The three major incidents in world navies that caused people to decide that maybe aluminum wasn’t a great idea for ships was:
1975 USS Belknap collision with USS Kennedy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Belknap_(CG-26)#Collision,_fire,_and_reconstruction
1979 HMS Amazon engine room fire - this was caused by a fuel leak that ignited. The superstructure wasn’t involved, but the aluminum ladders in the engine room space melted and made the fire much more difficult to fight due to the resulting access issues:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Amazon_(F169)
1987 USS Stark incident where Stark ate two Exocet missiles but managed to stagger back to port: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Stark_(FFG-31)#Missile_attack
However, by the time the Stark was hit, the US Navy had already discovered that the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates’ aluminum elements had some severe problems. The aluminum superstructures were working and cracking, in some cases severely enough to allow significant water ingress in any but the most placid sea states. The OHP successor was already to have a steel superstructure as a requirement long before Stark sucked up two Exocets. The Stark just served as a reinforcement to lessons already learned.
The bottom line is that nobody actually learned that aluminum was a bad idea for surface combatant superstructures through actual combat, and the only combat incident where aluminum actually materially contributed to the damage control problem was the Stark, where it was already known to be a problem.
The Royal Navy certainly had it figured out early on in the Falklands War. (Read One Hundred Days by Admiral Sandy Woodward). Sailors were sleeping up on the deck at night because they were terrified of being caught inside the ship in the event of an Argentinian air attack.