Who Won the Battle of Fallujah

Enemy insurgents defending Fallujah were formidable because many of them were willing to fight to the death. In general, however, they were an indifferently armed rabble who could inflict casualties because of the nature of urban warfare and U.S. sensibilities. What if our forces find themselves facing well-trained Syrian commandos or Hezbollah guerrillas?

Was Fallujah a battle we lost in April 2004, with ruinous results? Or was it a battle we won in November? The answer is yes. If that sounds awkward, it is because Fallujah was an awkward battle without an easy parallel in U.S. military history. It is hard to say whether the drawn-out process of securing that medium-sized Iraqi city was a one-time event or the beginning of a trend. I hope it is the former. And to make that outcome probable, I will objectively evaluate the battle here and offer comparisons of Marine Corps and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) doctrine and operations.

U.S. MARINE CORPS (KENNETH MADDEN III) In Operation Valiant Resolve, the Marines—here, an infantryman takes aim from a rooftop—fought impressively and with exceptional regard for civilian lives and property. But concern for minimizing casualties and damage quickly limited the scope of their advance.

The United States is likely to face more Fallujahs in the near future. The Marine Corps’ reputation as an elite and feared combat force will ride in part on how Fallujah and similar battles are perceived at home and abroad. In evaluating the battle, I considered the differing objectives of the two opposing forces and how close each came to achieving those objectives. One side’s objectives were more limited than the other’s. Third parties, such as Syria and Iran, may perceive the battle differently. Reaching honest answers to these questions requires looking beyond convenient bromides that recount U.S. heroics or anticipate favorable outcomes that remain largely unpredictable.

After its impressive initial victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) returned to Iraq in 2004 to replace Army forces in parts of central and western Iraq. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (1/5), was sent to Fallujah to relieve troops of the 82d Airborne Division. On 31 March 2004, four U.S. contractors driving through that city were ambushed and killed by Iraqi insurgents; their bodies were mutilated and displayed publicly before frenzied crowds in a scene reminiscent of the Battle of Mogadishu. A forceful response was vital and anticipated widely. Accordingly, 1/5, along with the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1), and supporting Army and Air Force special operations units were ordered to enter Fallujah for an operation dubbed Valiant Resolve. Their mission was to find and eliminate—or apprehend—the mujahadeen and any accomplices who had perpetrated the ambush. Resistance was expected. Rather than a stability and security operation, Valiant Resolve was to consist of deliberate assaults on prepared defenses.1

When the attack commenced 5 April 2004, lead Marine elements were engaged quickly by well-armed and organized enemy units effectively using hit-and-run urban warfare. Despite heavy resistance, the Marines limited their firepower, relying mostly on rifles, machine guns, and snipers. They restricted air support to Cobra attack helicopters and AC-130 gunships.2 On a few occasions—only after considerable deliberation—fixed-wing aircraft dropped guided bombs on insurgent targets, including a mosque used as a center of resistance.3 In general, Marine units fought with impressive skill and with exceptional care for civilian lives and property. This solicitude, however, quickly limited the scope of the advance to outlying areas of the city. They did not attempt to penetrate the heart of the city, apparently because U.S. casualties would have been excessive, as would casualties among the inhabitants. The Marines did not want to “rubble the city.”4

On 1 May 2004, Iraqi insurgents took to the streets of Fallujah to declare victory over the Marines. “We won,” an Iraqi insurgent told a reporter, explaining they had succeeded by keeping U.S. forces from taking the city.5 Newspaper and televised reports showed Muslim gunmen celebrating their “triumph” with weapons, flags, and victory signs. U.S. authorities explained that a new Iraqi Fallujah Brigade would assume security duties in the city and ultimately accomplish the mission.

According to the 1st Marine Division, by 13 April 2004, 39 U.S. Marines and soldiers had died in the battle, along with approximately 600 enemy fighters.6 In much of the Arab and Muslim world, the Marines’ withdrawal was viewed as a U.S. defeat, an outlook encouraged by Al Jazerra television and other Islamic media.

In some important respects, the initial push into Fallujah violated guidelines in the Corps’ urban warfare manual, MCWP 3-35.3. Often cautionary, the manual discusses 22 examples of modern urban warfare in detail and warns, “regardless of the size or quality of defensive forces, the defender usually extracts large costs from the attacker in time, resources, and casualties.”7 Located 40 miles west of Baghdad, Fallujah is a city of about 300,000 people and 30 square kilometers of area. Its western edge lies along the Euphrates River. The Marines faced a mixed bag of urban guerrillas with few heavy weapons, but nonetheless they were armed for close-quarter combat. Before the battle, the enemy force was estimated to be 2,000.

