CHINA

Overview

"What is he holding in his hand? It is a knife.
What is the use of a knife? It can kill a person.
Whom will he kill with the knife? He will kill the people…
the Chinese people also have hands,
and they can hold knives too.
They can forge one if they have none."

Major General Wu Jianguo, quoting Mao Zedong, 1995

China Military Science, No. 4

 

Since 1949, "the development of Chinese government and economic institutions has been closely linked." 1,2 Although modeled after and aligned with the Soviet Union, China was nonetheless dissatisfied by Russia’s unwillingness to provide them with blueprints for nuclear bombs. China turned to its own resources and, eventually, to other countries for later military development. One of those countries was the United States.3

After the disastrous "Great Leap Forward Campaign" in 1958, control of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) shifted several times. Finally, in 1969, China launched an extensive "war preparations" campaign. Despite infighting amongst various government factions during the 1970s, China’s "top priority through the early 1980s remained the development of its military capabilities."4

Moreover, the Soviet-style link between civilian and military functions remained intact. "At the sector level, most military industrial enterprises are involved in both military and commercial production."5

In 1989, Major General Yang Huan expressed the sentiment of China’s military: "China's strategic nuclear weapons were developed because of the belief that hegemonic power will continue to use nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. From the day of [its] establishment, the People's Republic of China faced a major economic and technology blockade from hostile powers. Further, it also faced serious nuclear threats from hegemonism."6 At that time, the two primary players in the World Theater capable of enforcing "hegemonism" were Russia and the United States.

COSTIND (Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense) helped supervise the development/modernization effort. Originally formed as the National Defense Science and Technology Commission in 1958, its various parts would survive disbanding in September of 1963, re-emerging once again in 1982. COSTIND answers directly to the CMC (Central Military Council) and State Council; however, it is controlled by the PLA (People’s Liberation Army).7 "A Rand study conclude[d] that COSTIND is the PLA’s fourth most influential organizational player in devising and supervising defense policy."8

China’s commitment towards development/modernization was intense. "While there is a range of different estimates, this study [CRS-86-889] speculates that China’s defense-industrial complex may include as many as 50,000 factories, research academies, and other facilities, with possibly five million personnel. Whole towns, some secret, are part of this immense complex."9 Government reports indicate that in 1997, the Chinese manpower dedicated to military enhancement was approximately four times the size of America’s current standing army.

COSTIND’s primary function was the acquisition of modern technology, preferably "dual-use" technology that could be transitioned for military applications.10 In the late 1980’s to early 1990’s, COSTIND’s focus specifically shifted; "COSTIND Deputy Director Shen Rongjun called for China’s weapon development programs to focus on high-technology, especially electronics and military applications of satellites."11 Because of trade limitations/embargoes against military end-users, China utilized several layers of civilian "front companies" to purchase the technology for them.

 

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