I will attempt to answer your questions, but first you need to understand that attempting to compare U.S. Army Special Forces units with U.S. Marine units in Vietnam just isn’t possible for a number of reasons.
1. 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters, commanded by a Colonel, was in Nha Trang with its four Companies, A, B, C, and D, assigned to the four Corps areas, I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps. Each Special Forces Company was a C-Team, commanded by a LTC, with four B-Teams, commanded by Majors, under it. These four B-Teams were assigned to Province Capitols throughout the Corps area, and each B-Team had four twelve man A-Teams, commanded by Captains, serving under it. These four A-Teams were assigned four areas of responsibility throughout the Province where they constructed A-Camps, recruited and trained Montagnard Tribesmen, and led them in combat operations.
2. Special Forces units in Vietnam had no assigned or attached Aviation units or Artillery units to support us, but, instead, we “depended upon the kindness of strangers.” The only fire support we could depend on was our own 60MM, 81MM, and 4-2 in. mortars.
3. At each C-team in each Corps Area, Special Forces kept a Mike Force Battalion consisting of three Mike Force Companies of Chinese Nungs or Montagnards led by Special Forces NCOs as a reaction force for A-Camps when they came under attack. A Mike Force Battalion of Chinese Nung Mercenaries led by Special Forces NCOs was based at 5th Special Forces Group HQs in Nha Trang as a country wide reaction force to assist any Special Forces unit under attack.
4. The three Nung Mike Force Companies borrowed by the 1st Infantry Division in the November 5, 1966 operation in Tay Ninh Province was the reaction force for all Special Forces units conducting operations in III Corps. The loss of these three Nung Companies curtailed Special Forces combat operations throughout III Corps until three Mike Force Companies of Cambodians could be recruited and trained. Lessons learned: I don’t think Special Forces ever again loaned out any of our Mike Force Companies.
I hope this answered your questions.
We haven’t given up yet, and as long as even one of us remains alive we will continue through channels with the MOH recommendation for MSG William B. Hunt and his recovery.
And, yes, we were expendable.
DJ Taylor
The only Special Forces folks that I dealt with while I was in Vietnam were the gents we helped evacuate from the A Shau in March '66.
You are correct about the differences in organization between us and the SF. Our philosophy was that if we had something less than a battalion of us out there in Indian Country, we'd ensure that we had reinforcements right around the corner and lots of artillery and on-call fixed wing on a short leash. p>The enemy was very good at massing in a hurry, so we always had plans in place and were task organized to ramp up fast when needed.
It just seems hard to imagine that you had the mission of finding COSVN - an aggressive recon mission, with a nearly certain contact with major forces - and nobody attached to you for rapid reinforcement or fire support. I wouldn't think that you could expect the whole division to come - just too many helo lifts/too few usable LZs - but a grunt battalion with an artillery battery or two with on-call targets would have been a godsend.
I hope you can beat the system and get that award for that heroic soldier.