Marine Corps doctrine calls for isolating cities before the assault. “No single factor is more important to success than isolation of the urban area.” In all the examples provided in MCWP 3-35.3, “the attacker won all battles where the defender was isolated.”8 The two battalions assigned the mission also were to cordon off the city: 2/1 from the north and 1/5 to the south and east. Although both cordoning and attacking a city of this size was a demanding task for two battalions, it appears the Marines effectively isolated the city early in the operation.9

In addition to isolation, “overwhelming superiority is needed if all costs are to be minimized.” Here it may be that the objectives and means of Valiant Resolve became incompatible. Two reinforced battalions were tasked with isolating and attacking a medium-sized city. MCWP 3-35-3 notes, “in an attack on a built-up area (population of 100,000+), the GCE [ground combat element] of a MEF would be a Marine division.”10 Fallujah’s population exceeds 100,000, but it is not Shanghai. Thus, while a division (normally composed of three infantry regiments and supporting units) was not needed to cope with the insurgent force in April, the Marines were at less than regimental strength.

During the battle of Jenin in 2002, two Israeli infantry battalions engaged several hundred Palestinian guerrillas. Jenin’s population of about 26,000 was much smaller than Fallujah’s. According to Randy Gangle, director of the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (a private concern in partnership with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory), the Marines would have operated in Jenin with a single battalion, given its one square mile area.11 The refugee camp where the main battle was waged is smaller still and densely populated. A Marine battalion probably would have done as well as the Israelis in Jenin. The tasks assigned to 1/5 and 2/1 in Fallujah, however, were of a different magnitude and beyond their capabilities—at least within what were deemed to be acceptable limits of friendly and civilian casualties and property destruction. Superiority does not necessarily entail a numerical advantage in men. At the same time, urban warfare marginalizes traditional Marine attributes, such as superior training and discipline.

Depending on the tactical situation, manpower shortages may be compensated for by increased firepower, which Marine commanders were unwilling—or unable—to apply in Valiant Resolve. Indeed, it appears that leaders at the scene quickly came to this conclusion. The operation never progressed beyond the foothold stage. Marines gained access to the urban area (in that case, outlying industrial neighborhoods), but did not penetrate to the heart of the city, much less take it. After a few days of active combat, Marines cordoned off the area and the matter was “resolved” politically by establishment of the Fallujah Brigade. The bulk of the enemy force remained at large in the city and was reinforced. Fallujah became an insurgent stronghold and base for kidnappings, murders, and attacks that would cost the coalition dearly in the following months.

Between April and November 2004, both sides busily prepared for a rematch. Iraqi insurgents and foreign mujahadeen dug tunnels, emplaced mines and booby-traps, and improved their defenses. Meanwhile, most of Fallujah’s civilian population fled the city, which greatly reduced the potential for noncombatant casualties. The emptying city invited greater applications of air power. U.S. warplanes and artillery launched highly selective attacks, weakening insurgent defenses, hitting leadership targets, and laying the groundwork for a renewed assault. Although some estimates put insurgent strength before al-Fajr as high as 5,000, many of them—including most of their top leadership—fled before the battle. When U.S. troops crossed the line of departure, it is estimated that 2,000-3,000 insurgents remained in the city.

The combined Marine-Army-Iraqi force for Operation al-Fajr was many times larger than the force employed in April 2004. Numerous press reports placed the total size of coalition forces at 10,000-15,000. The actual assault element comprised about 6,000 U.S. troops in four Marine battalions (3/1, 1/3, 3/5, 1/8) and Army Task Force 2-2 (two mechanized battalions).12 About 2,000 Iraqi troops bolstered the assault force, which was supported by aircraft and several Marine and Army artillery battalions.

With Fallujah cordoned by the remaining troops, the assault force struck from the north on 8 November 2004, quickly breaching insurgent defenses and reaching the heart of the city. Although fighting was at times severe, by 12 November, U.S.-Iraqi forces controlled 80% of the city.13 Combatants and observers recognized a heavier and broader application of firepower. By 10 November, U.S. artillery batteries had fired at least 800 rounds into the city; a frequently cited report claimed 24 sorties were flown over the city on the first day of combat and a total of four 500-pound bombs was dropped.14

