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Lacrew, you can by looking up Rebecca Mercuri. You will find her website and many of her papers on electronic voting at notablesoftware.com. There is an organization called verifiablevoting.org which I followed for a while. I will take another look. I became impatient because they dealt with many of the details of what I have presumed was a fatally flawed system. They may have been taking the practical approach that their chances of eliminating voting machines was slim, enhancing the likelihood of identifying might be more productive than trying to reform the whole system. Do look at their site, verfiablevoting.org.

There was also a Stanford engineering professor who published lots of papers on vote fraud. I don't recall his name at the moment, and don't see it, so try Professor David Dill at Stanford. He is much involved with the risk of electronic voting and probably keeps an extensive list of references. Try Bing or Google (Google’s involvement in the Arab Winter and the scrubbing of Supreme Court cases has caused me to avoid them when I can).

Mercuri’s publishing seems suddenly to have died out about five years ago. One can wonder why, but it may be that so few understand or believe that our systems are as flawed as they are that she can't afford the time. Remember, even if you aren't an electrical or electronic engineer, that simplicity is the key. Once voting systems involve DNA checking or voice recognition (DRE) or generate reports of probabilities based upon a variety of warnings, they are anything but transparent. Paper ballots placed in a locked box by the voter, in the presence of a half dozen or more precinct workers is about as secure is one can make it. The box is only opened with everyone present, and everyone is present during the count. Each counted ballot is placed into the archival storage box, never to be handled unless by court orders. That is simplicity and transparency which might have resulted in different results for a number of elections, certainly including this one.