Emergency: California’s Oroville Dam Spillway Near Failure, Evacuations Ordered

Breitbart ^ | Feb 12, 2017 | Joel B. Pollak1

[janetjanet998]

The California Department of Water Resources issued a sudden evacuation order shortly before 5 p.m. Sunday for residents near the Oroville Dam in northern California, warning that the dam’s emergency spillway would fail in the next 60 minutes.

The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.

[abb]

http://www.chicoer.com/general-news/20170628/risk-management-expert-lays-out-changes-needed-to-keep-oroville-dam-safe-for-next-50-years

Risk management expert lays out changes needed to keep Oroville Dam safe for next 50 years

By Risa Johnson, rjohnson@chicoer.com, @risamjohnson on
Posted: 06/28/17, 5:45 PM PDT

Oroville >> With repairs at the Oroville Dam spillway underway, a risk management expert says there is still a lot of work to be done within the organization managing the infrastructure.

Visiting town this week was Robert Bea, a retired UC Berkeley professor previously recognized by the U.S. Senate for his review of disaster management following the BP oil spill and Hurricane Katrina. He has written an extensive report about what may have led to the Oroville Dam spillways’ failing and several papers on the subject.

He hosted several informal gatherings and gave a speech at the Butte County Board of Supervisors meeting Tuesday, detailing what he referred to as “the five C’s.”

The first word was “culture” – as in that of the state Department of Water Resources. He said that needs to change.

“The culture I’m suggesting has to be focused on safety,” Bea said. “There are other countries in the world struggling with exactly the problem you are facing and they’ve learned how to spell the word ‘safe’ correctly.”

The organization making people unsafe should also be liable for all costs, he said. While DWR officials have repeatedly stated that public safety is the organization’s first priority, it needs to go further, in Bea’s opinion.

“Something has to change in that culture and it has to be dramatic,” he said.

The Association of State Dam Safety released a statement in May that new members of the forensic team looking at what caused the spillways’ failure would consider “human and organizational factors” as well. There were none listed in the preliminary findings published, though the group’s final report does not come out until fall 2017. The forensic team is supposed to be independent, but Bea suggested team members may face pressure to not include those factors.

The next points were “cognizance” of hazards and “capabilities” of those in the organization.

“They aren’t unnatural disasters. They are unnatural hazards,” Bea said. “These are disasters caused by people and organizations.”

There also needs to be “commitment” to see the project through, coming from the top-down, he said.

“We aren’t leaving here until it’s done right. That’s commitment,” Bea said. “No more of this BS, telling me ‘I think it’s safe. Safety is our No. 1 public duty.’”

Finally, his last key point was to ensure there was “counting.” Safety needs to be quantified, he said, having seen other countries like Canada and Mexico do so successfully. Who is going to really pay also needs to be made transparent, he said. Previously the State Water Contractors took responsibility for covering any remaining costs for the project.

“It costs money to be safe. It costs 10 million times more not to be,” Bea said after the meeting.

Where will they get the money? He expects water bills to go up and would rather “pay a little now” than put it off as a lump sum.

Robert Bateman, OrovilleStrong! advocate and owner of Roplast Industries, organized Bea’s visit upon being impressed with what he had to say at a legislative hearing.

“It seems to me now he could be very helpful to us and that’s by acting as an adviser,” Bateman said. “This is pro bono. He will help us what were being told by the DWR.”

Speaking as a private citizen, he said some residents would like to see local oversight in the future, with regard to maintenance and operations of the dam.

“Then I think we can create some change, otherwise I think we’ll be back to the same thing, and if I’m alive, will be regretting it in 20 years’ time.”

Supervisors Maureen Kirk and Bill Connelly voiced support for the idea. Connelly said it should be inclusive of communities downstream under threat if there was a breach at the dam.

“It needs to be followed through on,” he said. “There’s an emergency, everybody’s excited, then we forget. I’m a great (student) of history. I don’t like to forget things.”

Resident Tasha Levinson said she feels getting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission license is prioritized over residents’ safety and said she would also like to see a local oversight group be instated.