Fallujah is sometimes called “the city of mosques”; and insurgents made heavy use of them as command posts, arms depots, and defensive positions. Inside the Saad Abi Bin Waqas Mosque in central Fallujah, Marines found small arms, artillery shells, and parts of missile systems. Marines and soldiers engaged insurgents emplaced in mosques, but always with great caution and often using Iraqi troops to finish off assaults. It took Company B, 1/8, fighting on foot, 16 hours of house-to-house combat to capture the Muhammadia Mosque, during which time they were attacked with everything from rocket-propelled grenades to suicide bombers.15

Resistance stiffened in southern Fallujah as the assault force faced sometimes uniformed opponents who fought with increased professionalism and discipline. “When we found those boys in that bunker with their equipment, it became a whole new ballgame” said one soldier. He continued, “The way these guys fight is different than the insurgents.”16 Nonetheless, by 20 November, the attackers had routed the remaining insurgents and taken the city.

U.S. casualties in Operation al-Fajr were 51 killed and 425 seriously wounded; Iraqi government troops suffered 8 dead and 43 wounded; and as many as 1,200 insurgents were reported killed. Some knowledgeable analysts described these losses as historically light for an urban battle of Fallujah’s scale—and there is a sound basis for this claim. The U.S. forces avoided major disasters like the Soviets suffered in Grozny, and even more limited reversals, such as the IDF suffered in Jenin, when most of a platoon was destroyed in an ambush.17

Yet despite the superb performance of Marines and soldiers in Fallujah, there is reason for concern. The 476 U.S. casualties represent about 8% of the total assault force, a low but not insignificant loss for less than two weeks’ combat.18 Moreover, a surprising number of U.S. troops are wounded and returned to duty in Iraq—about 45% overall. For example, as of 12 November 2004, I MEF Commander Lieutenant General John Sattler reported that, while 170 troops had been wounded seriously, another 490 Marines and soldiers suffered wounds but were able to return to duty.19 Extrapolating U.S. losses based on a 45% rate of wounded returning to duty, actual wounded in Fallujah might have been 616. Considering General Sattler’s actual figures, total wounded might have been more than 1,200 men (about 20% of the assault forces), a casualty rate that is not significantly lower than historical precedents. It is gratifying that U.S. troops are willing and able to fight on despite their wounds, but it is cause for concern when they are expected to take considerable casualties to spare civilians and infrastructure and appease the U.S. and international media.

In many respects, the U.S. approach in Fallujah resembled Israeli tactics in the West Bank and Gaza. This is not surprising because numerous sources indicate that Marine and Army officers studied Israeli tactics prior to OIF. Israeli urban warfare tactics are sophisticated, effective, and well practiced. In many respects, however, the IDF has different operational and strategic objectives from U.S. forces. In addition, the IDF historically—for example, in Jerusalem in 1967, Beirut in 1982, and Jenin in 2002—has proved willing to take high casualties in urban warfare.

Dating from the siege of Beirut in 1982, Israel has practiced a complex and limited form of urban warfare. In Beirut, this involved a cordon around the city, accompanied by limited attacks with artillery, ground, and air forces to put pressure on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian forces inside. The IDF did not launch a general assault on the city; it awaited a political solution that resulted in evacuation of enemy forces under the auspices of outside powers. Despite the IDF’s restraint, it was depicted as little short of barbaric by much of the international media. The PLO’s evacuation was treated as a victory parade, rather than the retreat it was, and the PLO lived to fight another day. The battle was a tactical victory for Israel, but a strategic defeat.

The Beirut experience and ongoing domestic and international pressures color Israeli doctrine. Throughout the current struggle, the IDF generally has not occupied Palestinian cities, a notable exception being seizure of the Jenin refugee camp. (The Jenin operation is the exception that proves the rule: the IDF was castigated for its assault on Jenin and falsely accused of perpetrating a massacre.) IDF urban warfare doctrine effectively bans the use of fixed-wing aircraft and artillery in support of ground operations. Troops rely on attack helicopters and direct fire weapons—usually only small arms and machine guns. Israeli units cordon Palestinian cities and towns, seize a few key buildings or areas, and launch raids against suspected terrorists. Although these operations tend to be quite effective tactically, they result in strategic stalemate because Palestinian forces are left in place after the IDF withdraws.

Tactically and operationally, fighting Israeli-style in an urban setting requires a heavy commitment of ground troops to make up for reduced fire support, and to intimidate rather than confront enemy forces. This allows Israeli units to achieve limited objectives. In June 2004, the IDF’s tunnel raids in Rafah, a small city in Gaza, required deployment of almost a division of Israel troops. (Israeli divisions are somewhat smaller than their U.S. counterparts, and the force in Rafah would have operated without artillery and other supporting elements.) Rafah has about half the population of Fallujah (167,000) and it is tiny in comparison: 5-6 square kilometers.

