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Posted on 09/15/2001 4:48:04 PM PDT by Fusion

The stunning attack by Islamic entente forces on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has shocked the United States and the entire world. The initial aftermath of the spectacular suicide assault -- that devastated the financial district of lower Manhattan and leveled portions of the American military command center -- has been one of national paralysis and grief. Now, as the world's Heavyweight Champion rises from the canvass, it becomes increasingly clear that America is at war for the first time since 1991 -- and will settle for nothing short of a comprehensive knockout victory.

This piece will attempt to provide an examination of one leg of the Islamic entente -- the Taliban of Afghanistan -- while discussing military forces the United States may face as they attempt to neutralize this foe through combat operations. This analysis seeks to provide a brief view of the military challenges that will be presented to the American leadership as they begin to construct the counteroffensive necessary to destroy the Taliban as an effective enemy of the United States and her allies.

This article will not discuss two key factors that ultimately will have crucial bearing on the final campaign. The first is the role of Iraq in the September 11 attack. That Baghdad is involved there is little doubt, however the resiliency of Saddam Hussein as a long term Western problem is unlikely to be solved until after the dictator's death. Current international political realities would make such a solution difficult to successfully execute at this time as it could weaken support for a Coalition type victory versus Afghanistan.

Secondly is an issue that -- while painful for Americans to examine and subsequently fathom -- cannot be totally ignored. That is the aspect of previous long term American support for many of the elements that this war will seek to engage and defeat. National Security Directive 166, signed by President Ronald Reagan in March 1985, authorized covert military aid to the Afghan Mujahadeen in an attempt to defeat the Russian military forces then engaged there. That this policy aided substantially in engineering the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union is recognized my most military and political analysts. However the public should be warned about -- and prepared to absorb -- criticisms of this Cold War policy that will no doubt emanate as the conflict progresses.

Both the Iraqi involvement in the suicide attack and the blowback from Directive 166 are beyond the scope of this piece. Their ultimate influence on the coming campaign must be left for future historians to judge.

THE TALIBAN AND AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban are the current rulers of the southern Asian nation of Afghanistan. Formed in Pakistan in 1994 -- by dissident Muslim students and former rebel fighters -- the term Taliban means "Seekers after knowledge." The movement adheres to the strictest -- and most fundamentalist -- of Islamic principles and teachings known as Shari'a law. This interpretation of the Koran is extremely focused and disciplined -- but should not be construed as being in compatible harmony with mainstream Islamic religious tenets as practiced by the majority of Muslims in the United States.

The Taliban ascended to power in September 1996 with the capture of the capital Kabul from the central government. Supported directly by the Pakistani ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) during the war versus the Soviet Union (1979-89), many of these veteran Afghan fighters would later become disenchanted with government rule and provide the nucleus for Taliban fighting forces. These military victories have continued to the present day as the Taliban is slowly pushing back the opposition forces of the Northern Alliance. Supported by India, Iran, and Russia -- the Northern Alliance is now reported to be in a state of near collapse in their tiny northern enclave following the spectacular assassination of their leader, Commander Masoud, by a Taliban suicide sapper team on September 9.

While the rest of the world formally recognizes the former Afghan government as legitimate, the Taliban enjoys official diplomatic relations with only three states -- Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries provide extensive financial aid to the Taliban which, combined with the opium trade, permits the movement to enjoy extensive financial resources.

Afghanistan is now the world's largest opium producer -- supplying an estimated 4500 metric tons to global drug markets last year. The spectacular growth of this crop's yield now results in excess of 120 billion dollars in revenue annually for fundamentalist Islamic elements. In addition Afghan opium -- and subsequent heroin derivatives -- provides a secondary barter economy for weapon transfers in much of the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia.

This organized drug trade is an extensive ancillary factor dominating any geopolitical decisions concerning Afghanistan. Unfortunately for American strategists it is a Pandora's box that once opened is unlikely to survive a close inspection by determined Congressional investigators and watchdog committees. However this dynamic does offer intriguing options when considering the possibility of America utilizing tactical nuclear weapons in any action versus the Taliban. The long term destruction of Afghanistan opium production would be a legitimate victory (perhaps the first) in the so-called American war on drugs.