Reach reporter Risa Johnson at 876-7763.

[EarthResearcher333]

Key Quote: "The forensic team is supposed to be independent, but Bea suggested team members may face pressure to not include those factors.

[EarthResearcher333]

Hi Ray76, See Abb's post url 3,912. "Stay-Form" is a quick and flexible technique to build concrete forms, including curvatures. The material is a metal mesh so it will remain after the pour (i.e. intended to bond with the concrete).

Construction companies will either form a skeleton support of rebar inside the metal mesh or weld a structure of rebar outside of the metal mesh. (See website link at post 3,912 for examples). Any rebar that is "inside" the pour within the metal mesh would be very difficult to remove as the metal mesh and the rebar would be encapsulated and bonded with the concrete.

ANOTHER version of what Kiewit is constructing is a Stay-Form wall that remains as a void in the middle. In this case, the OUTSIDE will have the concrete while this section keeps a "slot" open. This "clue" may be from the internal wooden spacers that would "hold" the internal shape from external side forces. However, if this is the case, the outside pressure from concrete would have to be "matched" - (i.e. poured or RCC compacted at the same time). We'll just have to wait and watch to see.

Stay-Form metal forming mesh where this example places the sidewall support rebar inside the pour area. The rebar will remain after the pour. Soil is used to support the sides of the Metal Mesh form. Other techniques leverage wood bracing of the side metal instead of soil.

[EarthResearcher333]

New Oroville Spillway Model - 1:50 Scale Model Testing - Aerator "bubble" generating channels - No help to Forensic Team Analysis

DWR has contracted with Utah State University to study "Aerator" bubble generating devices intended for the new spillway. Aerator techniques in a modern spillway are designed to create a pressure differential - from a depressed "groove channel" - in which a foam like generation of air bubbles result within the flowing water. With the steep slope of Oroville's spillway, high water velocities develop and increase the risk of cavitation damage to the spillway concrete surface. Aeration mitigates this cavitation damage risk. The result is less concrete repair fixing in surface spalling (roughing of the surface from a micro chipping effect). Aeration also reduces damage to slab seams. For proper Aerator performance, the "notch cut" aerator "channels" are placed near the peak of the spillway. A second or sometimes a third aerator channel(s) are placed at strategic spaced distances further down the steep spillway slope. Most cases have found that two aerator channels are sufficient (see photo below).

Oroville's thick Pier columns at the Radial Gate Headworks act as "giant aerators" from the recombinational mixing of the gate flows. The trailing "fins" and turbulent water recombination will inject a great volume of air (bubbles) into the spillway water. This has helped Oroville's spillway in the steeper down hill section. Indeed, many photographs of spillway flow reveal the whitish bubble entrainment from the "fins" at the headworks, throughout the length of the spillway.

Although Scale Hydraulic Models are quite a bit better than supercomputer simulations, the scale factor of a model to the full actual size spillway can only render the model as an "indicator" to the final results. The differences in the Reynolds numbers (turbulence factor) and Weber Numbers (surface tension) create a mismatch in the true performance.

Here is one article discussing this Model Testing:

Miniature Oroville Dam built as part of repair strategy

Most of the articles look to reference a primary source story. However, the reporter seems to be confused in inferring that this Model is serving another significant purpose for the Forensic Team. That would be a major surprise, if true, on the part of the Forensic Team as this model is a fixed concrete chute with no micro replication of slabs, joints, seams, anchorage, and foundation material conditions. The Forensic Team has already stated (minimized) that Cavitation was not considered a primary factor to the blowout failure**. Note: Much different than a "delamination of a seam" which is a primary source for the BOC's notation of a "hole" formation initiating the failure sequence. In a "delamination of a seam" a slot would form to where Cavitation would then micro-jackhammer (implosion forces of micro bubbles) the concrete. This is the "process" to how the hole would "form" (i.e. become greater in dimensions and depth until risk of flow penetration under an already vulnerable and unstable slab - piping foundation void erosion, anchorage loss, thinning & drain cracks,...).

