Posted on 09/12/2002 3:16:53 PM PDT by Axion
Iraq War Plans IV: Operation Desert Storm II Summary
12 September 2002
The strategy of Desert Storm was predicated on a pessimistic evaluation of Iraq's military capability. Desert Storm overmatched Iraq's forces on the assumption that operating on worst-case scenarios was safest. Operations Desert Stun and Desert Slice are built on relatively optimistic assessments. They assume that Iraq's ability to resist is severely limited. Desert Storm II takes a more pessimistic view of Iraq's capabilities or at least assumes that the worst case is possible
Analysis
Desert Stun and Desert Slice are operations that seek to minimize the requirement for ground forces. Desert Stun focuses on the use of air power striking at the heart of Iraq's command and control capability and the use of special operations and covert forces to encourage defections of Iraq's deployed forces. Desert Slice combines air power with sequential attacks on Iraq's western, northern and southern regions using forces sufficient for those limited missions, without deploying sufficient forces for a direct assault on Baghdad. It assumes that once surrounded, Baghdad will capitulate.
Both plans are built around a core assumption: that Iraq's military capability today resembles the performance of the Iraqi army in Kuwait in 1991. Desert Stun assumes that many formations will disintegrate when subjected to air attack while other units will defect. It assumes that once Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's direct operational control of his forces is shattered by air attacks, forces will be incapable and unwilling to engage in persistent resistance.
Desert Slice makes similar assumptions but adopts the view that those forces deployed outside the Baghdad region will not offer significant resistance and will capitulate when attacked. Their surrender will allow U.S. forces to move into blocking positions around Baghdad using minimal force. It also assumes two further points. First, even if the forces near Baghdad are more reliable, they will be incapable of mounting counterattacks against thin U.S. forces on the ground. Second, any counterattack can be shattered by air power before the Iraqi forces can impose battles of attrition on U.S. forces.
The inherent weakness in both plans is if the assumptions about Iraqi capabilities are false and if Saddam's troops prove to be both more reliable and more capable than the conventional wisdom holds. On paper, Saddam's forces are substantial. The sheer quantity of armor available to the Iraqis ought to permit them to close with any U.S. light infantry force and impose punishing blows, even if intensive air attacks were carried out. However, wars are not fought on paper. The level of maintenance, training and above all, the morale of the Iraqi troops, can readily negate apparent quantitative capabilities.
The assumption that Iraq's forces are incapable of effective, high-intensity combat is a proposition that has to be tested on the battlefield. However, as a cautionary note, the Israeli experience with Egypt is worth considering. In 1967, the Israel Defense Forces defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai in a mobile armored battle that lasted about three days. At every level of the Egyptian army, from commanders to privates, the Egyptians showed themselves to be utterly incapable of operating as an effective fighting force.
The Israelis took Egyptian ineffectiveness as a given in their war planning. Six years later in 1973, that same Egyptian army mounted a sophisticated and complex attack across the Suez Canal that took the IDF by surprise both in the sense that it happened and in the sense of how effective the Egyptians had become at all levels. While the Egyptians ultimately were defeated by the IDF, they never disintegrated as they had in 1967. The Egyptian army in 1973 was a completely different fighting force than it was in 1967. Armies, particularly defeated ones, can integrate lessons learned and new technologies at a startling rate.
Desert Storm in 1991 was designed around an intentional overestimation of Iraqi capabilities. To be more precise, the operational principle embedded in Desert Storm was to design the attacking force based on the most pessimistic evaluation of Iraqi capabilities possible. Since no one knew how the Iraqis would perform on the battlefield, Desert Storm was planned to massively overmatch any potential Iraqi capability. From the first-phase attacks on air defenses and command, control and communication to the counterforce attritional air attacks to the final campaign against Kuwait, Desert Storm was built around worst-case assumptions concerning the Iraqis.
Desert Storm had three advantages built into it:
1. Time: Saddam's decision not to advance into Saudi Arabia gave the United States time to build up its forces in-theater to massive levels.
2. Space: the willingness of the Saudis to participate in the war gave U.S. forces substantial room to deploy in depth.
3. Materiel: Saudi ports and coalition partners allowed the United States to deploy a substantially greater force more quickly than might otherwise have been the case.
