Also from Atkinson’s The Guns Last Light:
Eisenhower had urged his lieutenants in Verdun “to avoid any discouragement or feelings of disappointment in the changes situation.” However, a new development left Bradley not only discouraged and disappointed but also furious.
British intelligence on Tuesday evening concluded that the road to Namur was in fact vulnerable, and if German shock troops crossed the Meuse there they could reach Brussels within hours. Montgomery confided to Brooke that he had told SHAEF’s deputy operations officer, Major General J.F.M. Whiteley. “that Ike ought to place me in operational command of all troops on the Northern half of the front. I consider he should be given a direct order by someone to do so.” In Versailles, Whiteley and Major General Strong, also British, agreed that the Ardennes battlefield would best be managed by two commanders - Montgomery in the north and Bradley in the south - rather than by 12th Army Group alone.
Bradley’s subordinate generals to the north were frustrated by their commanders isolation, which allowed only fitful telephone and radio contact; they also complained that not a single staff officer from the army group had visited First Army, Ninth Army, or their affiliated air forces since the offensive began on Saturday. When Eisenhower had proposed that 12th Army Group shift its headquarters to a more central locale, Bradley absurdly replied, “That would startle the people of Luxembourg too much. They would think we were defeated and had to get out.”
Rousted from his bed by Whiteley and Strong on Tuesday night, Beetle Smith listened to their proposal to expand Montgomery’s role and their warnings of “further deterioration” at the front. Then he rounded in anger on the staff officers. Clearly these two Britishers did not consider the Yanks capable of handling this crisis, Smith charged. Where did their loyalties lie? Such faithless impertinence was intolerable. Both men should consider themselves relieved of their duties, and return to England immediately.
As Whiteley and Strong slunk away in the face of this tirade, Smith phoned Eisenhower, finding the supreme commander still in his office at eleven p.m. Fuming, Smith described the bifurcation proposal while grudgingly conceding that it had merit: among other benefits, Montgomery would more likely commit British reserves to the battle if he commanded them. Eisenhower, staring at a huge wall map promptly agreed. With a grease pencil he drew a line on the map from Givet on the Meuse east through the Ardennes to Prum in Germany. St-Vith fell north of the line, Bastogne south.
While the supreme commander pondered this demarcation, Smith phoned Bradley in Luxembourg City:
“Ike thinks it may be a good idea to turn over to Monty your two armies in the north and let him run that side of the Bulge from 21st Group....It seems the logical thing to do. Monty can take care of everything north of the Bulge and you’ll have everything south.”
Bradley answered cautiously. He noted that no hint of this scheme had arisen in Verdun that morning. Although three enemy armies were now interposed between his command post and the bulk of his army group to the north, he considered his communication difficulties insignificant. “I’d question whether such a change-over is necessary,” he added.
...continued tomorrow.
Oh no. Monty’s head has cropped up again.
But on 18 December Bradley called
Patton to his Luxembourg headquarters,
and there Patton learned for the first
time of the grave situation faced by the
First Army. When asked what help he
could give, the Third Army commander
replied that he could intervene in the
battle with three divisions “very shortly.”
He telephoned the Third Army chief of
staff to stop the XII Corps attack form-
ing for the following day and to prepare
the 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divi-
sions for immediate transfer to Luxem-
bourg. The 87th Division halted its slow
advance, as did the 35th. On the move
out of rest area for assembly in prepara-
tion for the XII Corps’ attack, the 4th
Armored and 80th likewise stopped.
When it became apparent by nightfall
of the 18th that the situation on the First
Army front had deteriorated beyond
expectation, General Bradley decided
upon immediate use of the Third Army’s
resources. Patton had returned to his
command post at Nancy when, a couple
of hours before midnight, Bradley called
with word that conditions on the VIII
Corps front were much worse, that the
troops promised by the Third Army had
to move at once, and that Patton was to
attend a meeting with the Supreme Com-
mander the following morning at Ver-
dun. By midnight one combat command
of the 4th Armored Division was on its
way north to Longwy; at dawn on the
19th the 80th Infantry Division had
started for Luxembourg City. And
through the night before the Verdun
meeting the Third Army staff worked
feverishly to draft plans for the inter-
vention of all or any part of Patton’s
forces in the battle raging in the north,
for Bradley had intimated that Patton
was to take command of the VIII Corps
and other forces moving to its assistance.
Bradley already had directed that the
III Corps headquarters would be moved
from Metz to take command of an attack
to be mounted somewhere north of
Luxembourg City. Patton’s general staff,
therefore, prepared three plans for a
counterattack: on the axes Neufchâteau
–St. Hubert; Arlon-Bastogne; and Lux-
embourg-Diekirch–St. Vith.