I would be very surprised if the Forensic Team or DWR pointed to this Model testing as direct evidence to the final Team's analysis due to the scalability issues described. (Technically, this model also does not replicate the Pier aeration from the headworks - as can be seen in the flow color in the photograph).

With all of the lack of detailed complexities of the micro replication of slabs, joints, seams, anchorage, foundation materials, and pre-erosion void conditions, this model would be a very imperfect reference to point to a Forensic Failure inference or conclusion. Even if this model were to have the extreme complexity of these details, the effects of the Reynolds numbers and Weber numbers would render the uncertainty to any substantive conclusion to be doubtful at best. This doesn't include the concrete cutting, patching, drain cracks, variable slab thickness, and seam repairs.

** http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/Memorandum_050517.pdf

Forensic Team May 5, 2017 Memorandum: "24. Cavitation; although preliminary analysis suggests this may not be a significant factor."

= = Why is the Forensic Team stalling? (i.e. recent press statements seemingly expressing uncertainty in their current technical analysis). The BOC zeroed in on a stark technical description very shortly after their formation and examination of evidence.

The Board of Consultants quickly identified the location of the origin of the spillway blowout failure at/near Station 33+00 in their 2nd Memorandum March 17, 2017 report. Quote: "These photos show that the failure was initiated at the hole at the left side of the chute near station 33+00"

The BOC stated further: "The failure, likely occurred as a result of high velocity flow (in the range of 85 to 90 feet per second), penetrating under the slab, causing a strong uplift force and causing the slab to lift, eventually causing all or part of the slab to break away. Subsequent erosion of foundation material caused progressive failure both upstream and downstream."

= = From Post 3,908 above:

That exact area (33+00) is where all of the photos show DWR maintenance trucks at a repeated fix "seam" area where patching/cutting/filling/repairs were done for the full 178 foot width of the invert chute. Two side drains also were non-functional to the left and right [offset] of this repeated "fix" area (each side drain services a 200ft section of one half of the invert).

It shouldn't take rocket science to quickly identify the O&M DWR's maintenance & contractor "fix" work done in this failure location to get the answer to the blowout. In fact, the glaring answer has been sitting for months at the bottom of the spillway. They were "deep void filling" in the foundation chasm erosions deeper than the anchor bars. There isn't a spillway in the world that could survive the complications from this fatal repair decision.

Oh, and all of the clogged non-function drains... They too would have been an issue for deep void filling as (1) the drains would "drop" from the deep foundation erosion, (2) the void filling now has "open" drain pipe that facilitates grout plugging, including migration to the longitudinal drains. Pretty easy way to neutralize 35,600 sq/ft of slab "drains" area. The pressurized underflow water would then have a field day in eroding the frangible areas of the foundation (leading to more "void filling").

Again, doesn't take rocket science.

But, exposure of this would be very damaging to DWR. They face forfeiture of FEMA funding and Lawsuits from their water customers in denial of paying the 25% if someone comes out and speaks the truth. I'm not holding my breath on the Forensic team on this info coming out. When DWR officials deny the obvious in a State Legislative Hearing, when they refuse to answer other technical questions, and then they say "wait until the Forensic Analysis Report comes out", what does that tell you?"

btw- Operating the chute intermittently in years in the past, including the 160kcfs 1997 operation, makes the blowout failure even more dramatic as it was just under 55kcfs. The spillway was designed for 296,000 cfs max operation with a factor of safety on top of this. So the 160kcfs is just about half its rating. And the 55kcfs is 18% of its rating (not including factor of safety).

= =

Other Forensic Team Questions/Issues:

Will the Forensic Team take note of the inaccuracies and denials in engineering specific testimony? What about false/incorrect statements from top leaders in DWR's organization from town halls, press releases, media interview statements, and State Legislative Testimony? (See Post 3,903) "DWR Organizational Ethics? - Severe Engineering Incompetence or Calculated Engineering Deception? - On the Record Examples from DWR officials in Press Releases, Town Halls, to the Press, and Testimony in State Legislative Hearings 2017"

Has DWR already interfered with the Forensic Team? Instructed them not to speak to outside experts? Also is DWR trying to "fish" for what new report information may be forthcoming to counter? If all true, wouldn't DWR know that this would eventually surface? (i.e. leak to Legislators & eventually the media?).

