Posted on 08/27/2002 1:37:19 PM PDT by rightwing2
Jane's Defence Weekly
August 28, 2002
Russia To Retain MIRVs Beyond START II Deadline
By Nikolai Novichkov, JDW Correspondent, Moscow
Russia will not destroy its arsenal of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the timeline stipulated under the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), but will retain its MIRV capability until 2016, according to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov.
Following the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty by US President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin on 28 May, Russia announced it would withdraw from the provisions of START II. The decision means that Russia will now retain some 154 liquid-fuelled RS-20V (NATO reporting name: SS-18 'Satan') heavy ICBMs and combat rail-mobile missile complexes (RMMCs) with 36 RS-22V (SS-24 'Scalpel') ICBMs, each carrying 10 MIRV warheads. All ICBMs of this type were to be phased out before 2003 and eliminated before 2007 under the provisions of START II.
During a 16 August visit to the Strategic Missile Forces' (SMF's) 35th South Urals Division, Ivanov said that Russia's decision to retain a group of RS-20V heavy ICBMs is not a response to the USA's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Jane's Defence Weekly 13 June 2002). "Even before the US announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty we had informed US officials that these missile systems would remain on alert," Ivanov said.
He added that essentially the decision implies that the heavy ICBMs with MIRVs will be phased out as their service lives expire. "This will enable [us to retain] the RS-20 missiles on alert until 2016," he said. According to SMF Commander Col Gen Nikolai Solovtsov, two out of four RS-20V divisions will remain in service. The possibility of retaining another division armed with such missiles is also being considered.
Extending the service lives of the missiles will require additional funding, and would include the cost of a reduction in procurement of new SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs. In addition, a decision was taken to retain in service with the SMF a Kostroma-based division equipped with four RMMCs with 12 RS-22V ICBMs. Two other divisions with such missiles will be transformed into missile depots.
Since 1989, the SMF has incorporated 12 RMMC regiments organised into three missile divisions (in all, 36 RS-22V ICBMs). Such a regiment comprises a train consisting of three diesel locomotives and 17 cars, including three rail-mobile missile launchers with the RS-22V missiles. During an alert, each of the 12 RMMCs can move continuously in various directions across Russia's territory.
The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had planned to begin disposal of RMMCs in Briansk where the company ASKOND in conjunction with Rosaviakosmos, the MoD and the SMF built a special plant. The Briansk plant was to eliminate only rail-mobile launchers used to transport, store and launch RS-22V missiles and not all RMMC components. The destruction of the missiles and their MIRV warheads was supposed to be carried out at other depots. Now the rail-based solid-propellant ICBMs being removed from alert status will be retained. According to the MoD's initial plans, the SMF was to field 270 new solid-propellant Topol-M ICBMs intended to replace the same number of silo-based missile systems with liquid-propellant RS-20V, RS-18 (SS-19 'Stiletto'), RS-16 (SS-17 'Spanker') and RS-22 ICBMs. In time, it was planned to phase out 360 Topol mobile missile systems and replace them with the improved Topol-M mobile version. To meet these targets, the SMF was to field 60 to 90 Topol-M systems annually. However, there are currently neither funds nor manufacturing facilities to achieve this.
Whereas, according to initial plans, the SMF was to adopt one Topol-M regiment (10 missiles) a year, funding difficulties have meant that this number has now been revised to six ICBMs.
By David T. Pyne May 24, 2002
Note: This is a special follow-up to the three part series on the Bush-Putin Nuclear Reduction Treaty posted last week.
The soon to be signed Treaty of Moscow, which mandates that US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads do not exceed 2200 warheads, is deeply flawed and will do little or nothing to reduce the threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal to the United States. One of reasons for this is the fact that the Bush Administration did not want to sign a formal treaty with Russia for the reduction of US and Russian deployed strategic warheads and only belatedly agreed to do so as a major concession by Mr. Bush to Russian President Putin. The Pentagon remained firmly opposed to this treaty long after Bush made the decision to sign it and repeatedly tried to change the treaty language in a veiled attempt to kill it.
Ultimately, the treaty as written is purposely designed by US negotiators to be as unenforceable as possible to preserve maximum flexibility for the US to keep a small hedge of deactivated nuclear weapons which could be re-deployed within a period of several months in the event of a crisis. However, for the same reason that the treaty provides maximum flexibility to the US to get around its restrictions, it also provides maximum flexibility for Russia to avoid any real reductions to its highly potent and dangerously threatening nuclear arsenal. Accordingly, the US will have no real ability to verify that Russian warheads are withdrawn from service as required by the treaty. Whatever happened to Ronald Reagan's motto of "trust but verify?" US negotiators deliberately excluded any effective verification procedures from the terms of the treaty precisely because they do not believe the Russians can afford to maintain their nuclear arsenal at present levels for very long. They believe that the Russians will reduce their arsenal to a level between 1500-2500 warheads within the next decade or so regardless of what the US does.
These longstanding, but faulty and outdated assumptions are based upon assumed strict Russian compliance with the never-ratified START II Treaty, which would have banned all MIRVd ICBMs that serve as the backbone of the Russian nuclear missile fleet. This new treaty poses serious challenges to the validity of those assumptions because it does not limit the number of deployed missiles or launchers, nor does it forbid the Russian deployment of MIRV'd ICBMs. Accordingly, the Russians are allowed to pack as many miniaturized nuclear warheads in each missile as they desire and, in fact, have expressed their intention to do so. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov confirmed earlier this week that the new treaty that the new nuclear disarmament treaty that will be signed Friday allows Russia "to load multiple warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles."
