QUESTION: Nuke War is it coming?(my title)

The Objective American ^ | Friday, May 31, 2002 | E.G. Ross

[freeforall]

I'm getting increasingly worried about the escalation of tension between India and Pakistan. Could we be on the verge of witnessing the world's first nuclear war? You've dealt with defense matters for many years. What would such a conflict look like in rough terms? —Shiverin' in Shreveport

It would look quite rough, indeed. I agree that nuclear war between India and Pakistan seems more likely every day. With the revelation Thursday that the White House is preparing to evacuate some 65,000 Americans from the area—a huge undertaking that we would attempt only in the most dire of circumstances—it appears that U.S. intelligence is far from sanguine about the situation. It's deteriorating fast. Reason is not prevailing. Despite European, U.S., and Russian efforts to get both sides to "cool it," the rhetoric is rising and the two are already engaged in intense conventional warfare. Artillery and mortar fire across the border is the heaviest in years. Between one and two thousand people have died in the last two weeks alone. At least two million troops are now facing off; more every week. Much commerce has been cut. Both nations have reportedly put their nuclear arsenals on a high state of readiness, dispersing warheads among commanders in order to assure themselves retaliatory capacity. Blustering and posturing are growing more shrill and irrational.

As to what it would look like if it happened… It would probably start with a dozen or more nuclear strikes by one side against the other in an attempt to preemptively deal a crippling blow. If the attacked nation survived with quite a few nukes intact, it would retaliate almost immediately. That would be followed by decreasing counter-retaliations and counter-counter-retaliations. If they exhausted their arsenals in the exchange, between 50 and 150 nuclear bombs could be detonated over scores of cities and other targets. The U.S. estimated last week that such a nuclear exchange would kill about 12 million people and injure another 8 million. This would not—scare stories to the contrary—be enough to wipe out the two nations or even completely destroy their economies. The damage would be horrendous, but both Pakistan and Indian would probably recover in a few years. As we learned from World War II and other conflicts since, major cities are surprisingly resilient.

As to who would win, well, because India's arsenal and population are much larger, let's put it this way: Pakistan would probably have the tougher time of it.

By the way, the U.S. would probably bear much of the cost, not only in lost trade, but also because the U.S. would be the country that would most likely have to clean up the radioactive aftermath. It could cost us billions, but it would not devastate our economy, although it could throw the world into another slowdown. Why us for the clean-up? Why is it ever us? We're the ones with the most technology and wealth—and good will. I'm told by sources that the U.S. has been quietly gearing up for this eventuality. Another bad sign that things may be spinning out of control over there.

What's the cause of the escalation? In TOA Daily's opinion, it's primarily due to the on-going terrorism—mainly by Pakistani-supported Muslim militants. They've been engaging in homicide bombings of Indian facilities for years and India has had enough. It wants an end to it, even if the price is high. It's demanded that Pakistan control its militants, but Pakistan either won't or can't. It could be that the militants have grown too strong and secretive, with too many resources, for Pakistan to control. The same thing happened with al-Qaeda, which Pakistan funded and helped build. Shows you that the pit of penalties for backing terrorism can be very deep. You could look at this situation—if it turns atomic—as the first nuclear exchange of the worldwide War on Terror. We thought we had it bad with the September 11, 2001 bombings. We did, but if Pakistan and India go at it with nukes, it's going to make 9/11 look like a firecracker in a mailbox.

[backhoe]

"Squantos" is the source. See the bottom of the note.

[backhoe]

Also found:

November/December 1998
Vol. 54, No.6

NRDC Nuclear Notebook
Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945-98

Since the last update of "Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide" (see May/June 1996 "Nuclear Notebook"), several tests have occurred and additional information has become available about several nations' nuclear programs. From 1945–98 we list 2,051 tests by seven nations, with the United States and Soviet Union accounting for 85 percent. Almost 26 percent of the tests (528) were conducted in the atmosphere.

In one of the tables below ("Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide"), we present what we believe to be a complete list of all nuclear tests by the five declared nuclear weapon states (as recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and India and Pakistan. Another table ("Indian and Pakistani Tests: Facts and Figures") presents some preliminary information about the Indian and Pakistani tests.

If we use the definition of a test adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia (a single explosion, or two or more explosions fired within 0.1 second within an area with a diameter of two kilometers), then the number of Indian tests in May 1998 was three and the number of Pakistani tests was two. As we will discuss below, the precise number of devices the Indians and Pakistanis may have used and the precise number that were detonated is unclear. More information is needed to accurately determine what transpired.

