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There is no question that the Army personnel system is stressed. "I think the Army is in terrible shape," said retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, who served last year as the Bush administration's first administrator in postwar Iraq. "I think people are worn out, equipment is run down and we've overstressed the reserves. We're drastically short [of] infantry and MPs because the Army is too small."

I sure am glad that we are letting them know that they are winning.

In the Army, the biggest long-term changes may be in how it trains -- if the lessons learned in counterinsurgency stick. After the Vietnam War, noted retired Army Lt. Col. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., who wrote a book on the Army and Vietnam, "we got out of the counterinsurgency business."

I sure am glad that we are letting them know that we were beaten once and should have known better than to attack terrorism. Also that we don't learn from our own mistakes and should have simply surrendered.

I know that when they show up at my home I will surrender my weapons for their use, my wife for rape, my kids for slavery and me for death.

The biggest institutional change that is likely to come about from our experiences in Iraq will be in the 'support' areas.

We have proven beyond the shadow of a doubt that we can decimate anyone who stands up to us. Our weakess is in our support structure and 'non combat' personnel. Non combat arms personnel have not had a Marine Corps like 'everyone's a rifleman' mentality, and because of this, they were often found to be extremely vulnerable to insurgent attacks.

This weakness in the support is not only a military vulnerability, it's a media vulnerability. Much of the good work the military has done had not been publicized, and much falsehoods and half truths have not been effectively combated.

In either case, the threats are not militarily significant so much as they are political factors that indirectly affect military operations. Our experiences in Iraq have shown us where our weaknesses lie, and if nothing else, it has shown us to be more formidable than many thought possible.

This article is a good starting point for discussion. The author either has no clue or was not allowed to write an article of sufficient length to expand upon each view put forward in the article. The article raised several issues and views without elaborating any.

Issues and views raised:
"The latest indication of the psychic toll was a recent study by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research that found that about 16 percent of soldiers who have served in Iraq are showing signs of combat trauma."
I can make any situation or observation in the military seem like a crisis. Having trouble sleeping is a sign of combat trauma; gastrointestinal discomfort is a sign of combat trauma. When does 16 percent of the military not show signs of combat trauma?

"And as the Army seeks to adjust to waging a counterinsurgency campaign 7,000 miles away, innovation in how it trains new recruits and structures forces for deployment is now rippling through the service."
This has great potential. The impact of Rumsfeld's decision to put General Schoomaker in the Chief of Staff position is having positive effects that are rippling through the Army. A former Delta operator, he understands the importance of changing the mentality and attitude of the average soldier - instilling a warrior ethos, greater emphasis on being a rifleman first, more hands-on training; these changes have not been made yet, but the groundwork has been laid.

"Other experts worry about the hidden costs of using up equipment in the extreme heat and abrasive dust of Iraq. Helicopters, armored vehicles and Humvees will have shorter service lives than the Army planned."
I am no expert on this subject, but I suspect that this is the area in which we are truly being bit in the rear by the years of neglect in the Klinton administration. We did not have a sufficient bench stock of parts and equipment going into war and our low past demand resulted in us having limited suppliers for such parts and equipment. Now manufacturers are backlogged for much of the items that we need. It took my unit 8 months just to get helmet mounts for our night vision.

"Even mechanics and clerks now are given training in combat operations, such as defending a convoy or reacting to an ambush"
That is the intent. The training and mindset of the soldiers continue to be improved upon. Quotes like this are deceptive in that they take the intended changes and assume that they have been implemented.

"The greatest long-term effect of the difficult environment in Iraq may be on the generation of younger officers and soldiers who have led platoons and companies there over the past year."

"His concern, he said, is that the Army will not know what to do with those agile, intellectually creative officers, and on their return will simply put them back into the lockstep of garrison life, rather than seek to find ways to nurture their newfound skills. One captain who recently returned from a year of combat in Iraq noted that he was returned to "restrictive training limitations of the past era," making it more difficult to convey some of the hard-earned knowledge he brought back."

These are the most accurate and important quotes in the article, in my opinion. The former Army that trained all year for its big show at NTC or JRTC has been replaced by the Army that uses the training centers as a training aid for a real world mission. The mentality of safety first, mission second is slowly eroding - and good riddance. Absurd safety restrictions are largely problems generated by regulations or rules produced by a staff of officers and senior NCOs that were raised in an Army where the only combat experience was from a brief invasion of Panama, a 100-hour war in the mideast where most deaths were from fratracide and non-combat incidents, and a bloodless air campaign in Kosovo. Expectations and unreasonable demands for no casaulties in future wars were reflected in training. Hopefully that trend will now reverse itself.