By Eric R. Taylor
It's beginning to look a lot like Vietnam.
Ever since our victory over Saddam Hussein last year, we have been plagued by terrorist attacks on our
troops that have now killed more soldiers than the actual three-week military campaign that toppled the
regime.
While attacks against U.S. and coalition troops have generally plateaued, attacks against Iraqi civilians
(softer targets) are on the increase. Recent ruthless attacks such as the car-bombing of the Mount
Lebanon hotel in Baghdad have led some observers to compare the situation with the Vietnam War. These
attacks cast an ominous shadow over the U.S. plan to turn sovereignty over to the Iraqis on June 30.
We should expect the terrorism to deepen in ferocity and frequency in the months ahead. It is the only
hope the jihadists have of defeating us. And there is a precedent: In Vietnam, the enemy wore us down,
politically, physically, materially, economically and psychologically.
Our conduct of the Vietnam War contains some valuable "lessons not learned" that are pertinent to the
situation in Iraq today.
In Vietnam, we attempted to fight a classical, set-piece war of attrition reminiscent of World War II and
then-current NATO war plans. But the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) and the Viet Cong (VC) didn't fight
such a conventional war. They avoided massed clashes as much as possible.
Instead, they capitalized on hit-and-run, melt-away tactics. We were fixed. They weren't. We operated from
firebases and other fixed installations (defense), while they operated mobile and loose (offense). We
attempted to defend everything and couldn't defend anything. At a day's end, we retired to a firebase or a
tactical bivouac within range of friendly artillery. Any ground we took during the day was repurchased in
blood the next.
The enemy's line of communications was an ill-defined jungle logistical route called the Ho Chi Minh trail that
snaked from North Vietnam down along Laos and Cambodia with feeder tentacles all along and across the
border into South Vietnam. They operated from sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia that - except for "sneak
and peek" observation missions by the Special Operations Groups (SOG) - were "hands off" to conventional
strikes because of political decisions in Washington. The reluctance to hit enemy lines of communications
until very late in the war was a major strategic blunder, significantly contributing to our losses, both in
terms of casualties and the war itself.
A similar situation seems to have emerged in Iraq today. Iraq is surrounded by (clockwise from the north)
Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria with a total border of 2,266 miles. Despite diplomatic
formalities, Iran, Syria and even Saudi Arabia - with nearly 2,000 of those miles of borders - should be
considered unfriendly to the United States in terms of our Iraqi occupation. And it appears that they have
no incentive to quell the operation of terrorists targeting Iraq who are operating within their borders.
To avoid a repeat of Vietnam, we must mercilessly strike those strongholds using
our Special Operations Forces. If we refrain out of concerns of world opinion or
international law, we face allowing the "Vietnamization" of Iraq and a continuing bloodbath.
Already there are disturbing parallels between the occupation and the quagmire we endured a
quarter-century ago: Our current position in Iraq is that of circled wagons. We are fixed, and the terrorists
are mobile. We are concentrated and the terrorists are diffused within the larger civilian population.
Our troops are saddled with the impossible task of providing urban security for nearly all areas to make the
political case we are bringing change and security to Iraq. By the time our troops smell something's afoul,
it's too late.
The terrorists operate with the aid of an inviolate supply line from currently untouchable sanctuaries. Yet,
to massively thrust into neighboring countries to strike terrorist enclaves does risk widening this conflict.
But if we don't neutralize those targets, it will probably widen anyway.
If we turn a blind eye to the sources nurturing these butchers, Iraq will be fed a steady diet of terrorism.
We can't win a war patterned after McNamara's doctrine of "proportional response."
An adage much older than the Vietnam War is still pertinent: The best defense is a good offense. Our
lightning-fast drive to Baghdad a year ago confirms the U.S. military's expertise in offense.
A year after victory, our troops in Iraq are stretched too thin. They are exhausted from the constant and
frustrating vigilance for a threat they can't see coming. We can only end the terrorist attacks by going back
on the offensive against the terrorist enclaves in countries neighboring Iraq.
Ask the PAVN's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap if defending expanses of land or cities is a nation-building strategy.
Guest Contributor Eric R. Taylor, served in the U.S. Army Chemical Corps before earning his PhD as a biochemist. He is the author of "Lethal Mists: An Introduction to the Natural and
Military Sciences of Chemical, Biological Warfare and Terrorism", and several papers on Weapons of Mass Destruction issues published with the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. He can
be reached at
ertaylor@louisiana.edu. Please send Feedback responses to
dwfeedback@yahoo.com. ©2004 DefenseWatch. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and
do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
For those who have not seen it, on the "Update on Iraq" thread it is being relayed that the Polish troops have killed Sadr's main man in Karbala.
The only thing the bad guys over there will respond to is force. The trick is to become advisers and let a Democratic Iraq(somethng that can't be achieved overnight) supply the needed force to keep the neanderthals in line. Anyone who thinks we can put a time table to achieve all this is mistaken. We still need to stop calling them(the supposed religious leaders) priests,clerics or imams and describe them for what they are; terrorists.
So when they say "60 dead Iraqis", do they mean Iraqis on our side or, the rebels?
There has not been one idle minute that we haven't thought about our soliders and said prayers for their saftey since we've heard about these vicious attacks against them....this is the most difficult part of war.....but as President Bush stated...we must stay the course.....
Amen, smiley...and we are not alone, though it sometimes seems that way to turn on our news.
Mr. Taylor,
I worked a great deal with SOG teams in Laos and Cambodia (SOG actually meant "studies and observation groups" -They were doing a lot more than studying and observing. Pretty much an unsung group of guys whose activities are rarely mentioned.