Regardless, the Taliban are increasingly extending and solidifying their control of the countryside -- in a mountainous country of 652,000 square kilometers that enjoys less than 2800 km (1680 miles) of paved roads. Terrain will be a critical factor in any campaign versus this landlocked country which, with the exception of Pakistan, is surrounded by hostile nations.

EXPORTING REVOLUTION

On the evening of December 27, 1979, following failed KGB attempts to topple the Afghan government -- three Soviet assault battalions launched a surprise attack on the Presidential Palace in Kabul. Five hours later the battle was over, and the next day two Soviet motorized divisions invaded the country. Ten years later the Russians had been defeated and in a sense Afghanistan has been in a constant state of war ever since. This resulting political and security vacuum has permitted a political climate to be sustained where dozens of guerrilla training camps and a substantial Mujahadeen infrastructure have flourished.

In many ways Osama bin Laden is considered the spiritual leader of the Taliban military forces although he is believed to take little active part in the current war versus the Northern Alliance. The shadowy and charismatic leader focuses instead on exporting his brand of Mujahadeen fighter to various conflicts throughout the world after preparing them in any number of training camps in the rugged Afghan countryside. A cursory examination of two such recent campaigns will provide a brief insight into the fighting capabilities of Mujahadeen forces the United States will encounter in a war in Afghanistan.

CHECHNYA (1995-96, 1999-2001) That Chechen forces defeated Russia in the first war is a fact that should not be lost on US military strategists. Although both wars are/were primarily battles of nationalism and not religion, each of the two primary Chechen commanders -- Shamil Basayev (Chechen) and Khattab (Saudi) have enjoyed close ties with the Pakistani ISI and received extensive military training in the Afghanistan camps.

During the First Battle of Grozny (January - March 1995) Chechen forces destroyed in excess of 150 Russian armored vehicles using RPG-7s (Rocket propelled grenades firing a shaped charge explosive) and urban close assault combat techniques. The Russian 131st Maikop Brigade lost more than 1300 of its initial component of 1500 men. In the same fight the Russian 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment lost half of its 1100 men. Total Russian losses in the first war were approximately 10,000 with Chechen losses near four thousand.

The lesson of the First Chechen War for American forces is to never fight dug-in Mujahadeen units in an urban setting -- especially with armor. The defensive force multiplier provided by these built-up areas combined with local knowledge of the terrain is a tremendous combat equalizer. US forces do not want an equal fight -- they want to enjoy localized firepower and numerical superiority in every battle if a conventional warfare option is selected.

The Russians have made dramatic tactical changes in the Second Chechen War, which is currently being fought and has become a classic counterinsurgency fight for Moscow. Extensive use of helicopter gunships in the mountains and indiscriminate heavy artillery and missile bombardment in the lowlands is the norm now. This has succeeded in lowering Russian casualties -- while causing tens of thousands of civilian deaths. This war is now stalemated.

The lesson of the Second Chechen War for American planners is that US casualties can be kept lower in a conventional ground invasion type attack with the extensive usage of tactical airpower -- supported by aggressive patrolling/interdiction with Apache helicopter gunship platforms. However the Russian experience in Chechnya advises there will be moderate helicopter and Forward Air Observer (FAO) losses in utilizing such a strategy.

KOSOVO/MACEDONIA (1998-99, 2001) While many elements of the American sponsored Kosovo Liberation Army are graduates of the training facilities of Northern Albania, increasingly fighters from the Afghan camps have joined the fray. When the NATO war began against Yugoslavia in March 1999, the KLA were primarily responsible for spotting Serb units for Allied air strikes. The lightly armed KLA had difficulty engaging superior Serb units with the exception of long range .50 caliber sniping and ambushing with radio detonated mines.

The KLA has enjoyed much greater success this year in Macedonia where, with extensive upgrades in weaponry and training, they have effectively defeated the Macedonian Army and forced NATO intervention -- despite being outnumbered four to one. This is due primarily to a lack of resolve by the ground forces of Skopje and inferior Macedonian air and armored capability.

