Posted on 02/23/2003 11:39:56 AM PST by SwimmingUpstream
"Find the problem. Fix it. Fly again."
During the past few weeks since that terrible February morning, we have all heard of this noble tradition among those who work to help man slip the surly bonds of earth. When one of their number perishes in the endeavor, the rest do all they can to see to it their comrade did not die in vain.
NASA is now following that noble tradition, diligently searching for the root cause of the catastrophe that took the Columbia's crew from us. And one of the questions they are asking is: Was Columbia's left wing compromised by debris striking it 80 seconds after lift-off?
NASA does not know for certain one way or the other, and may never know for certain.
But it ought to know. It could have known -- long before Columbia disintegrated during re-entry.
It could have known -- but for another tradition within NASA.
Years before Al Shepard soared away from Cape Canaveral atop a harshly vibrating Redstone rocket, a tradition was developing within NASA of making the astronaut as redundant as practicable in controlling the flight of manned spacecraft.
This tradition was not developing out of animus or envy towards the astronaut corp. It was developing as a matter of practicality, efficiency, mission requirements, and a natural bias among engineers in favor of the machine.
For their part, the astronaut corp have acted, traditionally, as a counter to this tradition. But the complex nature of the machine that carries them into space weighs against the astronaut as a continually active pilot of the spacecraft. And for all but a few minutes in any spaceflight the astronaut is a back-up component in the flight control system; many an astronaut aboard the spacecraft is merely a passenger, as far as flight control is concerned.
This traditional engineer's bias towards astronaut-as-back-up-component was very much in evidence during Columbia's last flight. It affected the entire structure of NASA's methodology in assessing the condition of the shuttle's thermal tiles from the instant the shuttle left the pad.
From the moment NASA became aware of the fact that something had struck Columbia's left wing during ascent the agency leaned away from involving the astronauts and towards relying on engineers in ascertaining the condition of the shuttle's thermal protection system. The agency's initial response was to begin an analysis of what might have happened to the tiles as a result of the debris impact -- an analysis based on guestimates about the size and weight and hardness and trajectory and speed of the debris.
And toward what ultimate end was this engineering guestimate undertaken? To determine whether a condition of risk to the crew probably existed that required NASA to modify the plan for a normal re-entry?
If this was the aim of the guestimate, what options existed for getting the crew home safely?
Was a rescue of some of the crew, and a time-buying provisioning for the rest, possible via a hastened launch of a Russian Soyuz?
Was an orbit change possible that could allow Columbia to rendevous with the Internation Space Station?
Was a time-buying provisioning possible by the Russian Progess vehicle that was already scheduled to be sent to the International Space Station in early February?
Was a wing-sacrificing re-entry scheme feasible given the compromised condition of Columbia's thermal protection system?
Would NASA have chosen any of these options without an eyeballing of the shuttle's left wing, either by an astronaut or by some telescopic means?
If not, then why did NASA wait on the results of the engineering guestimate, losing precious days to mount a rescue or re-entry modification in the event the guestimate indicated the wing was catastrophically compromised?
The answer is that the traditional bias towards astronaut-as-back-up-component had led NASA to omit training and properly equiping the astronauts to inspect the thermal tiles on the underside of the shuttle while on orbit. Consequently, the risk the atronauts would have had to assume in order to go over the side of Columbia and eyeball the thermal tiles was significantly increased. If the thermal tiles proved to be relatively undamaged and one or more of the astronauts was lost during the now relatively riskier inspection, or if an astronaut caused significant damage to some tiles during the inspection, NASA management would come under a lot of fire.
Therefore, NASA thought it more prudent to wait for the engineering guestimate than to immediately ask an astronaut to take a risky look at the tiles. And as it happened, the engineering guestimate concluded that it was unlikely the thermal tiles were catastrophically compromised.
So, no one bothered to look at Columbia's left wing while the ship was on orbit.
We don't yet know whether the debris that struck Columbia's left wing during ascent is the root cause of the catastophe that befell Columbia's crew on February 1st -- whether the shedding of that debris is the problem NASA is now diligently looking for in order to fix so we can fly again.
But another problem that needs fixing has already been discovered -- NASA's reluctance to use the astronauts more fully in assessing the condition of the shuttle's thermal protection system while on orbit.
NASA needs to fix this problem, as well as whatever problems it finds, before we fly again.
They owe it to Columbia's fallen crew, and to all the brave souls who will venture into space after them.
Eastport, Maine
February, 2003
Columbia did not have suffcient fuel to change to the ISS' orbit.