Desert Stun and Desert Slice assume that time, space and materiel might be in short supply. They choose not to overmatch Saddam's forces and operate from the assumption that Saddam's troops will not be able to resist. They take risks that appear necessary and prudent under the circumstances.
However, the most conservative course would be to repeat the 1991 Operation Desert Storm in principle -- if not in full detail. Overmatching Iraq's forces in every dimension leaves the least chance for unpleasant surprises. However to do that requires a key element that was present in 1991 but may not be available now: Saudi participation. If the Saudis finally decide, or are pressured by the United States, to participate in an attack on Iraq, then Operation Desert Storm II becomes an option.
In order to understand why Saudi Arabia is the key, we need to consider other potential axes of attack. The first, and most obvious choice from a political standpoint, would be to attack south toward Baghdad out of Turkey, with an armored and mechanized force strong enough to force its way into Baghdad regardless of Iraqi capabilities and resistance. Instead of basing in the south, the strategy would be reversed, with heavy deployment in Turkey, rendering Saudi participation irrelevant.
The problem with a massive armored drive from Turkey is terrain. The Turkish frontier with Iraq runs a winding 100 miles or so through extremely mountainous terrain on both sides of the border. For most of the border, the mountains on the Turkish side are more than 10,000 feet tall. On the Iraqi side, they are between 6,000 and 10,000 feet tall -- but at least it's downhill. There are mountain tracks in this area but along the entire border region there is only one road. In the extreme western part of the frontier, there is a plain with a 5-mile gap between the mountains and the Syrian border. A single road runs through the gap to Mosul.
The problem with the road is that on the Turkish side of the border, the road is not merely close to the Syrian border but virtually is the Turkish-Syrian border for about 10 miles. The logistical tail of an armored assault would have to run through this road. The ability to supply a major armored thrust along one road is questionable. There is also the security question of assuming that the Syrians will not interdict the road, which while it may be true, is but another optimistic assumption for a pessimistic war plan. It would be possible to support an armored thrust along this route, but not the full-blooded, multidivisional thrust needed to assault a well-defended Baghdad.
Interestingly, this route would become more viable if Syria permitted the use of its territory or if the United States were prepared to seize the northeastern finger of Syria. So while the Turkish option would be useful for operations envisioned at the levels of Desert Stun or Desert Slice, it could not become the primary axis of attack in a Desert Storm II plan.
Jordan also poses a problem. First, a thrust across the western desert toward Baghdad is by far the longest route. Second, and more important, Jordan's Port of Aqaba is extremely small and incapable of supporting a multidivisional deployment. A Jordanian deployment could be supported through Haifa in Israel, but that would involve a public dependency on Israel for the invasion of Iraq; something the United States sought to avoid in 1991 and which continues to be a core policy. Therefore, basing in Jordan, if available, would support a Desert Stun or Desert Slice but could not be a significant axis of attack in Desert Storm II.
An attack based solely out of Kuwait, with the port facilities needed to support a substantial military force, is more promising. Even if Saudi Arabia agreed to participate in a Desert Storm II, Kuwait would be the center of gravity of the U.S. thrust toward Baghdad. But, by itself, Kuwait poses certain challenges. The direct route north to Basrah is not conducive to armored operations. It is marshy, and the roads create opportunities for ambush. Once at Basrah, a single armored thrust north toward Baghdad would move through more swamps along roads on both sides of the Shatt al Arab. The thrust could not be concealed and if undertaken alone, would allow Saddam to concentrate forces in blocking positions at multiple points along the line of attack. At Basrah, therefore, U.S. forces would have to split, with one attack proceeding northward and another moving northwest toward An-Nasiriyah through marshy and difficult country also with numerous choke points.
An attack could be based from Kuwait if the Iraqis were not particularly effective. At even modest levels of capability, the United States could defeat them using air power and U.S. armor. But if the Iraqis were to surprise the United States with unexpected skill, an attack solely out of Kuwait could become rapidly bogged down with the advantage going to the Iraqi defenders.
