Replies

PeaRidge: "Morril tariff doubled the percentages within 2 years.
Northern business interests saw it coming and visited Lincoln in March on 1861.
Remember his comment.... 'but what about my tariff?'."

But there was no Morrill tariff so long as Southern Democrats dominated Congress and the Presidency.
Even in 1861, Morrill could not pass Congress until Confederate state representatives & senators walked out.

Further, the original Morrill proposals were quite modest, raising average rates from circa 15% to 20%, still relatively low compared to historical numbers.
But after Deep South representatives walked out, and after winds of war began to blow, then Congress, in its wisdom, saw fit not only to pass Morrill, but to raise its rates well above previous proposals.

So DiogenesLamp's argument here is that high Morrill tariffs, in normal peace-time, would have driven 90% of Northern trade, not just south, but specifically to the port of Charleston, SC.
I'm only saying Morrill rates were only especially high because, A) the Deep South had left Congress and B) from its beginning in early 1861 the Confederacy provoked war, and Congress wanted revenues to support whatever responses might be necessary.

Bottom line: in a peacetime situation, Congress could just as quickly reduce tariff rates to match those of the Confederacy, which were roughly the pre-Morrill rate of 15%.

PeaRidge: "He sent the warships south within a few weeks of his inauguration."

In fact, only one "warship", revenue cutter Harriet Lane (crew of 95), arrived at Charleston to witness the beginnings of Confederate military assault on Fort Sumter.
Harriet Lane escorted a civilian steamer, SS Baltic, which carried supplies for Fort Sumter and around 200 US Army troops.
Those troops were ordered not to reinforce Sumter so long as there was no Confederate resistance.

So, Lincoln's mission to Fort Sumter was precisely the same as President Buchanan's mission in January 1861 -- to send enough supplies to allow the garrison there to hold out while negotiations continued.
Lincoln had hoped to trade Sumter for something important, like a state, say, Virginia.

Finally remember, Buchanan's resupply ship, Star of the West had turned back after coming under fire from Confederate cannon.
Lincoln only hoped that a more robust mission might drive (or sneak) through such fire and reach Fort Sumter.

Lincoln was wrong about that, but there's still no justification for endless pro-Confederate wet dreams regarding Lincoln's supposed ulterior motives.

Negotiations in which Lincoln consistently refused to participate.

The evidence indicates that Lincoln never had any intention of respecting the principle that States can become independent.

And really that is the crux of the matter isn't it? Whether states have a right, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, to become Independent, or whether our principles of governance requires the forcible subjugation of people who are no longer happy with the existing government and wish to leave it. (Same as today.)

All the rest is just spinning.

On this crucial moral principle, Lincoln positioned himself on the same side as George III.

The Confederates, and most of the nation at the time, positioned themselves on the side of the Founders.

Well, let's take on another one of your silly posts...this time #571.

Your canard: “But there was no Morrill tariff so long as Southern Democrats dominated Congress and the Presidency.”

Wrong. It had passed the House well before secession.

The vote was on May 10, 1860; the bill passed by a vote of 105 to 64.

Then we have the 1860 elections.

The results of the election produced a reapportionment of Congress that all knew that even if one assumes that every single seceded state's senators had (a) remained and (b) voted against the Morrill act, they still would not have been able to muster enough votes to defeat it.

In the absolute best case voting scenario that could have occurred under the senate that took office in 1861, the best that the southerners could manage would be a tie vote, in which case VP Hanibal Hamlin would cast a tiebreaker in favor of the north and the tariff would pass. The southerners recognized this fact almost immediately after the 1860 elections and publicly stated so.

The Morrill bill was brought to the Senate floor for a vote on February 20, and passed 25 to 14.

The economic order of the United States was dramatically changed. The tariff took off on an upward trajectory that was far above any tariff in history.

Another Brojoke Canard Bites the Dust.

# 571 again. Brojoke canard: "Further, the original Morrill proposals were quite modest, raising average rates from circa 15% to 20%, still relatively low compared to historical numbers."

BS again.

From the day of its origin, Morrill rates were very high. The bill proposed raising the taxation rate from an average of approximately 37.5% with a greatly expanded list of covered items. This effectively tripled the taxation rate onimported goods. The law allowed a second additional rate averaging 47% for iron.

Your comment about 'the wisdom of Congress' raising the rates after secession is flat out BS again.

Just so you understand the real impact of the Morrill Tariff, here for your reading is this:

In its first year of operation, the Morrill Tariff increased the effective rate collected on dutiable imports by approximately 70%. In 1860 American tariff rates were among the lowest in the world and also at historical lows by 19th century standards, the average rate for 1857 through 1860 being around 17% overall (ad valorem), or 21% on dutiable items only.

See Wikipedia and http://www.econdataus.com/tariffs.html