Posted on 11/26/2016 7:16:32 AM PST by jmaroneps37
According to a report Tuesday in New York Magazine, a group of computer scientists and election lawyers have approached the Hillary Clinton campaign with evidence they believe suggests the election might have been hacked to make it appear that Donald Trump won the Electoral College when Clinton really did. The hacking claim appears to be based on concerns about tampering with electronic voting machines.
We’ve looked into the claim — or at least, our best guess of what’s being claimed based on what has been reported — and statistically, it doesn’t check out.
There’s no clear evidence that the voting method used in a county — by machine or by paper — had an effect on the vote. Anyone making allegations of a possible massive electoral hack should provide proof, and we can’t find any.
But it’s not even clear the group of computer scientists and election lawyers are making these claims. (More on this in a moment.)
The New York article reports that a group that includes voting-rights attorney John Bonifaz and computer scientist J. Alex Halderman presented findings last week about Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania to top Clinton campaign officials to try to persuade them to call for a recount. Exactly what those findings were isn’t clear.
The New York article includes just one example, a finding that Clinton did worse in counties in Wisconsin that used electronic voting machines instead of paper ballots.1 It’s not clear what data the group was using to call for a recount in Michigan and Pennsylvania, or if it was looking at data at all: It could have chosen those states because they were the ones besides Wisconsin that Trump won with the smallest margins.
Bonifaz, Halderman and the Clinton campaign officials mentioned in the article didn’t respond to requests for comment or more detail about the study.
But in a Medium post on Wednesday, Halderman said the New York article “includes some incorrect numbers” and misrepresented his argument for recounts.
He laid out an argument based not on any specific suspicious vote counts but on evidence that voting machines could be hacked, and that using paper ballots as a reference point could help determine if there were hacks. “Examining the physical evidence in these states — even if it finds nothing amiss — will help allay doubt and give voters justified confidence that the results are accurate,” Halderman wrote.
Without a recount, all we can do for now is look for any meaningful difference in the three states named in the New York article between votes in counties that used paper ballots and votes in ones that used machines.
That quickly crossed Michigan off the list: The entire state uses paper ballots, which are read by optical scanners.2 So we couldn’t compare results by type of voting in that state. Instead, we checked the six other states with a margin between Clinton and Trump of less than 10 percentage points that use a mix of paper and machine voting: Arizona, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, Texasand Virginia.
For each county in those states, we looked at Clinton’s vote share and whether it was associated with the type of voting system the county used, based on voting-system data compiled by a nonprofit electoral-reform group called Verified Voting and 2016 vote data from Dave Leip’s U.S. Election Atlas and ABC News.3.
It doesn’t make much sense, though, to just look at raw vote counts and how they differed, because we know there are many factors that affect how a county voted, both in those states and everywhere else around the country. So we separated out two of the main factors that we know drove differences in voting results: the share of each county’s population age 25 and older with a college degree, and the share of the county that is non-white.4
We found no apparent correlation5 between voting method and outcome in six of the eight states, and a thin possible link between voting method and results in Wisconsin and Texas.
However, the two states showed opposite results: The use of any machine voting in a county was associated with a 5.6-percentage-point reduction in Democratic two-party vote share in Wisconsin but a 2.7-point increase in Texas, both of which were statistically significant.6
Even if we focus only on Wisconsin, the effect disappears when we weight our results by population. More than 75 percent of Wisconsin’s population lives in the 23 most populous counties, which don’t appear to show any evidence for an effect driven by voting systems.7 To have effectively manipulated the statewide vote total, hackers probably would have needed to target some of these larger counties. When we included all counties but weighted the regression by the number of people living in each county, the statistical significance of the opposite effects in Wisconsin and Texas both evaporated.8
Even if the borderline significant result for Wisconsin didn’t vanish when weighting by population, it would be doubtful, for a few reasons. You’re more likely to find a significant result when you make multiple tests, as we did by looking at eight states with and without weighting by population.9Also, different places in Wisconsin and Texas use different kinds of voting machines; presumably if someone really did figure out how to hack certain machines, we’d see different results depending on which type of machines were used in a county, but we don’t.
And Nate Cohn of The New York Times found that when he added another control variable to race and education — density of the population — the effect of paper ballots vanished.
It’s possible nonetheless that the election was hacked, in the sense that anything is possible. (And the best hackers are experts in erasing their tracks.) Maybe hackers knew which control variables we’d look at and manipulated the vote in a way that it would look like it was caused by race, education and population driving different voting preferences. Maybe hackers didn’t manipulate the share of votes in individual counties, but rather the turnout, increasing the number of votes in counties likely to favor one candidate or another.
