“it is fact.”
Let’s hope that you never go to trial and try to sell a jury on your version of what “facts” are. They aren’t likely to accept your guesses about what other people’s intentions are as being equal to “facts”.
But if we were going to make an educated guess about what Eisenhower’s intentions for Vietnam were we would look to his own words rather than your imagination. Ike warned that the loss of Indochina to Communism would be a disaster for the Free World and he used the ‘falling dominoes’ illustration to make his point. Those are facts, not something we have to guess about.
You keep claiming that “Eisenhower had no intention of sending 16,000 troops to Vietnam”. The fact is that President Diem is the one who was holding down the number of American troops stationed in South Vietnam, a fact you obviously are blissfully ignorant about, and it was only after the Communist insurgency grew that Diem agreed to increase the number of advisers in his country.
“At a conference in Washington, D.C. on February 12, 1955 between officials of the U.S. State Department and the French Minister of Overseas Affairs, it was agreed that all U.S. aid would be funneled directly to South Vietnam and that all major military responsibilities would be transferred from the French to the MAAG under the command of Lieutenant General John O’Daniel. A problem arose however, because the French Expeditionary Force had to depart from South Vietnam in April 1956 pursuant to the Accords. After the French defeat, it was renamed the MAAG Vietnam in 1955, as the United States became more deeply involved in what would come to be known as the Vietnam War.”
The facts (the real facts, not the imaginary kind you like to play with) are that the Communist insurgency ramped up after Kennedy took office and the 700+ MAAG personnel Diem allowed Ike to station in Vietnam weren’t sufficient.
“The next few years saw the rise of a Communist insurgency in South Vietnam, and President Diem looked increasingly to US military assistance to strengthen his position, albeit with certain reservations. Attacks on US military advisers in Vietnam became more frequent. On October 22, 1957, MAAG Vietnam and USIS installations in Saigon were bombed, injuring US military advisers.[4] In the summer of 1959, Communist guerrillas staged an attack on a Vietnamese military base in Bien Hoa, killing and wounding several MAAG personnel.[5] During this time, American advisers were not put in high ranking positions, and President Diem was reluctant to allow American advisers into Vietnamese tactical units. He was afraid that the United States would gain control or influence over his forces if Americans got into the ranks of the army. The first signs that his position was beginning to shift came in 1960, when the number of official US military advisers in the country was increased from 327 to 685 at the request of the South Vietnamese government.[5] By 1961, communist guerrillas were becoming stronger and more active. This increased enemy contacts in size and intensity throughout South Vietnam. At this point, Diem was under pressure from US authorities to liberalize his regime and implement reforms. Although key elements in the US administration were resisting his requests for increased military funding and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troop ceilings, MAAG Vietnam played a significant role in advocating for a greater US presence in the country.[6] Throughout this period relations between the MAAG Vietnam and Diem were described as “excellent”, even though the advisers were doubtful of his ability to hold off the insurgency.[7]”
“Newly elected President John F. Kennedy agreed with MAAG Vietnam’s calls for increases in ARVN troop levels and the U.S. military commitment in both equipment and men. In response, Kennedy provided $28.4 million in funding for ARVN, and overall military aid increased from $50 million per year to $144 million in 1961. In the first year of the Kennedy administration, MAAG Vietnam worked closely with administration officials, USOM, and the US Information Service to develop a counterinsurgency plan (CIP). The CIP’s main initiatives included the strengthening of ARVN to combat the Communist insurgency, which had the corollary effect of strengthening Diem’s political position.[8] At the same time President Diem agreed to the assignment of advisers to battalion level, significantly increasing the number of advisers; from 746 in 1961 to over 3,400 before MAAG Vietnam was placed under U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and renamed the Field Advisory Element, Vietnam. At the peak of the war in 1968, 9,430 Army personnel acted as advisors down to the district and battalion level to train, advise and mentor the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps, Republic of Vietnam Navy and the Vietnam Air Force.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Assistance_Advisory_Group
The fact is that the Eisenhower presidency is already over, so you can quit pretending that we don’t know what he would have done.
No JFK, then no Vietnam.
Your devotion to protecting JFK, is extraordinary.