In Valiant Resolve, U.S. tactics and highly restrictive rules of engagement closely mirrored Israeli techniques. Owing to these restrictions and too small a force, the operation was aborted, with arguably disastrous results for U.S. policy in Iraq. Many mistakes were corrected during al-Fajr. Heavy armor was employed, and air and artillery strikes were more liberally authorized. Even so, dropping four 500-pound bombs on the first day of a major assault remains an extremely selective application of firepower. Despite predictable claims that Fallujah was devastated, photos reveal superficial damage to most buildings and an occasional structure demolished. Television coverage of Marines engaged in harrowing room-to-room combat belie hysterical stories that entire city blocks were leveled.

What would have happened had we met a tougher, more professional opponent in Fallujah? The insurgents were formidable because many were willing to fight to the death—but in the main, they were an indifferently armed rabble who could inflict casualties because of the nature of urban warfare and U.S. sensibilities. What if U.S. forces find themselves facing Syrian commandos or well-trained Hezbollah guerrillas?

Large ground forces are necessary when U.S. units adopt Israeli-style urban warfare tactics—which, to a large extent, the Marines appear to have done in Fallujah. To accomplish their mission in Valiant Resolve, they needed a considerably larger force to operate in the absence of heavy air and artillery support. Further, Israeli urban tactics are designed primarily for isolating selected areas, not seizing and holding terrain and buildings. If U.S. forces intend to take and clear an urban area block by block, as they did during al-Fajr, they are going to pay a heavier price. The result in Valiant Resolve was similar to what Israeli forces have achieved against the Palestinians: indecisive outcomes that keep the enemy in business. Operation al-Fajr weakened the Iraqi insurgency, but it came too late and too temperately to have broken the insurgency’s back, despite the claims of some U.S. officers. The men who killed the U.S. contractors—the act that precipitated the battle—have not been found, much less prosecuted. Many insurgents escaped Fallujah during the buildup after Valiant Resolve, and al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi remains at large.

Was the battle of Fallujah a victory or a defeat? The Marine Corps’ military operations in urban terrain doctrine recognizes that tactical success does not necessarily translate to strategic victory. It notes the Israeli’s tactical victory in Beirut was a strategic defeat—and observes the same about the Battle of Hue in the Vietnam War, when Marines defeated an enemy that sought to put up a good fight but never expected to win. Much the same can be said of Fallujah’s defenders. In spite of the beating they took in November, they will continue to assert they repelled the initial attack and fought well thereafter.

The potential problem for the Marine Corps and U.S. deterrence in general is more than just local. During a visit to Israel in the early 1980s, an Israeli acquaintance described his military service to me as “an Israeli Marine.” Israel does not have Marines; he meant he had been in the paratroops, which were the best and toughest soldiers in the IDF. He assumed that an American would understand a comparison with U.S. Marines—and I did.

At that time, the IDF could deploy paratroops to disturbances in the West Bank or Gaza who, by simply showing up in their red berets, could settle things down. Much has changed in 20 years. Today, no Israeli paratrooper would be so foolish as to wear his beret in Nablus or Ramallah. Israeli paratroopers continue to fight well. Nonetheless, a couple of decades of persistent and inconclusive combat in Lebanon and urban combat in the territories have done much to erode their regional, if not international, reputation.

I'm sorry, but I see this as so much balderdash. We elected to back off in April of last year. That wasn't a defeat.

We went back in during the winter and destroyed the enemy. That was clearly a victory.

This isn't to say that more battles will definately not be fought there. It is to saw we took one pass and kicked ass later on. Only God knows the future, but this is one American who can recognize a victory when he sees one.

The battle in late 2004 in Fallujah was a route for our side.

I wish folks would quit graying out the victories, and playing up the terrorist myths.

The Marines did not want to “rubble the city.”

I've always thought that would be just the thing for Falluja, and any other Sunni enclave town or city that persists in resisting and covering for the terrs. If these smartass Sunni
want to find out what tent camping in the desert is like , it is their call. I feel we should stop playing nicey nice and
decisively kick booty against any opposition , or leave....

The Media

Actually, this is from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, the professional journal of the Navy and Marine Corps.

It raises valid points regarding the conflict between victory, restricted rules of warfare and the desire to keep both American and Iraqi civilian casualties to a minimum.

The answer may be that the American Art of War is not yet at the point where you can achieve victory with the unrealistically low casualty rates that are now strived for.