Maybe some irregularities at the county level in early Wisconsin vote-counting are signs of wider problems. Maybe we’d find something if we dug down to the precinct level, or if we looked at other states with mixed voting systems.
But at a time when the number of voters without confidence in the accuracy of the vote count is rising, the burden of proof ought to be on people claiming there was electoral fraud.
The paradox is that in our current electoral system, without routine audits, seeking proof requires calling for a recount, which in itself can undermine confidence in the vote.
We already know students throughout the state system voted twice, once at school and once at home. Not sure what is/can be done about it.
In general, vote fraud and tampering is OWNED by the democrats. Once you start looking under rocks, hard to tell what will be found. It may not be what they expect.
May want to tread lightly.
“no justifiable reason other than liberal paranoia over possible hacking/vote fraud.”
There is no liberal paranoia over possible hacking/voter fraud since they know whatever there is was rigged by them. The reason for the recount is a fishing expedition in order to generate more fraudulent ballots.
Remember, the election ain’t over until the dead are finished voting.
Trump will turn the Dems into a starving zombie army that sings We Shall Overcome as they stumble around, hungrily searching for a pound of flesh to feed on, after they got so used to eating away at our country’s foundations for so many years.
AFFIDAVIT OF J. ALEX HALDERMANIn item 6 is stated that Illinois and Arizona voter registration systems were breached. An NBC news story is cited to support this claim. The NBC news story states that Illinois voter registration systems were breached and that attempts to breach Arizona's system failed.J. ALEX HALDERMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following under penalty of perjury:
1. My name is J. Alex Halderman. I am a Professor of Computer Science and Engineering and the Director of the Center for Computer Security and Society at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
2. I have a Ph.D., a Master's Degree, and a Bachelor's Degree in Computer Science, all from Princeton University.
3. My research focuses on computer security and privacy, with an emphasis on problems that broadly impact society and public policy. Among my areas of research are software security, data privacy, and electronic voting.
4. l have published peer-reviewed research analyzing the security of electronic voting systems used in Wisconsin, other U.S. states, and other countries. 1 was part of a team of experts commissioned by the California Secretary of State to conduct a "Top-to-Bottom" review of the state's electronic voting systems. I have also investigated methods for improving the security of electronic voting, such as efficient techniques for testing whether electronic vote totals match paper vote records.
5. I have published numerous other peer-reviewed papers in these areas of research. My full curriculum vitae, including a list of honors and awards, research projects, and publications, is attached as Exhibit A.
Context: Cyberattacks and the 2016 Presidential Election
6. The 2016 presidential election was subject to unprecedented cyberattacks apparently intended to interfere with the election. This summer, attackers broke into the email system of the Democratic National Committee and, separately, into the email account of John Podesta, the chairman of Secretary Clinton's campaign. Exhibits B and C. The attackers leaked private messages from both hacks. Attackers also infiltrated the voter registration systems of two states, Illinois and Arizona, and stole voter data. Exhibit D. The Department of Homeland Security has stated that senior officials in the Russian government commissioned these attacks. Exhibit E. Attackers attempted to breach election offices in more than 20 other states. Exhibit F.
7. Russia bas sophisticated cyber-offensive capabilities, and it has shown a willingness to use them to hack elections elsewhere. For instance, according to published reports, during the 2014 presidential election in Ukraine, attackers linked to Russia sabotaged Ukraine's vote-counting infrastructure, and Ukrainian officials succeeded only at the 1ast minute in defusing vote-stealing malware that could have caused the wrong winner to be announced. Exhibit G. Countries other than Russia also have similarly sophisticated cyberwarfare capabilities.
8. If a foreign government were to attempt to hack American voting machines to influence the outcome of a presidential election, one might expect the attackers to proceed as follows. First, the attackers might probe election offices well in advance to find ways to break into the computers. Next, closer to the election, when it was clear from polling data which states would have close electoral margins, the attackers might spread malware into voting machines into some of these states, manipulating the machines to shift a few percent of the vote to favor their desired candidate. This malware would likely be designed to remain inactive during pre-election tests, perform its function during the election, and then erase itself after the polls closed. One would expect a skilled attacker's work to leave no visible signs, other than a surprising electoral outcome in which results in several close states differed from pre-election polling.
