America is not in a mood to care
A very true statement, and for some reason some just do not understand.
Posted on 07/11/2002 6:08:18 PM PDT by Pokey78
John Keegan, Defence Editor, correctly predicted how quickly Saddam would buckle in the Gulf war. Here he explains how the campaign to unseat him will unfold
Private conversation with those in a position to know seems to make it certain that the United States will attack Iraq within the next six months, with the purpose of toppling Saddam Hussein from power for good.
The Bush administration will not be deterred by European protests or by the fear of alienating regional governments in the Middle East or South Asia. It has decided that Saddam threatens America's vital interests by his known and unrelenting efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and by his undoubted, though unproven, sponsorship of terrorism.
The American judgment is that the longer Saddam is left in power, the more dangerous he will become. President Bush Junior is determined to conclude the business his father left unfinished in 1991.
The first war on Iraq was not fought to topple Saddam, but to expel his troops from Kuwait, which they had illegally occupied in August 1990. In that respect, it was an old-fashioned war about sovereignty and the legitimacy of government.
That being so, President Bush Senior set himself to acquiring as many allies as possible, the more from the Middle East itself the better, in order to invest the campaign with an incontestable aura of legality.
His diplomacy was extremely successful, bringing contingents to the zone of operations from such unlikely countries as Syria and Egypt. This time, the United States is less likely to bother with cosmetics. Saddam has carefully given no casus belli and it may be difficult for Washington to frame legally watertight reasons for going to war.
True, Iraq has defied the United Nations by expelling its weapons inspectors but it is by no means certain that the Security Council will endorse an invasion.
The United States is unlikely to be deterred. As long as it can secure the co-operation of those countries whose territory it needs as bases or whose forces it believes will further the success of the mission, it will attack. The protests of bystanders will fall on deaf ears.
Few allies are needed. In 1990-91, America enjoyed the wholehearted co-operation of Saudi Arabia, which had good reason to fear that Saddam might move on from Kuwait to invade its own oil-bearing region across the border.
Saudi Arabia was valuable as a base for the United States not only because of its proximity but also because, over the previous 30 years, it had, with American assistance, constructed four "military cities", which provided the US expeditionary force with airfields, military ports and logistic and repair facilities.
This time, the co-operation of Saudi Arabia is more doubtful. Short-sightedly, it seems to have decided that Saddam is no longer an immediate threat, while the popularity of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world makes it more anxious not to be seen to be behaving in an anti-Islamic way.
America is not in a mood to care. It calculates that the measures it has taken to assure alternative sources of oil supply, particularly from the former Soviet Union, not only make it less dependent on Saudi oil but actually make the Saudis more dependent on the American market.
All it needs to prosecute the second Iraq war are proximate bases - and those it believes it can find in Turkey, the smaller Gulf states and the ex-Soviet Central Asian republics.
Turkey would be the land base, the Gulf states would provide maritime staging facilities, Central Asia is already providing airfields lying within operational range of Iraq's air space. The incentives to the ex-Soviet territories to participate lie not only in increased oil sales, but in offers of financial assistance and direct development aid.
In 1991, the American-led coalition attacked Iraq from its southern, narrow end. Their thrust was aimed at the downstream stretches of the great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and the bottom of the great Mesopotamian plain, which falls only six feet in 150 miles.
The nature of the chosen terrain was a principal reason for the discontinuance of the operation when total victory was within grasp. At that time of the year, February, the snow melt off the Zagros mountains on the Iraq-Iran border floods lower Iraq, creating vast temporary lakes, covering hundreds of square miles. The coalition forces were stopped from going on to Baghdad in part because of the fear that the plains were about to turn into a bog.
Next time, Iraq should be invaded on a broad front across its border with Turkey. The terrain in the north is more broken but not susceptible to floods. Much of it, moreover, is inhabited by Kurds, who are hostile to Saddam's regime, warlike and likely, despite some misgivings, to co-operate with the invasion forces. Mosul and its environs hold much of Iraq's oil, moreover, and has good roads leading towards Baghdad. Iraq is better invaded from the north than the south.