These are serious assertions. Yet, the behavior of the Forensic Team in their HOF and technical commentary to the media has been very revealing. This is in stark contrast to the bold and decisive swift Forensic failure evidential information documented by the Board of Consultants. Perhaps the BOC has sharper expertise in recognizing the Stagnation Pressure phenomenon in the expert in John Trojanowski.

Perhaps this is John France's (Forensic team leader) method of keeping the discussion going and being available or open to the press while the investigation is already zeroing in on its final conclusions. If not, major evidence has been already destroyed in the demolition construction. It's too late to examine the "large block" key evidence at the bottom of the spillway (i.e. deep void filling). The Forensic team is signaling uncertainty. A good top down and bottom up analysis will have the full rigor of answers to the state of the spillway at the time of failure, including all of the Human and Organizational Factors that led to the lack of recognition (HOF failure) to "sign" of major undercutting of the foundation to the spillway.

The BOC quickly found Station 33+00 as the initiating "hole" and blowout of the slab. Working backwards from this BOC starting point is a matter of evidence and engineering. What is taking so long? Politics?

Aerator Model testing at Utah State University. Note the locations of the two "aerator channels". The water flow "whitens" along a horizontal strip where the "aerator" groove channel causes bubbles to form within the water.

Defect in seam where BOC identified failure area (33+00) circled. Non-functional side drain outlets on both sides of spillway prevent 35,600 square feet of drain service area under the slabs. The pressurized water under the slabs would swiftly erode the "soil-like" identified foundation material under the slabs. The "hole" defect of a delamination of a seam joint is where all of the photos show DWR maintenance trucks at a repeated fix "seam" area where patching/cutting/filling/repairs were done for the full 178 foot width of the invert chute. This picture taken just before the blowout failure of the spillway (fresh evidence).

BOC identified failure area (33+00) is where all of the photos show DWR maintenance trucks at a repeated fix "seam" area where patching/cutting/filling/repairs were done for the full 178 foot width of the invert chute. Two side drains also were non-functional to the left and right [offset] of this repeated "fix" area (each side drain services a 200ft section of one half of the invert).

[KC Burke]

East Bay and other residents in Northern California are already paying water bills of 500 a month. They have a legal interest in how their money has been spent and now is squandered.

Jerry just announced another 120 billion on a tunnel set up — what can go wrong there?

[EarthResearcher333]

Wow. 120 billion for the tunnels? They are already in arrears in an estimated 64 billion in neglected maintenance of all of the water infrastructure (dams, levees, etc).

I get clear water from a well living in the mountains (property where lab & home reside). This seems a huge blessing considering the water cost burdens on CA residents.

[KC Burke]

I retired in the Phoenix valley. My water bill is about 50 not 500. And, AZ was the last state to line up at the trough to divide up the water assets of the Colorado.

I also have a little lake property in Missouri which has a shared well. It costs me about $20 for a year for my share of the electricity.

However, their is a push to force everyone off well water and onto local treated water which will cost me about 47 a month. The local communities want to force this so they can subsequently force everyone to pay for a new sewer district.

[meyer]

I’m not anywhere near California - I live in somewhat conservative Tennessee. My water bill is (a hugely pleasant surprise when I moved here from Cleveland, OH) approximately 15-20 per 2 month billing period. It’s downright oppressive that y’all have to pay those kind of prices!

I’m really enjoying watching the building process at Oroville. I check on it daily.

I’m also appreciative of the continued discussion here. There’s a bunch of shady things going on in the background with this.

[KC Burke]

I was just tonight explaining to a friend how following geo-physical events on an internet discussion forum is so interesting. I cited this event, Katrina, the BP Gulf blow out and 9/11. When I told him the forum I follow was discussing Bin Laden within 20 minutes of the first tower being hit that really impressed him. Then I told him I walked around the outside of the Clinton Whitehouse with those guys that would wear costumes and he said, you really are into this stuff aren’t you?