The Russians certainly have no shortage of MIRVd missiles. Their SS-27 Topol M, nominally a single-warhead ICBM, has been said to have the capability to carry as many as seven to ten miniaturized warheads according to Russian scientists. The Russians have repeatedly threatened to MIRV these missiles if the US broke out of the ABM Treaty as Bush did last December. In addition, the SS-18 Satan ICBM, nominally a ten-warhead missile, was revealed to have the capability to carry up to thirty warheads as long ago as 1983, according to a book entitled, How to Make Nuclear Warheads Obsolete by Robert Jastrow. What this all means is that with the ineffective to non-existent verification provisions in the Treaty, even if Russia complies with the terms of the treaty, the US will be extremely hard-pressed to guess the actual number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the Russians. The US will also be virtually incapable of detecting Russian treaty violations. The US intelligence community is likely to continue to greatly underestimate the number of deployed Russian warheads because it will be unable to accurately determine whether Russian missiles remain MIRVd and how many warheads are deployed in each individual missile.
This treaty does not require the destruction of even a single Russian missile or warhead although the Bush administration has signaled its intention to destroy the bulk of the thousands of strategic warheads to be withdrawn from service under the treaty. Furthermore, the treaty does not require any reductions in deployed warheads whatsoever until the treaty comes into force in 2012. Accordingly, 2011 could find Russia in possession of exactly the same arsenal of 6000 strategic nuclear warheads which she possesses today including its SS-18 and SS-24 rail mobile ten-warhead monster missiles that she now has aimed against the US. Even when the treaty comes into force in 2012, Russia gets to keep these monster missiles and still be in compliance. Whats worse, the terms of the treaty clearly state that the treaty expires in 2012, almost immediately after it comes into force, which means that any Russian warheads withdrawn from service that have not been destroyed may be redeployed at will back up to START I Treaty levels of approximately 6000 strategic warheads.
The Treaty of Moscow manages to retain all of the disadvantages of the unilateral nuclear disarmament measures originally proposed by President Bush and add yet another--the fact that these drastic cuts in the US nuclear arsenal will now be legally enforceable by the Russians. Considering the US historical record of meticulous compliance with past arms control treaties and the Russian record of violating every arms control treaty they have ever signed, US nuclear disarmament measures will be very difficult to reverse in a crisis once they are implemented and thousands of US strategic warheads are destroyed. Unlike the US, the Russians have expressed no intention to destroy the warheads they withdraw under the Treaty. In short, this treaty is arms control at its worst.
Copyright, David T. Pyne, 2002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- David T. Pyne, Esq. is a national security expert who works as an International Programs Manager in the Department of the Army responsible for the countries of the former Soviet Union and the Middle East among others. He is also a licensed attorney and former Army Reserve Officer. In addition, he holds an MA in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. Mr. Pyne currently serves as Executive Vice President of the Virginia Republican Assembly. He is also a member of the Center for Emerging National Security Affairs based in Washington, D.C. Mr. Pyne serves as a columnist for American-Partisan.com and OpinioNet.com and as a regular contributor for Patriotist.com. His articles have also appeared on Etherzone.com.
Oh my goodness ! Everyone knows the Russians are always truthful !!!!!
NOT !!!
And then Russia saves the day with a little "former Soviet" style treaty action.
If only we had their constancy ...
Someday, I'll have to expound on their cousins, the TEL resident DF-15s in Kunming PRC, at the northern end of the new superhighway set to open within weaks, that leads down south into Thailand...
It's his GRU stint that fascinates me ...
An official biography of Putin posted on the Russian National News Service web site in 1997 states that Putin began his career as a GRU military intelligence officer. That information was deleted from subsequent biographies.(6) Finally in 1984 he took a year-long course at the KGB Red Banner Institute of Intelligence (now the Andropov Institute) for training abroad, and was assigned the following year to East Germany, where he remained until 1990.[switching out Soviets with "former Soviets" who walked in on a pile of rubble that was the Wall which fell into the West]
Vladimir Putin while working in the KGB's foreign intelligence service. |
Speaking at an anniversary ceremony at the headquarters of Russia's military intelligence, the GRU, President Vladimir Putin announced that the role of the agency can be expected to "grow exponentially, not only as a tool of foreign policy but also as an element of military policy and defense," Russia's ORT television reported. In this context, according to Putin, the GRU is an important part of Russian military efforts in the Caucasus, and especially in Chechnya, where 421 officers of the agency have been killed over the past two years.Pootie-poot ping![Editor's Note: Putin's visit to the GRU has great symbolic significance -- although the intelligence organ can trace its roots back to 1810 and the rule of Aleksandr I, it continues to celebrate its founding on the date that Leo Trotsky established its Soviet directive in 1918.]
Bingo!
The Relevance of Chechnya ... The Kosovo Fiasco in Context ... (Mozdok's) Threat to the Whole Region
You kidding? Look at him! He's ever so dreamy ...
I'm thinking of maybe starting a Pootie-Poot "Day in the Life" thread. What do you think?
(Don't worry ... he didn't catch my eye in '97. That's the beauty -- despite one's prowess in the martial arts or on the slopes -- of being a bureaucrat so cold fish cardboard that the West figures you're just some functionary Company Man to whom they can relate who's been tapped to put a sane face on the Yeltsin years while punching up Russia's military resolve. I don't think their collective works quite the same as our collective ... in between Cult of Personality figures, anyway.)
I'll see what else I can find in the stacks to support this. GRU is far more interesting to me than KGB.
I don't think it dealt strictly with terror or with drugs. The extant gulag perhaps?
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