Questions about Indian tests. India first tested a device on May 18, 1974. Advertised as a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" it obviously had military application and India may have produced a small stockpile based on a basic fission design. The test, code named "Smiling Buddha," was carried out in a 107-meter deep shaft at the Pokharan test site in the Rajasthan desert in western India, nine kilometers north-northwest of the village of Khetolai (an especially useful article by Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian in Science & Global Security (1996, volume 6, no. 2) locates the site). Initially the Bhabha Atomic Research Center claimed the explosive yield of the test was 12 kilotons. Later they reduced their estimate to eight kilotons.

The magnitude of the seismic waves from the 1974 test, when combined with its announced depth and the formation of a subsidence crater at the surface, strongly suggested that the actual yield was less than five kilotons. At least one reputable Indian journalistic account placed the yield as low as two kilotons.

With regard to the 1998 tests, Indian officials claimed to have detonated three different devices on May 11: a "thermonuclear device" with a yield of 43 kilotons (code-named Shakti 1), a fission device with a yield of 12 kilotons (Shakti 2), and a low-yield device (Shakti 3) on the order of 200 tons (0.2 kilotons). According to Indian scientists, the blasts were set off simultaneously in three separate shafts. The two larger devices were in shafts one kilometer apart in an east-west direction, some three kilometers southwest of the 1974 test. The sub-kiloton device was in a shaft 2.2 kilometers away. (We have relied on three important articles analyzing the tests, one in the May 1998 issue of Arms Control Today, a second in the September 1998 issue of Seismological Research Letters, and a third in the September 25, 1998 issue of Science.)

If these devices actually produced the yields claimed by Indian weapon scientists, we would expect to observe a seismic signal corresponding to 55 kilotons, or magnitude 5.76 on the Richter scale. Sixty-two seismic stations reporting to the prototype International Data Center recorded the seismic signal, and the average magnitude was calculated as 5.0, with some estimates as low as 4.7. In well understood regions where tests have taken place, seismologists have learned that a 5.0 magnitude in a stable region would indicate a probable yield of 12 kilotons, with the range possibly as low as five kilotons and as high as 25 kilotons. A mid-point of 12 kilotons is less than one-quarter of what Indian weapon scientists claimed.

Of major significance is the Indian claim that it set off a "thermonuclear" device. Some experts initially suggested that this might mean India was "boosting" fission bombs by using tritium, a hydrogen isotope. Using a very loose definition, a "boosted" fission device could qualify as "thermonuclear." Indian scientists tried to dispel that interpretation at a press conference, where they correctly defined a hydrogen bomb as one with two stages, in which a fission primary sets off a hydrogen-fueled secondary; they claimed that was what they had tested. When challenged that a 43-kiloton "thermonuclear" bomb was too small to qualify, they stated that they reduced the yield because the village of Khetolai was only five kilometers away. (It was later reported that more than 40 percent of the structures in the village had sustained some damage.)

The first successful tests of a modern hydrogen bomb by each of the five declared powers had yields of 1.6 megatons to over 10 megatons. All were detonated in the atmosphere in the 1950s and 1960s, although the United States and Soviet Union both conducted multi-megaton underground tests.

It is technically feasible to scale back or "defuel" the second stage of a high-yield hydrogen bomb to perhaps 10–20 kilotons, but it is a sophisticated procedure and not something likely to be attempted on a first (and possibly last) thermonuclear test. It is also possible to design two-stage thermonuclear weapons with very low-yield secondaries that would correspond to the observed yield of the May 11 test.

But this potential explanation is vitiated by the fact that the observed yield corresponds rather well with India's announced yield of 12 kilotons for a "fission device" involved in the test. The simplest explanation of the available evidence suggests that either a thermonuclear second stage, or perhaps the entire thermonuclear device, failed to explode. Several explanations are possible, however, and without more information it is impossible to conclude which is correct.

India claimed that it conducted two additional tests on May 13, announcing the yields as 0.2 kilotons (200 tons) and 0.6 kilotons (600 tons). Although these tests are small by nuclear standards, they should have registered on some of the seismometers in the region, but they did not. The nearest station that reports its data publicly is in Nilore, Pakistan, 750 kilometers away from the Indian test site.

Based on the recorded signal-to-noise ratio for the earlier May 11 test, the limit of detection capability at Nilore for an explosion at Pokharan is calculated to be 10–15 tons for normally "coupled" explosions in most geologic media, and perhaps 100–150 tons for explosions in very porous (and dry) media, such as the "sand dunes" mentioned by the Indian press accounts of the May 13 event. Even assuming the latter "partial decoupling" scenario, the claimed yield of 600–800 tons for this event should have produced signals detectable at Nilore.