In World War II, the answer to the tactical problem of securing a strongly defended town was to pound it into rubble and let the civilian blood and guts fly and fall where they may.

Ultimate victory in Iraq may require that the dirty work be left to the Shiites and Kurds who will have a choice of wiping out the Sunni thugs by whatever means gets the job done or face a return to their former state of slavery.

I'm not sure if I'd refer to the Naval Institute Proceedings as 'the media'.

It is a professional journal for the naval forces, akin to many others like the Marine Corps Gazette, and Infantry.

995 of Americans have never even seen these publications, and if the did, 90% wouldn't understand or comprehend the articles.

They are, as I said, professional journals for warfighters.

Excellent article, Mike. Keiler rightly observes that many tactical victories translate into strategic defeats, because of the failure to follow through with or exploit tactical success. I was disappointed when we backed away from Fallujah last April and allowed the enemy to claim a victory from his defeat. But I am equally proud of the way we finished the job there -- and trust that such bold and decisive action is back to stay.

We killed 20 terrorists for every soldier we lost. We are a nation of 300 million people. The terrorists have support in the mid 5 figures in Iraq, maybe. Maybe 6 figures including others. They cannot remotely sustain such operations, we easily can.

In fact, the only way the terrorists can adapt to such unmitigated defeats, is to dial down the op tempo dramatically, to keep their own losses within sustainable bounds. They aim at an attack a day for the sake of headlines, without any ability to secure military objectives of any kind. The only reason they do this, is they can't remotely afford to trade 20 hardened supporters for one US soldier.

I understand that US military professionals dislike contemplating the actual cost of US strategic objectives in such terms. But that is the blank reality of it. You can secure the upper hand operationally with clean razzle dazzle and tech. But to defeat the enemy's will you have to kill his fighters, as many of them want it. And that means paying in blood yourself, as long as they do, and more.

The military is doing its job if it gets cost of that exchange into double digits, which it is clearly accomplishing in Iraq. The military cannot perform the political system's job, of mobilizing the will to enforce national policy even when it costs blood. There is no bloodless enforcement of national policy - that is a delusion.

Tactically, the use of firepower could have been greater. But the men did the job with what they were given, rapidly, and with quite limited loss of US lives - and (to their much smaller resources) collosal losses to the enemy. Counting that as any sort of defeat is a perfectionist hallucination.

...this example does not strike me as being tremendously insightful.

Perhaps if you were more familiar with the IDF operations in Beirut and Jenin, you would appreciate the author's insight into the applicability of IDF urban tactics to our experience in Iraq.

The author notes the limited scope of IDF objectives in its urban warfare doctrines -- which limited results always leave the enemy intact. The author correctly notes that in both Beirut and Jenin, IDF tactical victories -- because they were limited -- were interpreted as strategic defeats by the IDF's beaten but unvanquished enemies. The applicability to Fallujah in April 2004 is clear, since the insurgents remained alive and in ownership of the city after the Marines withdrew.

In full recognition that April's tactical victory ended as a strategic defeat, Marine leaders launched the second battle for Fallujah with an entirely different objective -- the complete destruction of the enemy and full occupation of the city. And it did so with little more than one-third of the combat power called for by established doctrine -- a daring feat. The author is correct to note that the enemy was a ragtag band, and to speculate that a more powerful force would be required to complete a similar operation in the future against an enemy force of trained regulars. We are known for planning ahead, you know.

Sorry you found the article lacking, but this old Marine infantry officer found it quite informative. We have taken the best of the IDF's successful urban tactics and refined them to meet our different objectives. Semper Fidelis...

The article addressed Fallujah, and I addressed Fallujah.

I am aware of what has taken place in Asia. I'm not happy about it.

Our options are to provide as much help to the victims as we can and leave, or land massive forces there and start a new front.

I believe it would be wiser at this time to forgoe opening up a new front in southern Asia.

We should provide as much direct help to people as we can, and regulate the disbursement of cash to the region in a manor that would prevent as much of the funds as possible, from reaching subversive elements.

I'd apply this to public AND private funds. Relief agencies would just have to buck up and accept the interference. I would never have turned a dime over to the U.N. to disburse. That goes for tangible supplies as well.

"We killed 20 terrorists for every soldier we lost. We are a nation of 300 million people. The terrorists have support in the mid 5 figures in Iraq, maybe. Maybe 6 figures including others. They cannot remotely sustain such operations, we easily can. "

First, you’re comparing the population of the US to the number in the "army" of our enemy. Second, it reminds me of a something Ho Chi Minh said, “"You can kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours, yet even at those odds, you will lose and I will win."”

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