I’d like to know whose decision it was to send that ship out in the face of forecasts. It couldn’t have waited another day?
Pretty sure the ultimate decision and responsibility rests with the ship’s Capt.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/us/el-faro-missing-ship-hurricane-joaquin.html?_r=0
The tropical storm had been newly christened Joaquin not long before the cargo ship El Faro pulled out of the busy port in Jacksonville, Fla., last Tuesday, heading for San Juan, P.R. It was a familiar run for the old ship, ferrying goods on the 1,200-mile route, one it had made countless times.
For many experienced captains of large vessels, a tropical storm is cause for concern but not necessarily alarm. It is carefully monitored and meticulously charted. Tropical storms in the Caribbean are commonplace, and do not necessarily lead to canceled voyages, veteran captains said.
But by the time El Faro and its 33 crew members approached the Bahamas, the storm had turned treacherous far more quickly than initially forecast. It hurdled past hurricane categories 1, 2 and 3 until it settled at 4, a fearsome ball of wind, waves and rain, and then it sat patiently. By Thursday, El Faro was trapped in the crush of 50-foot seas and 120-knot winds. Listing 15 degrees, the ship, full of cargo containers and cars, was taking on water. The engine failed, making it impossible to steer the ship. Then, after a distress signal, all communication vanished....
“Most ships will encounter tropical storm conditions on a frequent basis, particularly at this time; it’s not something they would necessarily attempt to avoid,” said Capt. Joseph S. Murphy II, a licensed master mariner and commercial vessel captain who has been going to sea since 1968, including along El Faro’s route. “These vessels are very robust; they are capable of handling both types of situation — tropical storms, tropical depressions. And this ship has encountered those on numerous occasions.”...
Look at the track at the link and how the storm changed direction.
“I’d like to know whose decision it was to send that ship out in the face of forecasts. It couldn’t have waited another day?”
The berths are pe-scheduled, so missing a scheduled berthing may in some cases have extremely negative logistical and financial consequences. Those logistical and financial risks are, of course, balanced against the risks to the safety of the crew, the ship, and the insurance and financial risks associated with their loss. Normally, a ship will navigate to skirt the storm and make an appropriate docking at its scheduled birth within normal tolerances for changes in scheduling, nad the crew does so by using the hurricane forecast products from the private and public forecasting weather services. In this case, the crew either utilized a bad weather forecast and/or misused the weather forecast when the hurricane moved on a different track than the El Faro expected. once the El Faro was overtaken by the hurricane, the ship may have been able to weather the hurricane if not for other failures which resulted in flooding, loss of engine power, loss of navigation, and then capsizing.
If I recall correctly, the waters between Florida and the Bahamas/ Bermuda are still on the continental shelf, and the waves in that area would be much steeper and come with greater frequency. Even a very large ship, if power is lost, would broach (turn broadside to the waves) in a very short time. Once the containers shifted, it was pretty much a goner.
As a former merchant seaman, my prayers go out to the families of those who were lost.
Wouldn’t have been a problem if they hadn’t lost power.