Posted on 08/09/2014 5:14:57 PM PDT by Retain Mike
To get to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad you first must present proper identifying credentials to pass Iraqi army checkpoints. Then turn through Assassins Gate, into whats now known as the International Zone, or IZ.
Nearing the banks of the Tigris, you turn right onto a boulevard, see the first guard tower marking the embassy compound, then driveand drivesome minutes fronting its fortress-high walls before you reach an entry gate.
The embassyopened in 2009 at a cost to U.S. taxpayers of over $750 millionis the largest diplomatic compound in the world. At 104 acres (thats 80 football stadiums) its about 10 times the size of any other U.S. Embassy. Think Vatican City, as its nearly that big.
At the entry gate you surrender your driver and car and are met by heavily armed guards from Uganda before entering a building, where you will give up your passport, camera, phone, and most anything else before proceeding through metal detectors and into the actual grounds.
During my embassy visit in April, once inside we were quickly escorted to an up-armored white Suburbanadded security apparently warranted even inside whats starting to feel like some surreally pleasant but disquieting prison.
An expanse of flawless lawn lined with date palms extends from the main chancery building past a dozen four- or five-story buildings used for housing and offices. Across the lawn is a building with an extensive patio. Embassy personnel relaxed there with lattes (it was Saturday), some returning from tennis judging by their shorts and rackets. At one open doorway a sign read, No weapons allowed when bar is in operation.
Fortress America, meet Alice in Wonderland.
The U.S. Embassy could serve as a metaphor for efforts by the United States to create a reality in Iraq without regard to the reality on the ground. Outside Iraq for months was falling to the very enemies the United States has been there to fight, but inside the American oasis along the Tigris few would know. State Department security protocol prevents meaningful contact and daily human intelligence-gathering outside the blast walls. For Iraqis, the fortress has become a symbol of distrust, suspicion, and ridicule. One embassy official there for three years told me hed never been on the streets of Baghdad, wouldnt know what an Iraqi market or the inside of an Iraqi home, mosque, or church looked like. Interaction with Iraqi counterparts is via email or the occasional meeting with Iraqi officials who also work inside the IZ.
President Obama in 2010 promised, Make no mistake: Our commitment in Iraq is changingfrom a military effort led by our troops to a civilian effort led by our diplomats. Gen. James Amos, outgoing commandant of the Marine Corps, is the latest military leader to say the Islamic State takeover could have been avoided if the United States hadnt completely withdrawn in 2011. A look at the Baghdad embassy shows further how grossly Washington has misused even diplomatic resources.
The new embassy opened with over 15,000 employees, and is now down to well under 5,000. All military officers attached to the embassy were being sent home when I was there in April, despite the clearly deteriorating situation. Embassy personnel could only imagine the bombs I could hear exploding in the city.
Yet the State Department managed to pay big Gulf contractors to landscape the embassy grounds and complete a soccer field to complement the Olympic-sized indoor pool, according to Ali Khedery, the longest-serving U.S. official in Iraq and a top adviser to Central Command.
Morale at the embassy since 2009 was plummeting, he wrote in The Washington Post, and relations between Americas diplomatic and military leadershipso strong in the Crocker-Petraeus era, and so crucial to curtailing Malikis worst tendencies and keeping the Iraqis moving forwardhad collapsed. Malikis police state grew stronger by the day.
Pundits freely discuss now the want of strategy in President Obamas determination to end the Iraq war, but few are uncovering another aspect: the fantasy-land waste in it.
The $592 Million U.S. Embassy In Iraq http://thinkprogress.org/security/2007/05/29/13350/photos-embassy-iraq/
Embassy of the United States, Baghdad http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embassy_of_the_United_States,_Baghdad
Right now my take on this event would be that it is a symptom of a multi-generational mental disease acquired by those who advance in the State Department. As one example I would mention that they had the Soviets build a new embassy for us in 1979 in Moscow and then were surprised there were bugs in every room. Another prominent example was Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson closing down in 1929 Herbert Yardleys code breaking Black Chamber and asserting that gentlemen do not read other gentlemens mail.
By the way, only our State Department could decide they dont need U.S. Marine security in Baghdad. Notice they depend on guards from Uganda. Shades of Benghazi here.
Currently my opinion is that these people always need a short leash and would be welcome at the Mad Hatters table.
Besides this article, I included a couple other links. I would suggest subscribing to World Magazine just to read her Middle East contributions.
That’ll be a nice Caliphate headquarters for ISIS, courtesy of the taxpayers.
Uganda Guards? I thought United States Marines guarded embassies?
Mindy mentions Ugandan guards in her article and never mentions seeing a Marine. From everything I have read there were no Marines at Benghazi either. Embassy security was a regular Marine duty when my son was on active duty from 2003-2007. I don’t get it either.
I think the Ugandans were the entry guards, to get onto the embassy grounds. I imagine that is were the Marines take over.
I do hope so. Iwouldn’t want to be part of any diplomatic mission where I wasn’t surrounded by U.S. Marines.
During my illustrious career, I had the opportunity to serve at several U.S. Missions without U S Marine Security Guards. The first was in Djibouti in 1982. We were told that the French Military, including the Legionnaires, would provide our security. In 1983, I worked at the United States Interests Section in Baghdad; the Belgian, our protecting power, would save us.Then in 1984, I worked at the Embassy in N’Djamena, Chad. There too, the French Army would go to bat for us. My final shot at Africa was in Mbabane, Swaziland. Not much danger there. In the unprotected missions, communications personnel like myself were usually ex military and were qualified on the M16 and several handguns. In later years we used to tel the Marines that we got sent to these places to make sure that it was safe enough to deploy MSG Personnel there. J/K, Devil Dogs.
The chief who presided over our boat training stressed that our chances of making in down the the boat lane in an opposed assault was three out of ten.
Three out of ten? I like better odds than that.
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