[meyer]

Indeed, I followed all of those events here on FR. Maybe not so much the BP blowout, but on the other hand, I was deep into the Fukushima event both here and elsewhere.

[EarthResearcher333]

Chief of Division of Safety of Dams Dave Gutierrez admits: “Maybe we did miss it,” Gutierrez said. “Let’s let the forensic team tell us. I don’t know.”

New SacBee Article reveals the pressure is all on the Forensic Team. The one person who would take the most heat from damaging findings would be the December 2016 retired Chief of California Division of Safety of Dams, Dave Gutierrez.

Dave Gutierrez has been hired back by DWR as an advisory consultant role during this crisis. He has spoken at town hall meetings and given Testimony at the State Legislative Hearings on the Spillway Failure.

Dave Gutierrez has been a central figure to questionable testimony and statements in light of considering his credentials in engineering expertise (see link to post below: "DWR Organizational Ethics? - Severe Engineering Incompetence or Calculated Engineering Deception? - On the Record Examples from DWR officials in Press Releases, Town Halls, to the Press, and Testimony in State Legislative Hearings 2017")

DWR Organizational Ethics? - Dave Gutierrez - Engineering Incompetence or Calculated Engineering Deception?

What is surprising is Dave Gutierrez's statement "Maybe we did miss it..". Why is this significant? In High Reliability Systems engineering, there is no "maybe". In engineering, this is equivalent to stating that DSOD did NOT investigate the myriad of evidence of pre-failure ("jetting drain flows", clogged non-functional drains, repeated cuts in the concrete slabs, 5 plus miles of cracks in slabs above drain lines, numerous Stagnation Pressure "sign" warnings,…). How? You don't use the word "maybe". You either "KNOW" or you "DON'T KNOW".

I find this statement to be extremely revealing. Myself as an engineer, in past consulting expertise work, having to account for millions in product consequences from design or production "incidents", you never, ever say "maybe" in your rigorous proof & substantiated failure analysis support data. Large company divisions go under (or lose massive market share or massive customer consequences) if you are not exhaustive in the thoroughness and the root cause identifications.

It really looks like Dave Gutierrez is placing all the marbles on the Forensic Team to "get them out of this pickle".

SacBee Article: "He oversaw dam safety as problems lurked at Oroville. Should he be advising state?"

http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article158874004.html

=== Article clips: (emphasis mine)

“Maybe we did miss it,” Gutierrez said. “Let’s let the forensic team tell us. I don’t know.”

The difference? He’s now working for Boston engineering firm GEI Consultants Inc., brought in under a contract that could pay GEI as much as $474,876 for Gutierrez’s services through Nov. 1. That’s far more than the $179,000 base pay he earned in his last year with the state, although he said his work probably will end well before November and the total payout to GEI will be considerably less than the contract maximum. Gutierrez doesn’t receive a share of the contract payments; he’s collecting his regular GEI salary, which he said is “just a little more” than what he made at the state.

Financial arrangements aside, critics of the state’s handling of the Oroville crisis are questioning why Gutierrez – who for years ran the Division of Dam Safety, or DSOD – was brought back at all. Citing preliminary investigative reports, these critics say DSOD’s inspectors appear to have missed critical problems at the Oroville spillway that may have contributed to the near-catastrophe in February.

A contract at $268 an hour

After retiring from the state in December, Gutierrez joined GEI Consultants, a nationwide engineering firm with an office in Rancho Cordova. When it comes to water projects, GEI is the nation’s 20th-largest engineering firm, according to Engineering News-Record. The firm has extensive ties with DWR. Its president, Raymond Hart, is a former agency director, and it has done millions of dollars worth of work for the state over the years.

= end clips

Some retired DWR sources have said that top DWR engineering & resource people retire to join GEI consultants or HDR engineering. There is an implied tight relationship where favorable treatment flows both ways considering FERC has requirements of "independent" consultants/firms doing certain Dam Inspections, including driving/participating in DSSMR's, DSPMP's, PFMR's. Is there a "good ol' boy" system that has developed? Millions of dollars are to be made in contracts - including "finding" new items to inspect and do analysis on (creating even more contract income). Comments have been made that GEI and HDR are the "retirement homes" for to DWR executives/engineers. Perhaps this interrelationship has led to the blindness of pending failure sign as there was no "fresh" and true independent thinking?