The absence of any seismic record for this test suggests that the actual yields were either far lower than planned, or that the announced yields were intended to confuse and mislead foreign observers as to the actual purpose of the tests, which may have been deliberately kept low to calibrate and validate computer models of the very early stages of nuclear device performance. As in the case of the May 11 tests, without further information from Indian officials, it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty what purposes were served by these explosions, or whether one or both occurred at all.

Questions about the Pakistani tests. In response to the Indian tests, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that five devices had been exploded on May 28. These explosions took place in Baluchistan very near the Afghanistan border, apparently in a horizontal tunnel. A sixth detonation was announced on May 30, conducted some 100 kilometers to the southwest according to seismic analysis, apparently in a vertical shaft.

Pakistani officials, like their Indian counterparts, seem to have exaggerated the number and size of the explosions, announcing the first day's yield as 40–45 kilotons (including one test of 30–35 kilotons) and a yield of 15–18 kilotons for the sole test on May 30. Analysis of the seismic data does not support these claims. The average magnitude reported by the 65 stations recording the event on May 28 was 4.9, indicating an explosive yield in the 6–13 kiloton range. Fifty-one stations recorded the event on May 30, with an average magnitude of 4.3, indicating an explosion in the 2–8 kiloton range.

As in the Indian case, much more information is needed to determine exactly how many devices were used, how many went off, and the nature of their designs.

Indian and Pakistani tests: facts and figures

Date	GMT	Coordinates	Yield (est. range)
Indian Nuclear Tests
May 18, 1974	02:34:55	27.095 N 71.752 E	2-5 kilotons
May 11, 1988	10:13:44	27.078 N 71.719 E	12 kilotons* (9-16 kilotons)
May 11, 1998	10:13	?	?*
May 13, 1998	06:51	?	?**
Pakistani Nuclear Tests
May 28, 1998	10:16:17	28.830 N 64.950 E	9 kilotons*** (6-13 kilotons)
May 30, 1998	06:54:06	28.495 N 63.781 E	4 kilotons (2-8 kilotons)

Local time in India is five-and-one-half hours later than gmt; in Pakistan, local time is five hours later than gmt.

*The Indian government announced that three nuclear devices were detonated simultaneously in three shafts, two of which were a kilometer apart; the third was 2.2 kilometers away. We count these as two tests.

**Seismic records do not discriminate the explosions of two devices (announced by Indian scientists as being 0.2 and 0.6 kilotons), one or both of which may not have detonated.

***Pakistani officials announced that five nuclear devices were tested. Seismic records do not discriminate these and it is possible that only one device was detonated.

Last Nuclear Test

Soviet Union (Russia)	October 24, 1990
United Kingdom	November 26, 1991
United States	September 23, 1992
France	January 27, 1996
China	July 29, 1996
India	May 13, 1998
Pakistan	May 30, 1998

Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945-98

Year	U.S.		U.S.S.R.		U.K.		France		China		TOTAL
	A	U	A	U	A	U	A	U	A	U
1945	1										1
1946	2										2
1947	0										0
1948	3										3
1949	0		1								1
1950	0		0								0
1951	15	1	2								18
1952	10	0	0		1						11
1953	11	0	5		2						18
1954	6	0	10		0						16
1955	17	1	6		0						24
1956	18	0	9		6						33
1957	27	5	16		7						55
1958	62	15	34		5						116
1959	0	0	0		0						0
1960	0	0	0		0		3				3
1961	0	10	58	1	0		1	1			71
1962	39	57	78	1	0	2	0	1			178
1963	4	43	0	0	0	0	0	3			50
1964	0	45	0	9	0	2	0	3	1		60
1965	0	38	0	14	0	1	0	4	1		58
1966	0	48	0	18	0	0	6	1	3		76
1967	0	42	0	17	0	0	3	0	2		64
1968	0	56	0	17	0	0	5	0	1		79
1969	0	46	0	19	0	0	0	0	1	1	67
1970	0	39	0	16	0	0	8	0	1	0	64
1971	0	24	0	23	0	0	5	0	1	0	53
1972	0	27	0	24	0	0	4	0	2	0	57
1973	0	24	0	17	0	0	6	0	1	0	48
1974	0	22	0	21	0	1	9	0	1	0	55*
1975	0	22	0	19	0	0	0	2	0	1	44
1976	0	20	0	21	0	1	0	5	3	1	51
1977	0	20	0	24	0	0	0	9	1	0	54
1978	0	19	0	31	0	2	0	11	2	1	66
1979	0	15	0	31	0	1	0	10	1	0	58
1980	0	14	0	24	0	3	0	12	1	0	54
1981	0	16	0	21	0	1	0	12	0	0	50
1982	0	18	0	19	0	1	0	10	0	0	49
1983	0	18	0	25	0	1	0	9	0	0	55
1984	0	18	0	27	0	2	0	8	0	1	57
1985	0	17	0	10	0	1	0	8	0	2	36
1986	0	14	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	2	23
1987	0	14	0	23	0	1	0	8	0	0	47
1988	0	15	0	16	0	0	0	8	0	0	40
1989	0	11	0	7	0	1	0	9	0	1	28
1990	0	8	0	1	0	1	0	6	0	1	18
1991	0	7	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	0	14
1992	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	8
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	2	7
1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5**
TOTAL	215	815	219	496	21	24***	50	160	23	22	2,051

