What a fantastic vision you have. Much of what you wrote is very inaccurate.
You wrote:
“china dis not enter until threatened by McArthur’s rants about having a war with china to allow the return of Chang Kai Shak.”
The truth:
“On 1 October 1950, the day that UN troops crossed the 38th parallel, the Soviet ambassador forwarded a telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou requesting that China send five to six divisions into Korea, and Kim Il-sung sent frantic appeals to Mao for Chinese military intervention.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War#China_intervenes_(October_–_December_1950)
You wrote:
“China was not allied to North Korea and was protecting Chinese interests. What’s more, after the initial devastating attacks destroying whole American units, the chinese drew back.”
The truth:
The Chinese entry into NK was to wage war against the UN Coalition at the direction of Moscow.
“After consulting with Stalin, on 13 November [1950], Mao appointed Zhou Enlai the overall commander and coordinator of the war effort, with Peng as field commander.”
China’s intention in Korea was to solve the “Korean question”
“On 20 August 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai informed the UN that “Korea is China’s neighbor ... The Chinese people cannot but be concerned about a solution of the Korean question”.
The December 1950 Chinese draw back was not some peace offer. They drew back because they were out of supplies and had suffered 70% casualties. Several PLA divisions were annihilated and removed from the Chinese Order of Battle for two years. Many of the Chinese casualties were due to the cold and lack of supplies. IOW many froze to death and many others were frostbite casualties.
China launched its Second Offensive in January, 1950 respective to their war planning, not MacArthur continuing the advance to the Yalu. MacArthur’s troop disposition and decisions show clear ignorance of the Chinese commitment and his limited strategic authority to use nuclear weapons.
I do agree with you on:
“The defeats were handed to the complete lack of the situational awareness by American officers that never visited the battlefield and gave orders from the Da Ichi hotel in tokyo.”
IMO they believed they could limit any escalation, even with China and/or Russia by using atomic weapons. They would rely on America’s qualitative and quantitative advantage in nuclear weapons in 1950. A strategically correct but not politically correct assumption.
I am currently reading the Coldest Winter by David Haberstam and my post reflects facts and conclusions expressed in that comprehensive and seemingly unbiased history.
As with many current histories with facts available from all historians in America, china and russia history is presented in a more truthful manner .