Justice OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (Horning v. District of Columbia, 249 U.S. 596 (1920)): "The jury has the power to bring a verdict in the teeth of both law and fact."
U.S. v. DOUGHERTY, 473 F.2d. 1113, 1139 (1972): "The pages of history shine on instances of the jury's exercise of its prerogative to disregard instructions of the judge...."
U.S. vs. DOUGHERTY (1972) [D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals]: The jury has...."unreviewable and irreversible power...to acquit in disregard of the instructions on the law given by the trial judge."
BYRON WHITE (1975): The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power--to make available the common sense judgement of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps over
conditioned or biased response of a judge.
Justice BYRON WHITE (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145, 155 (1968)): "A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government."
Justice BYRON WHITE (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145, 156 (1968)): "Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority."
And it behooves you to read that sentence in context.
The judge cannot direct a verdict it is true, and the jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts. But the judge always has the right and duty to tell them what the law is upon this or that state of facts that may be found, and he can do the same none the less when the facts are agreed. If the facts are agreed the judge may state that fact also, and when there is no dispute he may say so although there has been no formal agreement. Perhaps there was a regrettable peremptoriness of tone -- but the jury were allowed the technical right, if it can be called so, to decide against the law and the facts -- and that is all there was left for them after the defendant and his witnesses took the stand. If the defendant suffered any wrong it was purely formal since, as we have said, on the facts admitted there was no doubt of his guilt.
As for Dougherty, check the pinpoint cite a bit more closely. You're citing a dissent at the Supreme Court level.
Your citation of Dougherty at the appellate level makes no mention of a "right," but refers, yet again, to a "power."
Your White quotations deal with findings of fact. They speaks of overzealous prosecutors and judges, not mistaken legislators. Therefore, they have nothing to do with jury nullification.
Once again, a jury's ability to acquit based on disagreement with the law is not specifically sanctioned by the law. It is a by-product of the jury system.