The lesson from the KLA experience is that when Mujahadeen forces can be isolated on the battlefield, US combat elements will be in a position to absolutely decimate them. This strategy will require the introduction of substantial mobile ground forces -- well coordinated with artillery and air strikes. In addition American units must be willing to close ground and kill the enemy when he is located and subsequently pinned down -- thus exposing some US forces to the inevitable Mujahadeen ambushes. However the subsequent kill ratios of such scenarios will excessively favor the American side and provide a punishing response to the Taliban's ability to sustain resistance.

AFGHAN GOVERNMENT (TALIBAN) AND MUJAHADEEN (BIN LADEN) MILITARY CAPABILITIES

US policy makers will first seek the unconditional acquiescence of the Kabul government should a full scale war take place. State of the art American satellite tracking capability -- combined with the ability within hours (if not minutes) of hostilities commencing for US forces to gain air superiority -- would permit most of the Afghan government armor and artillery forces to be wiped out in a surprise first strike. Since this would serve to reverse the Taliban military success versus the Northern Alliance, it is believed Kabul may seek not to challenge US military operations versus Osama bin Laden if given a face saving option to avoid a fight.

However the problem with this strategy (as well as in any American war scenario versus Afghanistan) is the need for a substantial logistical buildup before mounting air strikes with the capacity to prepare the way for American ground forces. Reliable reports seem to suggest that at least one American carrier group is now heading to the theater. Intense diplomatic pressure is expected to be brought upon Pakistan to permit American overflights of her airspace.

Afghan armor components are composed of the older Soviet style and versions. These are primarily the T-55 (100 mm main gun) and the T-62 (115 mm main gun). These tanks are no match for American forces although it is doubtful whether the US Abrams Main Battle Tank could be deployed to Afghanistan from a logistical perspective. Regardless, these Afghan armored units have zero survivability probability in a fight with American forces fully backed by airpower.

Afghan artillery consists primarily of 122 mm and 152 mm Field Howitzers. Most of these units would be targeted for destruction by any American first strike -- surviving units would fire perhaps one or two salvos before being destroyed by superior American counter battery capability. This anticipated result is based on a full US deployment -- American MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) units deliver the most effective artillery fire in the history of the world. They are a dominant weapon platform.

The Taliban has one conventional weapon that can do great harm to US forces if successfully concealed and able to execute a coordinated fire mission. The BM-21 Grad (122 mm rocket launcher) delivers a devastating wide area High Explosive assault. Should American rear echelon or unprotected infantry formations be subjected to such an attack then scores would be killed. Knocking out these rocket launchers would seem a priority mission for any pre-invasion air strikes or cruise missile attacks.

Finally, the Afghan air defense grid is relatively unsophisticated and would offer little threat to US airpower. Unlike the Serbs, who enjoyed good success against Allied air strikes when they fought back in the NATO war versus Yugoslavia, the Taliban lack the command and control structure to present a serious challenge to American airpower. Kabul's air defense system features the older SA-2 and SA-3 surface to air missiles, complemented by extensive deployments of ZSU-23 (23 mm AAA) batteries.

Barring the proverbial "Golden BB" (lucky shot), US air losses would be no more than a handful mainly due to mechanical difficulties. All in all the Taliban government should be able to offer little resistance to a massive US first strike of cruise missiles, B-52 bombers, and tactical ground attack craft.

The Mujahadeen fighters under Osama bin Laden may provide a different story as they are unlikely to be caught unaware by an American surprise attack. They are unconventional and lightly armed guerrilla forces that can only be destroyed by isolating them on the battlefield -- and then killing them with artillery followed up by ground attack.

There are some sixty-thousand Mujahadeen fighters in Afghanistan. They are a mixture of nomadic tribesman, former government fighters, and various Islamic holy warriors. They have an extremely decentralized command structure (if it can be called that) and answer to no one -- although Osama bin Laden is their titular head. They are the toughest mountain fighters in the world and represent a huge "X" factor in any US decision to go to war with Afghanistan.

Operating in groups from half a dozen to a hundred fighters, they are armed with everything from World War II bolt action rifles to American made Stinger surface to air missiles. Most units are equipped with the venerable Soviet AK-47 assault rifle, the RPG-7, and the 7.62 mm light machine-gun.

Heavier Mujahadeen units are armed with 120 mm and 160 mm mortars. Antitank capability includes the older Soviet Sagger missile and the newer Spigot system. In addition various recoilless rifle types (73 mm and 82 mm) provide crew served support capability.

