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I knew this Greek election was going to be filled with rage, whether justified or not.

I was also pretty sure (in fact I had a post here the other day saying just this) that the results would end in an inability to form a government.

I’m paying only cursory attention to Greece, yet it seems I grasped more than some pros of the Euro elites. From the article “Just four weeks ago, a high-level envoy from the European Commission was still “firmly convinced” that one party would get an absolute majority or that there could be a coalition between the two main parties....”

Now, I guess that is just one person, but for all the attention given to the Golden Dawn party winning seats for the first time, I felt they were missing the forest for the trees.

And I did like this bit also “Panos Kammenos, head of the Independent Greeks party and a former New Democracy minister, said he would not even form a coalition with the conservatives if he was dead.”

LOL is all I can say to that.

But, sigh, it is no laughing matter.

The Greeks have driven themselves into the ditch and now they are mad about it. There’s no more slurpees to sip over there.

I suppose they’ll have a sort of do-over election in June.

I reckon this is the type of situation that is ripe for some kind of “Strong Man” to rise up.

Hubby’s plan is to send all the Greek immigrants here in the US back to the homeland to straighten things out.

That might be a better idea than anybody else has had so far.

Mr. Kammenos is still alive, bless his soul, but I think the Euro is dead. It has already contracted several fatal diseases and has not many quarters to live.

Don’t ever forget about the “beneficial crisis”—the EU elites wanted this, and they wanted the single currency to experience it.

The European Commission’s top economists warned the politicians in the 1990s that the euro might not survive a crisis, at least in its current form. There is no EU treasury or debt union to back it up. The one-size-fits-all regime of interest rates caters badly to the different needs of Club Med and the German bloc.

The euro fathers did not dispute this. But they saw EMU as an instrument to force the pace of political union. They welcomed the idea of a “beneficial crisis”. As ex-Commission chief Romano Prodi remarked, it would allow Brussels to break taboos and accelerate the move to a full-fledged EU economic government. …

If the ECB didn’t raise rates between 2007 and 2008 (they did it eight times), it may have been possible to avert this crisis. But also consider that the crisis was worldwide and hit the USA probably just as hard. But the goals of the “euro fathers” have to be kept in mind here—this is all they are focused on right now, especially since welcoming a crisis is tantamount to an admission of deliberately causing said crisis.