You might try studying a little history. Then you might be able to tell the difference between targeted bombing of strategic and tactical targets, which the Americans did at great risk and cost, and terror bombing, which the British used against the civilian population.
“You might try studying a little history. Then you might be able to tell the difference between targeted bombing of strategic and tactical targets, which the Americans did at great risk and cost, and terror bombing, which the British used against the civilian population.”
Time out for laughter and applause.
PAR35 might profit from learning a bit more about which end of the airplane goes forward, before making pronouncements sounding consequential, about strategic targeting concepts, intelligence data collection, weapon system effectiveness, strike success assessment, priority assignment, route planning, defense countermeasures, and any number of additional specialized fields of study.
I’d love to add more detail, but since I spent more than a decade accomplishing “war planning” at classification levels beyond what PAR35 can even fantasize about, I’m finding the enitre exercise is becoming a mite tedious.
None of which says the first word about the scholarly dabbling I’ve toyed with, for a number of decades, researching the very advent, buildup, and application of Britain’s RAF and US air power; it has been my privilege to meet a number of the original participants personally, plus one or two of the leaders and architects.
All of which is very much beside the point.
The point is, long-range direct-attack air power was a critical factor in Allied victory in Europe, as any honest analysis will reveal in short order. Much of it came to light in the 1980s, when extensive research into Third Reich industry and air defense of the Vaterland showed the Nazis to have been near immobilized in fear, on six or seven separate occasions ... if the Combined Bomber Offensive had just mounted one or two more strikes at the one or two target complexes that had already been heavily damaged (far more than Allied intel collection could know), it would have been “Finis Germaniae”, right there. [with thanks to Robert K. Massie, for the Latin phrasing]
Opinions to the contrary are products of institutional jealousy, courtesy of the senior armed services, who still feel deeply insulted that the air arm came out of nowhere (as their doddering timelines reckon history) and won the war for them. Seven decades on, they still cannot set aside their sense of grievance. Egad, the cheek of those flyers! Daring to wage war without all the traditional pomp and ego.
I’m touched that PAR35 and that ilk are so concerned about our moral state, but it’s nothing more than preening, exhibitionism and over-prissiness. At best, they are clueless. One hopes they don’t know enough to harbor actual malice.