Mujahadeen forces traditionally are split along factional lines during wartime. The elimination of Osama bin Laden as a unifying leader would be a crippling blow to this movement should the war come about. Since these units cross from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and back again with impunity -- such a war would require extensive monitoring of this border by US intelligence and rear echelon units. While sealing the frontier completely would be impossible -- an extensive interdiction campaign would be critical in hampering guerilla logistics during the coming winter.

These fighters fought Russia to a standstill for ten years and eventually drove them from their country -- they should not be underestimated.

CONCLUSION: THE DIFFICULT CHOICES

Any American war planning versus the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's Mujahadeen fighters in Afghanistan must first address a fundamental issue. Will the US attempt to win the fight with an air campaign only, as practiced in the NATO war versus Yugoslavia -- or will America be willing to commit to the costly and time consuming option of a ground campaign that seeks total and decisive victory?

There is no question more important should the US go to war in the region. In the long history of Afghanistan, no invader has ever been successful in defeating the indigenous tribesman and warrior clans of this country.

The NATO War versus Yugoslavia in 1999 saw Allied air sorties and cruise missile strikes bombard Serbian military and political infrastructure for 78 days. While much damage was done to Belgrade and the economic infrastructure of the country, less than twenty Serb tanks were destroyed in the entire campaign as American and Allied air forces -- fearing casualties that could collapse popular political support -- refused to challenge the Serb air defense grid. Had President Milosevic not surrendered, and NATO been forced to launch a ground invasion of Kosovo, allied losses would have been horrific as the well trained and highly motivated Serb forces constantly ambushed and defended from well concealed positions in difficult terrain.

Much of Afghanistan is mountainous terrain that would put any American invading force at a disadvantage. However it is doubtful that air power alone can force the decisive result needed for America to know victory.

If the ground invasion option is selected then the Desert Storm campaign to liberate Kuwait in 1991 becomes the model. There it took many months to build a coalition consensus and then deploy several hundred thousand troops to the theater. Even after all of that, decisive victory was denied the Allied Coalition by the American Command failure to drive on Baghdad and topple the government of Saddam Hussein -- ten years later he still remains in power.

Compared to Afghanistan, the Iraqi desert was ideal terrain for combat and relatively easy to access through the Middle Eastern shipping channels. Afghanistan is a landlocked country -- any invading force must transit through a third nation or be airlifted into the theater. An invading force would require a bare minimum of 80,000 troops -- and probably twice that -- to successfully sustain a campaign that could last several years.

With these considerations in mind the possibility of America using tactical nuclear weapons seems an increasing option. However it should be understood that Osama bin Laden is generally considered by most intelligence analysts to have "Allah's Suitcase" capability. That is the expression used for the detonation of a crude nuclear device by an Islamic suicide bomber. One of these bombs is actually bigger than a suitcase -- but not much. Such a detonation in a major American city would kill as many as a hundred thousand people and spread a contamination field that would take many years to negate.

Some would say this is an argument against using nuclear weapons in Afghanistan. Then again some would say this is precisely the reason for using them. It is a difficult decision.

Regardless, due to logistical and weather difficulties it would be unlikely that a full American invasion force could hit Afghanistan before February or March of next year. Thus any campaign, by necessity, would involve weeks if not months of American air strikes and limited airmobile and airborne attacks before the main combat forces arrived. A likely scenario would involve the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault divisions capturing Kabul -- following US Army Ranger attacks designed to secure the capital's airport.

To keep American patriotic resolve at the high level needed to sustain a long campaign -- and absorb eventual casualties that could reach tens of thousands -- US strategists may decide not to wait too long before beginning air strikes. These attacks by Stealth Bombers and long range B-52s could come within a few weeks (or days) and would focus on the Afghan air defense grid and possibly Taliban combat forces now opposing the Northern alliance.

Finally, two things should be realized by the American people. First, such a fight will be long and costly -- both in terms of money and human lives. Secondly, the enemy has fired the first shot and in all probability has second strike capability. Such a war will be a terrible struggle the likes of which this American generation can scarcely imagine -- however the alternative of not destroying this enemy is too horrible to contemplate.

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