Connecticut Judges rubberstamp rules and nominations without discussion 2012

Youtube ^ | Jun 28, 2012 | frankknee

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Published on Jun 28, 2012 by frankknee

June 15 2012 Connecticut Judges rubberstamp rules and nominations without discussion, care, or acumen to the issues which underlay them. Some citizens are calling for the inclusion of Civilian Oversight committees, with a voice, during meetings such as the one portrayed: Video is edited with the text throughout the work attempting to enlighten, offering counter arguments, and some discourse to otherwise a blatantly numbing response from the judges. ABOUT THE RULES ENABLING ACT (REA) , NOTING CONNECTICUT'S VIOLATION TO PROMULGATE RULES BEFORE 60 DAYS: 18:15 REA allowed Congress and State Legislatures to transfer Rulemaking powers to Judges in their judicial Independance. It didn't mean judge made practice book rules are without Legislative scrutiny. Today most Legislatures have been neglecting their resposiblity to oversee, and public oversight has been trumped as well. The Yale Law Journal:

A Blueprint for Applying the Rules Enabling Act's Supersession Clause Written by Anthony Vitarelli, Wednesday, 23 April 2008 117 Yale L.J. 1225 (2008)

C. Effect on Litigants' Substantive Rights Apart from these institutional considerations, courts should also consider how the rule affects litigants. The Supreme Court has endorsed the language of the REA, reiterating that "the Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.'"46 It has also affirmed, though, that "[i]n enacting [the REA], however, Congress expressly provided that [inconsistent laws] would automatically be repealed upon the enactment of new rules in order to create a uniform system of rules for Article III courts."47 Courts therefore must remain sensitive to a rule's potential impact on substantive rights, despite the REA's directive mandating automatic repeal of any statute that conflicts with the rule. The Supreme Court has not precisely defined what would constitute an abridgment, enlargement, or modification of substantive rights, but the Court's clearest statement on this topic appears in Burlington Northern Railroad. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 907 (1999) ("[C]oncerns about legitimacy lie at the heart of modern discontent with court rulemaking."). But see id. at 890 ("[T]he legitimacy of the court rulemaking process does not derive from public participation or political accountability, but instead from a model of principled deliberation akin to common law reasoning."). "[These rules] shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect." Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No.73-415, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2000)). At present, proposed rules are subject to a six-month period of public comment and hearings, followed by a seven-month period, during which Congress may amend or reject the rule. See Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L.REV. 323, 328-31 (1991). Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C.§ 2072(b) (2000)).47. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446 n.40 (1998); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for umanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996) ("It is ettled that if the Rule in point is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and the Constitution, the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law.").1225.VITARELLI.1234.DOC 2/3/2008 3:35 PM. Applying the rules enabling act's supersession clause 1233 Co. v. Woods.48 In Burlington Northern, the Court wrote, "Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate [the REA] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules."49 In contrast, though, at least one member of the Court has described the REA's reach as a "limited mandate."50 To give a more specific and recent example, the Court in Henderson v. United States held that time limits on service of process were "distinct from substantive matters."51 Dissenting in Henderson, Justice Thomas presciently noted that even though a rule may conflict with a statute, it should not supersede the legislation if the rule affects substantive rights.

52 If Justice Thomas's reasoning applies, the substantive right consideration trumps the recency and institutional competence arguments. The Court should consider these three factors in totality, however, and not permit one element to trump the other two. But see Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism Problems Raised by Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act: A Proposed Solution, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 519, 530 (2004) ("[A] Rule viewed as 'procedural' in the abstract may be shown to have unintended 'substantive' effects when actually applied in a specific case.").1225.VITARELLI.1234.DOC 2/3/2008 3:35 PM the Yale Law Journal 117:1225 2008

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Can you put some context to this?