>The Supreme Court Agreed
Here is why I think this sentiment is wrong, and why I believe that the federal courts ruled incorrectly on Arizona's SB 1070.
§ 1252c. Authorizing State and local law enforcement officials to arrest and detain certain illegal aliens(a) In general Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent permitted by relevant State and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and detain an individual who—
(1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and(b) Cooperation The Attorney General shall cooperate with the States to assure that information in the control of the Attorney General, including information in the National Crime Information Center, that would assist State and local law enforcement officials in carrying out duties under subsection (a) of this section is made available to such officials.(2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of such individual and only for such period of time as may be required for the Service to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of deporting or removing the alien from the United States.
As I underlined, this section of federal code expressly authorizes states to pass laws to support § 1252c.
Obama's DoJ sued Arizona on the grounds that ONLY Congress has the authority to make immigration law. This is not entirely true; Congress has plenary power, but they can delegate that power, and § 1252c is where Congress explicitly gives states a limited power to make supporting law, which Arizona did.
The federal court ruling against Arizona SB 1070 further found that the President has a discretionary power to not enforce a federal law, and so Arizona encroached on that Presidential power by enacting its own law. I argue that not enforcing a federal law that grants a power to a state does not disqualify that state from enforcing that law itself, because the state got its authority from Congress, not the President.
In the case of § 1252c (a)(2), a state is limited to apprehending previously convicted felons who were deported and reentered, and only for as long as it takes federal law enforcement to verify and take custody of the individual. § 1252c (b) compels the Attorney General to make this information available to state and local officials. Furthermore, 8 U.S. Code § 1226 - Apprehension and detention of aliens (d) Identification of criminal aliens authorizes the Attorney General to devise and implement an information system.
I would argue that if the Department of Justice refuses to cooperate with a state via § 1252c (b), then the state is in its rights to hold the individual until such time as the Attorney General cooperates. A defiant Attorney General does not nullify a state's power to act under § 1252c (a).
Based on the above analysis, the question now is whether § 1252c (a) gives California the authority to pass a law FORBIDDING cooperation with federal immigration arrests?
-PJ
Where in the law you cited does it give states the ability to ignore federal immigration Law? it doesn’t period.
Additionally you you said “As I underlined, this section of federal code expressly authorizes states to pass laws to support § 1252c.”
SUPPORT yes IGNORE no. And even that was struck down.
>>The Court held that “the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration,” meaning that all state action, “even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”<<
Here is the rest of the decision and the dissent opinion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arizona_v._United_States
On June 25, 2012, the Court struck down three of the four provisions of S.B. 1070. The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor.Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each concurred in part and dissented in part in separate opinions joined by no other justice.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 were preempted by federal law. The three provisions struck down: required legal immigrants to carry registration documents at all times; allowed state police to arrest any individual for suspicion of being an illegal immigrant; and made it a crime for an illegal immigrant to search for a job (or to hold one) in the state.
All justices agreed to uphold the provision of the law allowing Arizona state police to investigate the immigration status of an individual stopped, detained, or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion that individual is in the country illegally. However, Justice Kennedy specified in the majority opinion that state police may not detain the individual for a prolonged amount of time for not carrying immigration documents; and that cases of racial profiling are allowed to proceed through the courts, if such cases happen to arise later on.
Majority opinion
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion identified the question before the Court as “whether federal law preempts and renders invalid four separate provisions of the state law.” The four provisions in question were:
Section 3 of S.B. 1070, which made it a state crime to be unlawfully present in the United States and failing to register with the federal government;
Section 5, which made it a misdemeanor state crime to seek work or to work without authorization to do so;
Section 2, which in some circumstances required Arizona state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of people arrested, stopped, or detained; and
Section 6, which authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States based on probable cause.
Kennedy’s opinion embraced an expansive view of the United States Government’s authority to regulate immigration and aliens, describing it as “broad” and “undoubted.” That authority derived from the legislative power of Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” enumerated in the Constitution, as well as the long-standing interpretation of federal sovereignty in areas pertaining to the control and conduct of relations with foreign nations. In this context, federal discretion as to whether or how immigration laws are enforced is an important component of Congressional authority. At the same time, Justice Kennedy’s opinion acknowledged the serious concerns experienced by Arizona citizens and officials in dealing with illegal immigration, noting that signs along highways south of Phoenix, Arizona discourage travel by the public due to dangerous smuggling activities.
The majority opinion analyzed the four provisions in question within the framework of preemption, derived from the Supremacy Clause, requiring that federal law will prevail when state and federal laws conflict. The Court held that “the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration,” meaning that all state action, “even complementary state regulation is impermissible.” Therefore, the registration provisions of Section 3 were preempted by federal law. In contrast to Section 3, the criminal provisions of Section 5 had no direct counterpart under federal law, leading the Court to apply the “ordinary principles of preemption” rather than the doctrine of field preemption. Under those principles, Section 5 stood as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress of not imposing “criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment.” Therefore, Section 5 was also preempted by federal law.
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 was also found to be preempted by federal law on the basis that it created an “obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” The Court noted that it is not generally a crime for a removable alien to be present in the United States, and that Section 6 would give state officers “even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to trained federal immigration officers.” Furthermore, the removal process is “entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.”
The majority upheld Section 2, but did so by reading it in a more restrictive manner. The provisions at issue required Arizona officers to make a “reasonable attempt” to determine the immigration status of any person stopped, detained, or arrested on a legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion” existed that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States. Additionally, any arrestee’s immigration status would have to have been determined before they could be released. Status checks would have been made through Immigration and Customs Enforcement and their databases. Listing several examples, Justice Kennedy wrote that Section 2(B) “likely would survive preemption” if it is interpreted only to require state officers to conduct a status check “during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released.” Underlining the cautious approach that the majority took to Section 2(B) were Justice Kennedy’s final words on the section: “This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.”
Dissents
Justice Scalia dissented and said that he would have upheld all four provisions as a valid exercise of concurrent state sovereignty over immigration. Justice Scalia argued that the statute was valid because, “As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress. That power to exclude has long been recognized as inherent in sovereignty.” To support his position, Justice Scalia reviewed several cases from the early history of the Supreme Court’s Immigration jurisprudence.
Justice Thomas likewise would uphold the entire law as not preempted by federal law, but for different reasons. Justice Thomas concluded that none of the challenged sections presented an actual conflict with federal law, so preemption doctrine did not apply.
Justice Alito agreed with Justices Scalia and Thomas regarding Sections 5(C) and 6, but joined with the majority in finding Section 3 preempted and that Section 2(B) was not preempted. With respect to Section 5(C) Justice Alito argued that “[t]he Court’s holding on §5(C) is inconsistent with De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), which held that employment regulation, even of aliens unlawfully present in the country, is an area of traditional state concern.” He also argued that Section 6 was not preempted because, “[l]ike §2(B), §6 adds virtually nothing to the authority that Arizona law enforcement officers already exercise. And whatever little authority they have gained is consistent with federal law.”
Legacy
The Solicitor General of the United States Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. said in an 2016 interview while it was a high-profile case in 2012, but that the consequences of that were not fully appreciated. In his view the problem was not so much the “show me your papers” provision of the law at issue, “but that the states are trying to supplant the federal government’s role in setting immigration policy, and we can’t have fifty different immigration policies.” After the Supreme Court announced its decision this decision helped to deter other states from establishing and enforcing its own immigration policies. Virrilli concluded the Court’s decision was “a very consequential decision” which meant that an incipient anti-immigrant movement “got stopped dead in its tracks.” In addition, this decision could hamper California’s attempts to undermine federal law under President Trump.