You can cut and paste by the yard and it does not change the fact that the overwhelming majority of Taney's decision does not relate to the fact of the matter before the court and because of that just about everyone of Taney's comments in his written opinion were made in dicta. As such, they are not binding as precident.
That’s what I said, dear. The Opinion was issued seriatim. There are nine of them. Only something agreed upon by five or more is an Opinion of the Court. You are absolutely fixated on the dicta that do nothing.
Taney’s massive amount of dicta is in response to the even more massive dicta of Juscitce Benjamin Curtis who sat on the bench and listened to his older brother argue the case, and then leaked his opinion to the press before the Court had authorized the release of any opinion.
Taney’s dicta was only 56 pages long. Curtis's dicta was 70 pages long.
When Scott took the case to federal court and sued Sandford, the lower court ruled against him and cited the Missouri Supreme Court decision as the basis for their ruling.
What the U.S. Supreme Court said:
So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back in that character, his status, as free or slave, depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of Illinois.It has, however, been urged in the argument, that by the laws of Missouri he was free on his return, and that this case, therefore, cannot be governed by the case of Strader et at v. Graham, where it appeared, by the laws of Kentucky, that the plaintiffs continued to be slaves on their return from Ohio. But whatever doubts or opinions may, at one time, have been entertained upon this subject, we are satisfied, upon a careful examination of all the cases decided in the State courts of Missouri referred to, that it is now firmly settled by the decisions of the highest court in the State, that Scott and his family upon their return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of the defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction, when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff was a slave, and not a citizen.
Moreover, the plaintiff, it appears, brought a similar action against the defendant in the State court or Missouri, claiming the freedom of himself and his family upon the same grounds and the same evidence upon which he relies in the case before the court. The case was carried before the Supreme Court of the State; was fully argued there; and that court decided that neither the plaintiff nor his family were entitled to freedom; and were still the slaves of the defendant; and reversed the judgment of the inferior State court, which had given a different decision. If the plaintiff supposed that this judgment of the Supreme Court of the State was erroneous, and that this court had jurisdiction to revise and reverse it, the only mode by which he could legally bring it before this court was by writ of error directed to the Supreme Court of the State, requiring it to transmit the record to this court. If this had been done, it is too plain for argument that the writ must have been dismissed for want or jurisdiction in this court. The case of Strader and others v. Graham is directly on point; and, indeed, independent of any decision, the language of the 25th section of the act of 1789 is too clear and precise to admit of controversy.”
In the directly on point Strader v. Graham, 7-2, the Court was unanimous in its finding of a lack of jurisdiction. McLean in dissent stated, "I agree there is no jurisdiction in this case, and that it must be dismissed." Catron in dissent stated, "no jurisdiction exists to examine the State decision."
As Strader stated on jurisdiction,
In fact, when the Constitution was adopted, the settlement of that vast territory was hardly begun; and the people who filled it, and formed the great and populous States that now cover it, became inhabitants of the territory after the Constitution was adopted; and migrated upon the faith that its protection and benefits would be extended to them, and that they would in due time, according to its provisions and spirit, be admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the old States. For the new government secured to them all the public rights of navigation and commerce which the Ordinance did or could provide for; and moreover extended to them when they should become States much greater power over their municipal regulations and domestic concerns than the Confederation had agreed to concede. The six articles, said to be perpetual as a compact, are not made a part of the new Constitution. They certainly are not superior and paramount to the Constitution, and cannot confer power and jurisdiction upon this court. The whole judicial authority of the courts of the United States is derived from the Constitution itself, and the laws made under it.It is undoubtedly true, that most of the material provisions and principles of these six articles, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, have been the established law within this territory ever since the Ordinance was passed; and hence the Ordinance itself is sometimes spoken of as still in force. But these provisions owed their legal validity and force, after the Constitution was adopted and while the territorial government continued, to the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, which adopted and continued the Ordinance of 1787, and carried its provisions into execution, with some modifications, which were necessary to adapt its form of government to the new Constitution. And in the States since formed in the territory, these provisions, so far as they have been preserved, owe their validity and authority to the Constitution of the United States, and the constitutions and laws of the respective States, and not to the authority of the Ordinance of the old Confederation. As we have already said, it ceased to be in force upon the adoption of the Constitution, and cannot now be the source of jurisdiction of any description in this court. In every view of the subject, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction of the case, and the writ of error must on that ground be dismissed.
It doesn't matter whether Taney delivered it seriatim or discontinuously, any comments made that did not involve the matter before the court were made in dicta and are not binding as precedent.
Taney’s massive amount of dicta is in response to the even more massive dicta of Juscitce Benjamin Curtis who sat on the bench and listened to his older brother argue the case, and then leaked his opinion to the press before the Court had authorized the release of any opinion.
Now that you've admitted that the bulk of Taney's comments were made in dicta do you also admit they were not binding? And if they were not binding then we could expect that had the rebellion not interfered then the Republicans in Congress and the Lincoln administration would have challenged the Sanford decision every way possible?