The chance/likelihood that you'll inadvertently do more damage to the thermal protection system than you could find/repair.
IIRC, two of the crew were EVA-qualified and had suits. However, since the Canadarm wasn't installed and MMUs have been discontinued, they would have had to have made a tethered EVA. Since they had no way to repair damaged tiles in orbit, I don't see the point of an EVA anyway.
This tradition was not developing out of animus or envy towards the astronaut corp. It was developing as a matter of practicality, efficiency, mission requirements, and a natural bias among engineers in favor of the machine.
Actually, it was duelling traditions: conventional engineering practice (i.e., 1950s automation of payload delivery systems which gave us ICBMs) was counter to the JFK dictum to land men on the moon. As soon as people noticed, this was justified IIRC by touting astronauts as in-orbit repair-people. They just put on their space suits and do a space walk to fix the problem.
Considering they had no way to fix tiles in space, and second, and additional weight of spacewalk equipment degraded their ability to do their chartered mission, there would have been little point to a spacewalk and considerable downside negative publicity of finding and confirming a problem out there that could not be addressed.
[SteveH]Considering they had no way to fix tiles in space, and second, and additional weight of spacewalk equipment degraded their ability to do their chartered mission, there would have been little point to a spacewalk and considerable downside negative publicity of finding and confirming a problem out there that could not be addressed.
You seem informed, are you involved in the space program? I ask because this last paragraph of yours is an excellent example of a very dangerous culture within NASA.
The inability to repair tile damage weighs not at all in the question. If it did, then there was no point in doing any of the engineering analysis -- for there was NOTHING to be done... which is what you state in your closing words. But, of course, NASA never has suggested that there was NO OPTION to the fatal re-entry option, for there were some known options -- and perhaps others may have come to someone's imagination had NASA been aware of significant damage to the thermal protection system.
As for the weight of the EVA equipment degrading any mission... this is arsy varsy reasoning. The mission is suited to the capability of the machine and crew requirements. The payload capacity is calculated after the weight of the shuttle is calculated, so the weight of the EVA equipment ought always to be part of the calculation that LIMITS payload, not the other way around.
Lastly, ask the asronauts whether they would like to know the actual status of their spacecraft. I have, and to a man they have said they want to know -- even if that knowledge is knowledge of impending doom. And, to a man, they have reiterated one thing -- when push comes to shove the imagination is a tremendously powerful tool, unthought-of options come flowing from an enlivened imagination. We saw this in small ways during Apollo 13.
Your reply was much appreciated -- I think it pointed in spades to a problem that needs fixing before we fly again.
Kindest Regards
Good grief, no, just a systems guy with a lot of spare time now (sigh).
The inability to repair tile damage weighs not at all in the question. If it did, then there was no point in doing any of the engineering analysis -- for there was NOTHING to be done... which is what you state in your closing words. But, of course, NASA never has suggested that there was NO OPTION to the fatal re-entry option, for there were some known options -- and perhaps others may have come to someone's imagination had NASA been aware of significant damage to the thermal protection system.
Well, sure, I don't have much problem with that. I suppose I was just trying to give the standard NASA reasoning.
Please see my first paragraph in which I point out the essential contradiction of the NASA goals. The shuttle represents a retrograde goal set (manned payload delivery). At an extreme end, imho, it ignores expensive lessons we learned using manned bombers during WWII. The main point was, and is, that the shuttle should be fully automated; the astronauts are superfluous to most missions.
If you check my posts going back in time on Columbia, you'll see that I have been consistent.
Chicago Sun-Times
May 24, 2003
BY MARCIA DUNN
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla.--NASA could have launched another shuttle to rescue the Columbia astronauts if it had realized the severity of the wing damage early on and decided it was worth the extreme risk to the second ship and crew, the chief accident investigator said Friday.
Retired Navy Adm. Harold Gehman Jr., chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, said the question was put to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration earlier this month and that the agency's preliminary findings show that such a rescue would have been technically feasible.
But he added: ''I've got no idea if it would have been successful or not.''
Gehman stressed that a rushed rescue mission by shuttle Atlantis and four of NASA's best and most seasoned astronauts would have been ''very, very risky--but not impossible.''
He said astronauts would have been ''standing out in the hallways to volunteer.''
In the days after the Feb. 1 tragedy, NASA managers insisted nothing could have been done to fix Columbia's wing and save its seven astronauts.
But earlier this week, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe said he would have strongly considered sending Atlantis to the astronauts' rescue, even if it meant losing another shuttle and crew.
AP
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