The central strategic feature of Desert Storm was the famous left hook by U.S. armor enveloping the Iraqis in Kuwait and engaging them at the moment the United States chose. Nearly as significant was the westward deployment of the U.S. Army Airborne XVIII Corps to the west, protecting the flank of the armored thrust. An attack solely from Kuwait would make it difficult but not impossible to deploy a flanking operation in the west.
However, if Saudi Arabian territory were available to the United States, it would be much easier to probe into central Iraq and develop attacks on Baghdad from the west as well as from the south. In addition, while air operations from Qatar could be significant, access to Saudi bases would allow a much higher tempo of operations by providing additional facilities and reducing the number of tanker sorties needed to support offensive air operations. It is possible to imagine a major armored operation solely out of Kuwait, but there is no doubt that a full Desert Storm II requires access to Saudi territory.
In a strictly political sense, the Saudis hold the key to Kuwait anyway. It is extremely unlikely that the Kuwaitis would place themselves in the position of alienating themselves from the Saudis. If the Kuwaitis permit the United States to launch attacks against Iraq from their territory, they will have already received the green light from the Saudis. And if the Saudis refuse to give that green light, Desert Storm II is not an option. The crucial step is for the Saudis to be willing to forego the deniability of operations from their own territory.
If only Kuwaiti territory is available, a full Desert Storm II consisting of multidivisional armored and infantry operations is unlikely. Kuwaiti participation without that of the Saudis points to Desert Slice, or some variant of it. A Kuwait-based force would move far enough north to engage forward-deployed Iraqi army infantry and seize the southeastern part of Iraq, but it is difficult to imagine this being the only thrust or a thrust that would by itself extend to Baghdad. A Kuwait-based operation would involve some hedging of bets on the American side, and if Kuwait were not available at all, then the only alternative would be an amphibious operation.
However, if the Saudis permit U.S. operations, the classic three-part sequence seen in Desert Storm could be repeated:
1. A stunning attack on Iraqi air defenses and command, control and communications facilities designed to paralyze the national command authority.
2. A counterforce air campaign designed to shatter the capabilities of Iraqi army formations.
3. A final, multipronged armored thrust designed to destroy remaining Iraqi ground forces and move toward Baghdad.
Desert Storm never envisioned assaulting Baghdad. If the Iraqis stand and fight, the proposition of taking Baghdad will not be appealing. There is, of course, the idea of encirclement and siege, and the attendant political costs, but that is a solution fraught with difficulty.
Every ground-campaign plan ends with the question of Baghdad. The answer each time is the assumption that the regime and the armed forces will crumble and yield the city without a serious defense. It is always easier to assume the weakness of Iraqi capabilities rather than to plan for the worst-case scenario.
There is one final plan that avoids altogether the problems posed by Baghdad as well as by the swamps and inadequate roads. Operation Desert Thunder is a plan built almost entirely around an intense air campaign without any serious engagement on the ground.
I also wonder if Navy and Army SpecOps aren't trying to find either a) Saddam himself or b) a WMD cache.
I'd bet the unit formerly known as SEAL Team Six and/or Delta Force are both trained for this type of mission (nuke snatching). If they were to get their hands on some serious evidence- irrefutable- Bush could then just say "Well, here's your evidence World- now we're going in hard and heavy."
How do you know this is not already underway, perhaps for the last couple of months? There has been a lot of activity in Iraq lately. Possibly the Big News will not be The Assault- D-Day as it were- but one day Saddam just goes poof and the Turks are in control of Mosul and the Shiites have their own association in control of the south and the Republican Guard are all in line for applications to work for MacDonald's, and small units of Seals, Delta Force and various colors of berets are ubiquitous in the land.
Also, when was the last time you heard anything about the SAS in Afghanistan? It seems like they've pretty much cleared out of that theatre of operations. I would reckon Britain has shifted those assets and now has a lot of Special boots on the ground in Iraq.
Then, I hate to refer to DEBKA but there was that report the other day about a massive airstrike on Iraq with the purpose being to open up a corridor through Iraq's radar screen that would allow SpecOps to insert and carry out missions with relative impunity.
I think it must suck to be Saddam right about now.
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