A = atmospheric U = underground

*Includes one Indian test in 1974

**See "Indian and Pakistani Tests: Facts and Figures"

***All U.K. underground tests were conducted in the United States

Total nuclear test megatonnage

	Atmospheric	Underground	Total
United States	141.0	38.0	179.0
Soveit Union	247.0	38.0	285.0
United Kingdom	8.0	0.9	8.9
France	10.0	4.0	14.0
China	21.9	1.5	23.4
India	-	0.014-0.017	0.014-.017
Pakistan	-	0.014-0.017	0.014-.017
Total	427.9	82.428-.434	510.328-.334

Tests by location

Nevada	935
Kazakhstan	496
Russia	214
Mururoa Atoll	175
Enewetak	43
China (Lop Nur)	41
Christmas Island	30
Bikini	23
Algeria	17
Johnston Island	12
Australia	12
Fangataufa Atoll	12
India	4
Pacific Ocean	4
Malden Island	3
So. Atlantic Ocean	3
Alaska	3
New Mexico	3
Pakistan	2
Mississippi	2
Colorado	2
Ukraine	2
Uzbekistan	2
Turkmenistan	1
Total	2,051

Nuclear Notebook is prepared by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin of the Natural Resources Defense Council. Inquiries should be directed to nrdc, 1200 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C., 20005; 202-289-6868.

[Domestic Church]

Thanks for posting that info. It appears both Pak & India have overinflated their yields and we can find some comfort in that. From a medical standpoint there is an expected difference in resulting illness between the kind of exposure one would expect from a Hiroshoma bomb every 11 hours and a few much greater blasts.

[sneakypete]

I think they are just waiting for Jerry Rivers to arrive to do the play by play.

With any luck at all,he will be at ground zero to report on the flash.

[freeforall]

bttt

[a merkin]

It's a Muslim Thing, You Wouldn't Understand© . . . Jihadis in Kashmir are the wildcard.

I've listened to Arabs a lot ove the years complaining about their spectacular failures in achieving their national aspirations in the 20th Century. I must admit that I've listened with some sympathy to what they've had to say about Western interference in their affairs. I might say the same about non-Arab muslims that I've talked to.

Nevertheless, it's equally clear that the Islamist antidote to the sick state of social and political affairs in muslim ruled nations is a hydra-headed jihad that is approaching its own WATERLOO at the speed of light. The results will make a bonfire of their philosophical presumptions and perhaps cause a reaction against terrorism much like the results of two world wars in Europe occasioned a rejection of militarist nationalism.

[freeforall]

I think the muslim world has no idea what advantages a free society have over a theocracy.They have lived for so long with force,fear and dictators they mistake openess,freedom etc as weakness.They can not accept responsibility because then they would have to change not just institutions but hearts and minds.Will this culminate in a Waterloo of sorts?In a way I think it might be.

[arete]

Keep an eye on it, but don't count the nuclear chickens before they hatch. President Bush and others are working to bring the situation to a calmer state. They may yet succeed

The administration is seen as having failed to prevent 9/11. The administration is seen as having failed to catch or kill OBL. The administration is seen as having failed with the Israel/Palistine problem. Now, wouldn't it be a great victory for the administration if it prevents/stops a nuclear exchange between the Indians and the Paks -- wink wink. I just have to wonder how much is this is theatre being played out for us. It provides an excellent distraction from, say the economy -- just as an example.

Richard W.