If this is legit, keep up the good work.
If not, bye bye.
Sure seems it.
Numerous University Computer Science Engineering departments have investigated security and integrity of Digital Recording Election voting machines and have concluded there are Severe security flaws in software and firmware code.
University of Connecticut Electrical Engineering dept investigations:
https://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/reports/
States have reviewed the vulnerabilities and decertified multiple vendor voting systems:
https://web.archive.org/web/20070817120818/http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm
Top-To-Bottom Review
Secretary of State Debra Bowen began her top-to-bottom review of the voting machines certified for use in California in March 2007. The review was designed to restore the public’s confidence in the integrity of the electoral process and to ensure that California voters are being asked to cast their ballots on machines that are secure, accurate, reliable, and accessible. On August 3, 2007, Secretary Bowen announced her decisions regarding which systems in the review will be permitted to be used in the 2008 elections and beyond. The following documents detail Secretary Bowen’s decisions.
Decertification/Recertification Decisions Issued August 3, 2007, by Secretary of State Debra Bowen
Diebold Election Systems, Inc.
Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval (.pdf, 6,734KB)
Hart InterCivic
Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval for Hart System 6.2.1 (.pdf, 5,886KB)
Voluntary Withdrawal of Certification of Hart System 6.1 (.pdf, 303KB)
Sequoia Voting Systems
Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval (.pdf, 4,631KB)
Elections Systems and Software, Inc.
Rescission and Withdrawal of Approval (.pdf, 303KB)
UC Final Reports
The University of California has submitted its reports on the findings from the top-to-bottom review. The red team and source code team reports are separated by voting system. The accessibility report contains findings on all of the voting systems that were reviewed. The document review teams submitted their reports on schedule. Their reports will be posted as soon as the Secretary of State ensures the reports do not inadvertently disclose security-sensitive information.
UC Source Code Team Reports:
Principal Investigator’s Statement on Protection of Security-Sensitive Information (.pdf, 13.9KB)
Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. (.pdf, 561KB)
Hart InterCivic (.pdf, 573KB)
Sequoia Voting Systems (.pdf, 831KB)
UC Red Team Reports:
Overview by UC Principal Investigator Matt Bishop (.pdf, 303KB)
Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. (.pdf, 498KB)
Hart InterCivic (.pdf, 376KB)
Sequoia Voting Systems (.pdf, 108KB)