[Borges]

Judicial Review seems spelled out by Hamilton in Fedaralist Paper #78. What else would 'all Judicial Power' in the USC mean? Without it Congress could pass a law tomorrow cancelling all future elections and the citizenry would have no legal remedy.

[1stFreedom]

>>Judicial Review seems spelled out by Hamilton in Fedaralist Paper #78

Nevertheless, it was not included in the Constitution. Understand that many ideas were debated, but few made them into this vital document.

The reason? There wasn't enough support for Judicial review..

[Noachian]

Judicial Review seems spelled out by Hamilton in Fedaralist Paper #78. What else would 'all Judicial Power' in the USC mean? Without it Congress could pass a law tomorrow cancelling all future elections and the citizenry would have no legal remedy.

You seem to forget that the SC can do the same thing. What's to stop 5 of 9 legal elites from passing a law canceling elections?

Putting that kind of power in the hands of unelected elites is madness.

[goldstategop]

Alexander Hamilton meant the Supreme Court ensures the lower courts function in a uniform manner and that the law is evenly applied. I do not think he envisaged in Federalist 78 or elsewhere the notion the Supreme Court would become a law unto itself, dictating social policy and the nature of the country's laws. Yet in the two centuries since Marbury that is what has happened: the growth of a judiciary not subject to any checks and balances.

(Denny Crane: "Sometimes you can only look for answers from God and failing that... and Fox News".)

[gbcdoj]

Judicial Review seems spelled out by Hamilton in Fedaralist Paper #78

Don't forget, though, what he also says there:

The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.

This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. ...

But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.

It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.

Seems pretty clear that if the judiciary oversteps its bounds, the other branches can ignore it.