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I was thinking similarly. I was prior enlisted, went to college, was commissioned and attended Surface Warfare Officer School at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in the mid 80's. Learned to drive a ship using old yard minesweepers in San Diego Bay. Served on small boys in Pacific Fleet and have been OOD (underway) in the areas where both ships were hit.

Every Navy ship has two chains of command. They are assigned to a Destroyer Squadron who is their administrative commander. When they deploy they CHOP (change of operational command) to a task force or something designated like 77.1 (the . is spoken as "dot" and the first 7 indicates 7th Fleet - the commander of which was relived in this instance.

Here's what rubs me about this. A ship like that usually never sees or hears from the top of the chain. All of the administrative stuff (like training and qualification) is handled at the squadron or group level. That level of command certifies that the ship is ready for deployment. It strikes me, based on my experiences, that the problem most likely lies at that level and I was wondering why the Fleet commander was canned. Then I recall an article I read on Gcaptain (Red Over Red, The Failure Of U.S. Navy Leadership). That explained it perfectly: public relations. He was ready to retire soon and will "take one for the team" and will not take any financial hit whatsoever. This is known in the military as "different spanks for different ranks.

All this talk of hacking and conspiracy makes me cringe as it deflects attention from the most likely cause, "familiarization breeds contempt."

When my ship deployed to the Pacific we (the bridge watch standing teams) were paranoid. We never saw shipping traffic like exists there. We were always on edge and whenever we did anything out of ordinary (even steaming through the Inland Sea during daylight) it was "all hands on deck." Both of these destroyers are/were home ported in Japan and see heavy ship traffic on a daily basis. I think they became familiar with it and comfortable around it and that is a bad combination. Let your guard down for a minute on a ship at sea in the early hours of the morning and you are asking for trouble. I suspect that the Fitzgerald was "doing circles" waiting to pull into her home port the next morning. I have done that a lot but it's one thing outside Pearl Harbor and quite another outside Tokyo Bay.

The only thing that really strikes me as curios is that the Master of the ship that hit the Fitzgerald blamed in on them because he said he signaled them with a light. WTF? In any close situation bridge-to-bridge VHF channel 13 was *ALWAYS* used to hail and I think the Colregs require it but am too lazy from typing all this typing to look it up.

"...All this talk of hacking and conspiracy makes me cringe as it deflects attention from the most likely cause, "familiarization breeds contempt"..."

I agree 100%. It is making me irritable and angry.

(Thanks for your service, btw) Your input on things like this is invaluable, since you have experience as an OOD and understand completely how these things can go wrong.

I just sent this email to a bunch of people I know:

*********************************************************************

In light of the recent collisions of US Navy ships in 2017, there are many questions about how this kind of thing could possibly happen.

In 1969, the Melbourne–Evans collision was a collision between the light aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the destroyer USS Frank E. Evans of the United States Navy (USN). On 3 June 1969, the two ships were participating in SEATO exercise Sea Spirit in the South China Sea. At approximately 3:00 am, when ordered to a new escort station, Evans sailed under Melbourne's bow, where she was cut in two. Seventy-four of Evans' crew were killed.

Wikipedia: Collision between the HMAS Melbourne and USS Frank E. Evans

In response to this, the US Navy created a training film that describes this accident, and the bridge and watchstanding procedures that should have prevented it: "I Relieve You, Sir"

Even though technology changes, many of these ritualized processes (some that date back hundreds of years) still apply even today. *********************************************************************

"...I suspect that the Fitzgerald was "doing circles" waiting to pull into her home port the next morning..."

There were several of us Freepers wondering about that, and that was similar to what I postulated...she was in a holding pattern of some kind on one side of the sea lane, then made the move to exit and head south when the trouble began.

IRT your 106. It is thoughtful analysis. My guess at the time of the accident was to go after the squadron commander. Maybe they had a recent change of command at that level, so they couldn’t ding that person. Another option is the squadron commander has a major paper trail and articulated major complaints, but fell on deaf ears..