The precondition, however, is Turkey's co-operation. Washington is working on the problem. Turkey inclines strongly to the West. Its prosperity depends on Western trade and it has recently suffered an economic downturn, making Western economic assistance attractive.
The regime, explicitly secular, is hostile to the Islamic movement. Historically, the Turks look down on Arabs, once their colonial subjects. Iraq was a collection of Turkish provinces until 1918.
If America works the diplomatic levers skilfully - and provided Turkey emerges from its current political crisis - Ankara should come on side. Once a great power, Turkey has no objection to regaining local great power status, with American help.
The small Gulf states are likely to do as America wants. So are the ex-Soviet Central Asian republics, whose economic welfare is likely to benefit more from Washington than from a Moscow still struggling with its post-collectivist problems.
America is therefore likely to get the local allies it needs. Further away, it can count on the support of several countries whose armed forces will be useful, particularly Britain, Australia and perhaps New Zealand, which maintains highly efficient special forces units. It is unlikely that America will look for other military help. Its own armed forces are at a peak of efficiency and, thanks to their intervention in a number of small wars in the last 10 years, have a large proportion of experienced soldiers and junior leaders. Half-hearted European participants will probably not be wanted.
How would a second war on Iraq go? The first war was a grossly unequal contest. Despite Saddam's boasts of his readiness to fight "the mother of all battles", his army was heavily outnumbered and technically quite inferior. His air force literally ran away, to shelter in Iran. This time, he will be weaker still. He has been unable to re-supply since 1991, his equipment has deteriorated, his stocks of munitions are depleted, his cherished "secret weapons" are still struggling to emerge from his primitive laboratories.
The population of Iraq is only 22 million, less than one tenth that of the United States, and his country's principal export, after oil - which he can export only with foreign permission - is dates.
Iraq is recognised to be one of the more advanced Arab states. There is a high degree of literacy, the regime is nominally secular, women enjoy a degree of equality unknown in, say, Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, it remains a poor, backward and completely unindustrialised country.
It depends for its military strength on arms supplies from Russia and China, most of which were cut off years ago. To any Iraqi with a knowledge of the history of the American civil war, the prospect of a war between Iraq and the United States must resemble that of the defiance of Arkansas or Alabama to federal authority. Iraq is bound to lose, quickly, completely and perhaps painfully.
The Telegraph correctly predicted the outcome of the last war. The mistake it made - I was a party to it - was to expect that a defeat so complete as transpired would not end in Saddam's overthrow by coup. It may have been President Bush Senior's mistake also.
His son is unlikely to make that mistake again. If the Iraqis will not dispatch their leader, the invading forces will do the work for them. Saddam, his awful family and his venal supporters are living on borrowed time. They have less than a year to enjoy their depredation of their homeland.
The drums beat louder
America is not in a mood to care
A very true statement, and for some reason some just do not understand.
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I bet they would fold in a few weeks? |
I heard Saddaam quit issuing white underwear to the Iraqi National Guard given how easily they can be turned into surrender flags.
The period of greatest discharge for the Tigris system as a whole is from March through May and accounts for 53% of the mean annual flow. The highest mean monthly discharge takes place during April. Minimum flow conditions are experienced from August through October and make up 7% of the annual discharge
If we were worried about floods in 1991, it would be nice to know when we are lease likely to have to deal with them. Follow link for source.
How long ago did we say his cock was already ticking....
We are Sooooooooooooooooooo in the wrong business
How do we break into punditry?
...or we try to verbally keep heat up and hope someone overthrows him.
It's also a commu-nazi, totalitarian regime.
Or what if Iraq did this and signed non-agression pacts with Iran and Syria and made some sort deal with Jordan. Or if Israel quickly retaliated and the whole region goes into all out hysteria.
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