . . . whether it usually is complied with or not.” Texas & Pac Ry v Behymer, 189 US 468, 470; 23 S Ct 622, 623; 47 L Ed 903 (1903). Law is “designed to disrupt,” nonconforming practice, U.S. v City of Los Angeles, 595 F2d 1386, 1391 (CA 9, 1979). A “practice” “not based upon any rule of law” must be reversed, Biafore v Baker, 119 Mich App 667; 326 NW2d 598 (1982); The T. J. Hooper, 60 F2d 737, 740 (CA 2, 1932).
Sometimes, violations in disregard of the rule of law, have developed, and continued through generations. Nonetheless, the Constitution is “designed to disrupt” such practices, so customs and usages do not define or create law, but must be superseded and ended by it, when these issues are raised.
Defendant hereby raises these issues.
If Texas speeding laws raise Constitutional concerns, then why are they so frequently enforced? These laws are relatively new (1999) and no Federal challenge has yet been substantiated. Indeed, due to the minor nature of penalties associated with these laws, the State appeals process end at the County Court at Law (CCL) level. Due to the monumental difficulty in perfecting such an appeal, making a “Federal Case” out of such a decision could possibly only be available to the most persistent of defendants.
The lack of a credible challenge to new law, however, does not impact the relevant Constitutionality issues raised by those laws. The lower Courts have the discretion to determine these issues on a case by case basis, independent of its decisions in other, similar cases: there is no real stare decisis at the lower Court level. This is especially true in that, while this motion addresses State Law generally, this motion is only concerned with the specific application of that law on a specific stretch of the State Highway system. Upholding the Defendant’s rights in this motion holds no implication in State Law above the specific facts of this particular case.

WHEREFORE for all the foregoing reasons, and each of them individually,
Defendant prays that the Motion to Set Aside the Complaint and Motion for 705(b) VOIR DIRE Examination be granted.
DEFENDANT prays for specific and general relief.

Acting Pro Se


“(1) General concepts.
(A) The maximum speed limits posted as the result of a study should be based primarily on the 85th percentile speed, when adequate speed samples can be secured.
(B) The 85th percentile speed is a value that is used by many states and cities for establishing regulatory speed zones.
(2) Theory. Use of the 85th percentile speed concept is based on the theory that:
(B) a speed at or below which 85 percent of people drive at any given location under good weather and visibility conditions may be considered as the maximum safe speed for that location; and
(B) the large majority of drivers:
(i) are reasonable and prudent;
(ii) do not want to have a crash; and
(iii) desire to reach their destination in the shortest possible time. . .
(E) Experience proves these findings valid and shows that the 85th percentile speed is the one characteristic of traffic speeds that most closely conforms to a speed limit which is considered safe and reasonable.”


TO: City Attorney, Calvert, TX, Prosecutor, PO Box xxx, Calvert, TX

DEFENDANT requests that Prosecutor, The City of Calvert, TX, produce for inspection and/or copying the items described below, prior to any trial or pre-trial meeting.

Respondent requests that this information be provided, for inspection or copying, in a manner that substantially complies with the Texas Open Records Act.

Respondent stipulates that any and/or all of this information is necessary both in preparing an adequate defense and/or in proving the elements of Prosecution’s case. As such, Respondent asserts that any and all such documents be available for inspection at any pre-trial meeting and/or available for trial.

Time Period

The discovery requested is for documents prepared, received, or generated at any time related to the persons, entities, or equipment used to support Petitioner’s case, unless otherwise provided in this request. All requested documents, whenever actually prepared or generated, that relate to this period are to be produced.

Documents Requested to be Produced

All items set forth in Exhibit A are requested to be produced for inspection, examination, and copying within 30 days or within 10 days prior to required for any trial or pre-trial appearance and/or must be made available for same at the appropriate city offices.

Respectfully submitted,
Acting Pro Se

Exhibit A

1. All information related to the purchase, maintenance, preventative maintenance, and calibration of the RADAR device employed and used as evidence in Petitioner’s case.

2. A copy of the instruction manual that accompanied the RADAR device employed and used as evidence in Petitioner’s case.