=== Main Article clip:

He oversaw dam safety as problems lurked at Oroville. Should he be advising state?

BY DALE KASLER AND RYAN SABALOW

dkasler@sacbee.com

Facing a crisis after a huge crater formed in the main flood-control spillway at Oroville Dam, officials at the California Department of Water Resources called in an old hand to help: David Gutierrez, a nationally known engineer who had just retired as chief of the agency’s dam-safety division.

He seemed like an obvious choice for dealing with an emergency at America’s tallest dam– valued for his technical expertise, his coast-to-coast connections in the engineering field, and his years of experience. Before long he was advising DWR on repairing the spillway, conducting briefings with reporters and fielding testy questions from legislators and townspeople.

It’s as if Gutierrez never left state government.

The difference? He’s now working for Boston engineering firm GEI Consultants Inc., brought in under a contract that could pay GEI as much as $474,876 for Gutierrez’s services through Nov. 1. That’s far more than the $179,000 base pay he earned in his last year with the state, although he said his work probably will end well before November and the total payout to GEI will be considerably less than the contract maximum. Gutierrez doesn’t receive a share of the contract payments; he’s collecting his regular GEI salary, which he said is “just a little more” than what he made at the state.

Financial arrangements aside, critics of the state’s handling of the Oroville crisis are questioning why Gutierrez – who for years ran the Division of Dam Safety, or DSOD – was brought back at all. Citing preliminary investigative reports, these critics say DSOD’s inspectors appear to have missed critical problems at the Oroville spillway that may have contributed to the near-catastrophe in February.

“Clearly DSOD failed to catch the vulnerability of the main spillway,” said Ron Stork of Sacramento environmental group Friends of the River. “To have missed that developing problem is a big miss and a consequential miss. It set up that cascade of failures that almost killed a bunch of people....It certainly has the appearance that Dave may be there to cover up DSOD’s mistakes.”

Republican Assemblyman James Gallagher, whose constituents were among the 188,000 residents forced to evacuate at the height of the crisis, said Gutierrez is too much of an insider to give DWR the advice it needs.

“Why not bring in someone who is actually, truly independent and who wasn’t their career employee?” said Gallagher, who has clashed with Gutierrez at legislative oversight hearings. “It just seems there’s a lot of circling the wagons.”

Gutierrez made no apologies for the work he’s done since February.

“I never approached DWR; DWR approached me,” he said in an hourlong interview. “In a situation like this you can’t say no. I mean, you’ve got to go help.”

He said his primary role is “technical expert,” and his lengthy history with DWR and his deep institutional knowledge about dam safety has served the state well in his new capacity.

“DWR does have confidence in me, and I do have a lot of experience in this area,” said Gutierrez, who spent 37 years at the agency. “If somebody doesn’t think I’ve got the experience, hey, I’ve got plenty of other stuff to do.”

It’s hardly unusual for a state agency to hire outside help on construction, communications and other matters. Experts consulted by The Sacramento Bee said it doesn’t appear the contract for Gutierrez’s services violates the law governing work performed by retired state workers. He also isn’t running afoul of the one-year “revolving door” rule that forbids recently departed state employees from lobbying their former agency.

== end clip Full Article at link above

[abb]

The Katrina threads put up by NautiNurse, were, in my opinion, some the finest examples of information aggregation I’ve ever seen. Everyone was focused, because they knew it was a looming disaster, even as many in New Orleans remained mostly ignorant.

[Jim W N]

And the hits just keep on coming. Another good and revealing post ER.

Engineering Incompetence or Calculated Engineering Deception?

My take at this point? Engineering Incompetence followed by Engineering Incompetence to cover up the incompetence.

[The Westerner]

ER333, your statement about "High Reliability Systems" engineering below leads to the unpleasant feeling that the danger will continue to increase just as it did when Dave Gutieerez managed the dam.

