” These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, protect a substantial Government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). The military is, “by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). Military personnel must be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises. Ibid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing their mission promptly and reliably, the military services “must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.” Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975); see Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367 -368 (1976).
“`Speech that is protected in the civil population may . . . undermine the effectiveness of response to command.’” Parker v. Levy, supra, at 759, quoting United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C. M. A. 564, 570, 45 C. M. R. 338, 344 (1972). Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment, “the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S., at 758 . The rights of military men must yield somewhat “`to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty. . . .’” Id., at 744, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). 10 Speech likely to interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock, [444 U.S. 348, 355] 424 U.S., at 840 ; id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id., at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring).”
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/444/348.html
To repeat for emphasis:
“The rights of military men must yield somewhat “`to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty. . . .’” Id., at 744, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). 10 Speech likely to interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base.”
Also:
“In 1974 the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, “While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). This quote from the Court sums up what is known as the Doctrine of Military Necessity or the military-deference doctrine.
Though it did not become entrenched in modern legal thought until the Levy case in 1974, the view of the military as a separate community, where constitutional freedoms can be applied differently, was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1953. Ruling in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953), the Court said: “The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.”
And:
“In 1986, the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the appeals court decision against Goldman. Justice William Rehnquist, writing the opinion for the Court, noted that Goldman argued for the Court to analyze the Air Force regulation under the standard the Court had used in an earlier, non-military related, free-exercise case. This standard required the government to show a compelling interest to justify restricting a citizen’s free-exercise right. The need to show a compelling interest involves a higher standard of scrutiny and is a more difficult standard to reach.
Rehnquist rejected applying this standard in Goldman’s case, saying, “[W]e have repeatedly held that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.” The Court held that the military was the best judge of whether a particular regulation was proper and that courts are “ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.”
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/military-speech
When I was in the military, a pretty common restriction was not to discuss politics or religion while on duty. Why? Because those can seriously affect morale and unit cohesion. I was in one squadron where several enlisted members believed GWB was not really elected President and that they could therefor refuse to deploy to combat.
I’m a Baptist and generally approve of discussing religious beliefs - but not while on duty, in uniform. It just created too much bitterness and anger. But I’m only a military brat who spent 25 years on active duty, so what do I know?
Thank you for your service.