The Vulnerability of American Voting Machines to Cyberattack
9. As I and other experts have repeatedly documented in peer-reviewed and state sponsored research, American voting machines have serious cybersecurity problems. Voting machines are computers with reprogrammable software. An attacker who can modify that software by infecting the machines with malware can cause the machines to provide any result of the attacker's choosing. As I have demonstrated in laboratory tests, in just a few seconds, anyone can install vote-stealing malware on a voting machine that silently alters the electronic records of every vote. 1
l0. Whether voting machines are connected to the Internet is irrelevant. Shortly before each election, poll workers copy the ballot design from a regular desktop computer in a government office and use removable media (akin to the memory card in a digital camera) to load the ballot design onto each machine. That initial computer is almost certainly not well enough secured to guard against attacks by foreign governments. If technically sophisticated attackers A video documenting this result is publicly available at https://youtu.be/aZws98jw67g. infect that computer, they can spread vote-stealing malware to every voting machine in the area. Technically sophisticated attackers can accomplish this with ease. 11. While the vulnerabilities of American voting machines have been known for some time, states' responses to these vulnerabilities have been patchy and inconsistent at best. Many states, including Wisconsin, continue to use out-of-date machines that are known to be insecure.
Examining the Paper Record Is the Only Way to Ensure the Integrity of the Result
12. Paper ballots are the best and most secure technology available for casting votes. Optical scan voting allows the voter to fill out a paper ballot that is scanned and counted by a computer. Electronic voting machines with voter-verified paper audit trails allow the voter to review a printed record of the vote he bas just cast on a computer. Only a paper record documents the vote in a manner that cannot later be modified by malware or other forms of cyberattacks.
13. One explanation for the results of the 2016 presidential election is that cyberattacks influenced the result. This explanation is plausible, in light of other known cyberattacks intended to affect the outcome of the election; the profound vulnerability of American voting machines to cyberattack; and the fact that a skilled attacker would leave no outwardly visible evidence of an attack other than an unexpected result.
14. The only way to determine whether a cyberattack affected the outcome of the 2016 presidential election is to examine the available physical evidence-that is, to count the paper ballots and paper audit trail records, and review the voting equipment, to ensure that the votes cast by actual voters match the results determined by the computers. For ballots cast through optical scanners, a manual recount of the paper ba1Iots, without relying on the electronic equipment, must occur. Using the electronic equipment to conduct the recount, even after first evaluating the machine through a test deck, is insufficient. Attackers intending to commit a successful cyberattack could, and likely would, create a method to undermine any pre-tests. For votes cast on electronic voting machines, the paper audit trail records must be counted, since the electronic records stored in the machines could have been manipulated in an attack. Voting equipment that might yield forensic evidence of an attack includes the voting machines, removable media, and election management system computers. Paper ballots, paper audit trails, and voting equipment will only be examined in this manner if there is a recount.
15. A recount is the best way, and indeed the only way, to ensure public confidence that the results are accurate, authentic, and untainted by interference. It will also set a precedent that may provide an important deterrent against cyberattacks on future elections.
In item 6 is stated that "attackers broke into [] the email account of John Podesta". Podesta's email was retrieved because he clicked on spam and provided his password. http://www.salon.com/2016/10/21/hillary-clinton-campaign-chariman-john-podestas-email-was-hacked-because-he-clicked-on-a-phishing-link/
In item 6 is stated "The Department of Homeland Security has stated that senior officials in the Russian government commissioned these attacks." The DNI-DHS statement does not claim there is evidence that Russia directed or conducted attacks, specifically stating "we are not now in a position to attribute this activity to the Russian Government." DNI & DHS believe attacks are "consistent with methods and motivations". Methods and motivations are not proof of actions, as the joint statement makes clear. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/215-press-releases-2016/1423-joint-dhs-odni-election-security-statement
Item 8 is conjecture.
No evidence of hacking or irregularity is presented by Halderman. Presented is conjecture, exaggerations, distortions, and lies.*
Stein claims an increase in absentee votes is an irregularity. Stein presents no evidence that any irregularity in absentee voting occurred.
* conjecture, exaggerations, distortions, and lies - item 8 in Halderman's affidavit is pure conjecture, exaggerated claims regarding the DNI-DHS statement, distorting Podesta's e-mail characterizing it as being "broken into" when Podesta himself provided the password (Note also, Podesta's email has nothing whatsoever to do with Wisconsin or any other state's voting systems. This is simply an attempt to prey upon the public mind by casting fear, uncertainty, and doubt into it.), lying about Arizona's voter registration systems being breached
If these phonies were REALLY interested in "justifying confidence" they'd be all for Voter ID.
The professor has not made a case why only these three states were the targets of “hacking.” Surely in the interest of science, the good “scientist” needs a comparison to an un-hacked state ballot system. Otherwise, his learned opinion looks more like cherry-picking.
Yes Trump needs to add the fixing of voting fraud to his agenda.
It's so very important.
One of the great benefits of this election is that we will never hear of the infallible accuracy of fivethirtyeight polls and analyses anymore, or the ignorant mumblings of Nate Silver.
... and Lenin’s not really dead.
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