"...What is surprising is Dave Gutierrez's statement "Maybe we did miss it..". Why is this significant? In High Reliability Systems engineering, there is no "maybe". In engineering, this is equivalent to stating that DSOD did NOT investigate the myriad of evidence of pre-failure ("jetting drain flows", clogged non-functional drains, repeated cuts in the concrete slabs, 5 plus miles of cracks in slabs above drain lines, numerous Stagnation Pressure "sign" warnings,…). How? You don't use the word "maybe". You either "KNOW" or you "DON'T KNOW".

I find this statement to be extremely revealing. Myself as an engineer, in past consulting expertise work, having to account for millions in product consequences from design or production "incidents", you never, ever say "maybe" in your rigorous proof & substantiated failure analysis support data. Large company divisions go under (or lose massive market share or massive customer consequences) if you are not exhaustive in the thoroughness and the root cause identifications..."

[meyer]

Hey, they’re the state. Responsibility isn’t their forte.

[KC Burke]

In the Leftist political culture of California, many unknowable things are certain: Anthropogenic Climate Change and Corrective Actions are certain — who raised the fireman’s pension to $200,000 is unknowable.

Delta Smelt must be protected before California Agriculture is certain — where did all these Mexicans come from is unknowable.

[mad_as_he$$]

Changing the culture at DWR would be impossible with the current set of fools running that operation. Most are politically connected and don’t really know squat about the water business.

[abb]

http://www.orovillemr.com/article/NB/20170702/NEWS/170709960

Team investigating spillway wants public input
By Risa Johnson, rjohnson@chicoer.com, @risamjohnson on Twitter
7/2/2017

Oroville >> The independent team looking to close the case of what caused the Oroville Dam spillways to fail in February is seeking tips and taking questions.

The group is interested in any information which may be helpful to its investigation, which could relate to physical or human factors, according to an announcement emailed Friday by the Association of State Dam Safety Officials.

“The information can involve any phase or activity of the project up to the time of the incident, including planning, design, construction, inspection, maintenance, repair, and operations,” the announcement reads.

The group can be reached via email at oroville.forensic@gmail.com. All messages will be reviewed, though the group may not have time to respond to each one individually, according to the announcement. They will be treated in a confidential manner.

“Sources of the information will not be shared with DWR or any other parties outside the six members of the forensic team unless either (a) a legal requirement arises to do so, or (b) the individuals providing information give permission to share their identity,” the announcement reads.

The forensic team released a preliminary list of potential causes in May and will release its final findings sometime in fall 2017.

[EarthResearcher333]

"The group is interested in any information which may be helpful to its investigation, which could relate to physical or human factors, according to an announcement emailed Friday by the Association of State Dam Safety Officials."

"The information can involve any phase or activity of the project up to the time of the incident, including planning, design, construction, inspection, maintenance, repair, and operations,” the announcement reads."

Well this is a "turn of events".

What happened to the narrative of the investigators having reams of information and documentation? What happened to the narrative of touting the Human and Organizational Factor experience of the team? A crucial component of an expert in HOF experience is conducting insightful internal interviews, discussions, and investigation with the actual people within the organization(s).

This announcement is nothing less than stunning.

What now becomes the elephant in the room is why?

There are two "elephant" choices. (1) a possible attempt at an indirect "public relations" reaching-out "image" where the public thus sees that they covered all possible sources, including outsiders (retired too) that may have critical information. (2) or an internal "war" broke out to where there is no cooperation & the team is seeking to break the dam in information sources they are unable to procure within.

The last possibility is that this may be an attempt to gather ("fish for") all potential issues (real or perceived) so that they may be explained or dealt with in a final report (i.e. taking away any real issue by "framing" it in a way that is not detrimental). This last item is a common "political" maneuver to neutralize "issues".

With the current shade of doubt in trust towards DWR, the Forensic Team should publicly answer WHY they are doing this at this time.

Without honestly and openly explaining in detail the "WHY", people may not trust these actions (i.e. "elephants in the room").

[Ray76]

That’s a very interesting development.