Indian Strikes Could Escalate Into War With Pakistan

STRATFOR ^ | 22 May 2002 | Staff

[Axion]

Indian Strikes Could Escalate Into War With Pakistan
22 May 2002

Summary

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told troops in the contested territory of Kashmir May 22 that the country was being drawn into a proxy war with Pakistan, one from which India would "emerge victorious." New Delhi is preparing for limited strikes on suspected militant camps in Kashmir in retaliation for a recent string of cross-border attacks by suspected pro-Pakistani militants. Such strikes could be the first in an escalating series of steps that could once again lead these South Asian rivals to engage in war.

Analysis

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee May 22 visited Indian troops in Kupwara, near the Line of Control that divides the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of the disputed Kashmir state. Vajpayee told troops to "be prepared for sacrifices … but our aim should be victory, because it's now time for a decisive fight," the Press Trust of India reported. He also said Pakistan was using "hired militants" to fight a proxy war with India.

Vajpayee's comments come amid a general increase in border tensions between India and Pakistan. Dissatisfied with Islamabad's failure to halt attacks against India, New Delhi may be laying the groundwork for limited air strikes on suspected militant bases on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control. If carried out, this could be the first in a long series of steps leading up to war between the South Asian rivals.

The worst fear is that such a war could lead to the use of nuclear weapons, something of which both Islamabad and New Delhi are acutely aware. Obviously neither wants to see its own destruction, and there are several levels of conflict in which they can engage shy of nuclear annihilation. Yet there are two outside factors -- the United States and the militants in Kashmir -- that can influence Islamabad and New Delhi's delicate balance between political posturing and war planning.

Vajpayee is under increasing domestic pressure to act against Pakistan after a series of cross-border attacks by suspected pro-Pakistani militants. With the United States leading the way in the international war against terrorism, New Delhi has been offered what would seem a prime opportunity to strike back finally at Kashmiri militants. But Washington also needs Pakistan's cooperation in its campaign against al Qaeda, and it has pressed and coerced India to refrain from carrying through with strikes in Kashmir.

The December attack on the Indian parliament building triggered a major deployment of Indian troops along the border with Pakistan, with Islamabad responding in kind. Washington has since intervened several times, trying to forge a long-term strategic relationship with New Delhi while actively engaging Islamabad for more immediate concerns.

For the United States, the threat of an Indian attack on Pakistan served to pressure Islamabad to cooperate with U.S. anti-al Qaeda and anti-Taliban operations, but a real Indian attack could turn the tide of opposition in Pakistan against President Pervez Musharraf and endanger the government's ties with Washington.

During his May 22 visit to Kashmir, Vajpayee warned that "nobody should think that the threshold of our tolerance has no limit." Shelling across the LoC is already a regular occurrence, but India has refrained from striking deeply into Kashmir not only because of U.S. pressure and promises -- such as enhanced military cooperation -- but also because even a limited operation has the potential to escalate to full-scale war. But New Delhi also believes that the time for action is nearing, and if it can keep its attacks focused and limited, it may elicit only a minimal response from Pakistan.

Air- and land-launched missile attacks on a limited number of militant camps could buy Vajpayee widespread support at home and send a clear message to Islamabad that if it cannot control the militant problem, India is prepared to raise the stakes another notch.

For Islamabad, such an action would have a greater impact on politics than on Pakistan's ability to fight. Musharraf walks a delicate line at home, balancing secular elements in the military and the moderate middle class with Islamist factions and pro-militant elements in the military and intelligence services. To avoid a domestic backlash for his cooperation with the United States, he continues to tacitly and overtly support the cause of Kashmiri separatists, something that plays well across all sectors of Pakistani society.

If India undertakes an attack in Kashmir, Musharraf would have little choice but to respond. His initial reaction likely will include harsh diplomatic rhetoric coupled with increased Pakistani shelling across the Line of Control -- raising the fighting to the level of the Kargil conflict of 1999. Anything larger risks an even more extreme response from India. Anything less, however, could trigger a backlash from within Pakistan's own intelligence and military, leaving Musharraf out on a limb.

Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad are going to make moves they feel will lead to an uncontrollable situation. For Pakistan, launching a full-scale war against India would remain a distant option, given the overwhelming advantage India has in conventional forces. By many estimates, India could defeat the Pakistani military in less than a week, assuming neither resorts to nuclear weapons and no other nation -- like China or the United States -- intervenes.

Likewise for India, if it actually defeated the Pakistani military and avoided nuclear apocalypse, it must not only deal with the international political ramifications but figure out how to deal with the sudden creation of hundreds of thousands of Pakistani partisans and guerrillas.

Assuming both countries are run by people who think before they act, the wild cards in the equation remain Washington and the militants in Kashmir themselves. The United States serves as a moderating voice in the conflict, sending envoys to both countries in an effort to give them time to cool off and rethink potentially rash actions that could lead to a wider conflict. However, by staging more attacks against Indian targets, the militants have the ability to press the conflict to a higher level in spite of the intentions of the leadership in New Delhi, Islamabad or Washington.

Musharraf is not capable of controlling all the militants even if he wanted to. An attack in India on the day U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca arrived in New Delhi -- in which more than 30 people were killed by suspected Pakistan-backed Islamic militants in Kashmir -- not only nullified her visit but pushed India further down the path toward confrontation. As long as these extremist groups continue to operate, they hold the fate of South Asia in their hands.

[Fish out of Water]

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