3. Provide information regarding margin of error of the RADAR device employed, both by manufacturer specification and by any relevant test data regarding accuracy over age of device that is and/or should be known by agencies that deploy RADAR. Site the specific RADAR device employed to the extent possible.

4. State as accurately as possible, the age of the RADAR employed at the time of citation and any data you have and/or should have as an agency that deploys said RADAR regarding the useful life-span of said device.

5. All RADAR training and certification documents related to the operator who actually employed and used the device at the time of the alleged speeding infraction.

6. Provide data regarding specific training provided to the RADAR operator (at the time of citation) that demonstrates the operator’s training to avoid RADAR operator errors, such as but not limited to, COSINE error.

7. Any and all ticketing books and/or evidence of the operator’s (who employed the RADAR in this case) pattern and/or method of ticket writing for a period of at least a year prior from the time of the alleged speeding infraction.

8. All interdepartmental and/or other documents, to include evaluations and/or written and/or record of verbal counseling that address either ticket quotas specifically, or address officer performance as a function of ticket writing.

9. Within the last five (5) years, All city documents that include or calculate speeding ticket revenue as a function of city budget, including documents generated to satisfy State Law regarding 30% revenue in cities with a population under 5,000.

10. All drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, tape or electronic recordings, and audio/video recordings that constitute or contain matters relevant to this litigation.

8. Specifically, provide any audio recording that the alleging officer may have made at the time of the alleged speeding infraction.


TO: City of Calvert, TEXAS, Prosecutor, PO Box xxx, Calvert, TX


All information responsive to this request that is not privileged and that is in your possession, custody, or control is to be produced.

Possession, custody or control of an item means that the person either has physical possession of the item or has right to possession of the item that is equal or superior to that of the person who has physical possession of the item.

If an interrogatory calls for an answer that involves more than one part, each part of the answer must be clearly set out so that it is understandable. You must precede your answer to each separate interrogatory with the question constituting the separate interrogatory.

Option to Produce Records

If the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from public records, from your business records, or from a compilation, abstract, or summary of your business records, and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for Respondent as for you, you may answer the interrogatory by specifying and, if applicable, producing the records. Your answer must specify the records in sufficient detail to permit Petitioner to locate and identify them as readily as you can.

Respectfully submitted,
Acting Pro Se


1. For a period of one year until date of the alleged speeding infraction, state or estimate the following: –

a. The percentage or number of times it was necessary to cross jurisdictional lines (specifically to pursue outside the municipality of Calvert, TX) in order to pull over alleged moving vehicle violators.

b. The percentage or number of times you lock RADAR upon acquisition of speed data used for alleged moving vehicle violations.

c. The percentage of times in the last year that you have written “554” as the mile marker in citations and/or warnings that you have issued.

d. On a monthly basis for the past year, the actual number of moving violations for which you have issued citations.

e. On a monthly basis for the past year, the actual number of moving violations for which you have issued warnings.

2. Please provide any information you have regarding your superior’s opinion of your ticket writing pattern, specifically, any praise or admonition based upon any specific number of tickets written in any specific time frame.

3. Please describe, as exactly as possible, the location where the RADAR was located at time of acquisition. Include data as to whether the RADAR was in motion or standstill at time of acquisition, and information regarding RADAR’s angle to Respondent’s vehicle. (was the vehicle approaching, if so, at what distance/ was the vehicle retreating away from RADAR, if so, at what distance/ was the vehicle at right angles to RADAR, etc.)

4. Please describe any and all residential and/or commercial structures located within 100 feet of SH 06, between the exact spot of the alleged moving vehicle violation and the northern city limits of Calvert, TX.

5. Please state, as accurately as possible, how far outside the jurisdiction of Calvert, TX that it was necessary to pursue in order to write this particular citation. (Please refer to audio recording, if available, in which Officer stated to Respondent that, although the pull over was past the 70/65 marker, the infraction occurred in the 55 mph speed zone and in which Officer stated to Respondent that Respondent was ‘speeding up pretty fast through the zones’).