Thanks, Grampa!September 26, 2002 Committee Hearing: Cofer Black
(More data re Clarke's lying!)
Please let me know if you want ON or OFF my General Interest ping list!. . .don't be shy.
Posted on 04/06/2004 9:10:32 AM PDT by Grampa Dave
September 26, 2002 Committee Hearing: Cofer Black, Dale Watson, Robert S. Mueller
Joint House And Senate Select Intelligence Committee September 26, 2002
SPEAKER: CHAIRMAN
LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
WITNESSES:
COFER BLACK, FORMER CHIEF OF THE COUNTER-TERRORIST CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DALE WATSON, FORMER EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
BODY:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HOLD A JOINT HEARING ON PRE-9/11 INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE SPEAKERS: U.S. SENATOR BOB GRAHAM (D-FL) CHAIRMAN U.S. SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI) U.S. SENATOR JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV (D-WV) U.S. SENATOR DIANE FEINSTEIN (D-CA) U.S. SENATOR RON WYDEN (D-OR) U.S. SENATOR RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL) U.S. SENATOR EVAN BAYH (D-IN) U.S. SENATOR JOHN EDWARDS (D-NC) U.S. SENATOR BARBARA MIKULSKI (D-MD)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY (R-AL) RANKING MEMBER U.S. SENATOR JON KYL (R-AZ) U.S. SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE (R-OK) U.S. SENATOR ORRIN G. HATCH (R-UT) U.S. SENATOR PAT ROBERTS (R-KS) U.S. SENATOR MIKE DEWINE (R-OH) U.S. SENATOR FRED THOMPSON (R-TN) U.S. SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN)
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE SPEAKERS: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER J. GOSS (R-FL) CHAIRMAN U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DOUG BEREUTER (R-NE) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL N. CASTLE (R-DE) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT (R-NY) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JIM GIBBONS (R-NV) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RAY LAHOOD (R-IL) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM (R-CA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PETER HOEKSTRA (R-MI) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD BURR (R-NC) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TERRY EVERETT (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NANCY PELOSI (D-CA) RANKING MEMBER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SANFORD BISHOP JR. (D-GA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JANE HARMAN (D-CA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE GARY CONDIT (D-CA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TIM ROEMER (D-IN) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SILVESTRE REYES (D-TX) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LEONARD BOSWELL (D-IA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE COLLIN PETERSON (D-MN) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BUD CRAMER (D-AL)
*
GOSS: The joint inquiry hearing will come to order please. This is a joint inquiry of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I'm advised that Chairman Graham will be here shortly.
This is the fifth open hearing by our committees as they conduct their joint inquiry into the intelligence community performance regarding the September 11 attacks. The committees have also held 10 closed hearings.
Our witnesses this morning will be Cofer Black, former chief of CIA's counterterrorist center and Dale Watson, former executive assistant director of the FBI's counter-intelligence and counterterrorism division.
Gentlemen, welcome we're pleased you came up this morning.
Each has been asked to address the evolution of his agency's response to the growing international terrorist threat and how his agency assessed the nature of possible attacks against the United States and U.S. interests.
Before swearing in these witnesses there is one brief business matter I'm advised on. On June 18 the committees heard in testimony in closed session from the director of central intelligence, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the director of the National Security Agency about what the intelligence community now knows about the September 11 plot. We then asked the directors to declassify their testimony to the extent consistent with national security. The director of the FBI has submitted his declassified statement for the record. I ask unanimous consent that the declassified June 18 statement of the FBI director now be made part of the open record of these proceedings. Is there objection?
(UNKNOWN): No objection.
GOSS: Hearing none, it so ordered.
If there's any question that either witness determines would be best answered by other than CIA or FBI personnel who are present, we would welcome being informed of that.
Our goal is to have the best possible information. So, that we don't need to interrupt the flow of questioning by administering oaths to other personnel who are called upon to speak, would anyone who might be called upon to speak now identify himself or herself for the record and take the oath together with Mr. Black and Watson.
And, Mr. Black and Mr. Watson, do you have anybody with you, particularly you anticipate will be assisting you?
BLACK: No, sir.
GOSS: The answer being no in both cases. Is there anybody else from either agency that is intending to speak?
Seeing none. Each of our committees has adopted a supplemental rule for this joint inquiry that all witnesses shall be sworn. I'll ask our witnesses to rise at this time and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before these committees will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
WITNESSES: I do.
GOSS: Thank you, gentlemen.
The full prepared statement of the witnesses will be placed in the record of these proceedings. I'll now call on Mr. Black first and then Mr. Watson, as I understand was the selected order.
WATSON: That's agreeable.
GOSS: Mr. Black, welcome. The floor is yours, sir.
BLACK: Thank you very much. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
GOSS: I can hear you very well.
BLACK: Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be here. I'd like to express my appreciation to you and to the committee offering me a screen to protect my identity and to enhance my security. Good security is always a very good idea. And, if this were normal circumstances I would accept your offer. The work of this committee and this hearing is just too important.
I don't want to be just a voice behind a screen. When I speak I think the American people need to look into my face. And I want to look the American people in the eye.
My name is Cofer Black. I'm a case officer of the director of operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. I served as the director of the counterterrorism center from the 29th of July 1999 until May 2002.
Mr. Chairman, I hoped that these proceedings provide the relatives and the loved ones of those lost in the horrific act of 9/11 the information that they're seeking. But, we are meeting here today because of the loss of over 3,000 innocents. We provided strategic warning. Our intense efforts were unable to provide tactical warning on 9/11. We all share a profound and horrible sense of loss.
Everything we do in this global war and the very real risks that we take have only one objective and that's to defend America and to defend innocents. In this long fight my CIA colleagues, operating with me in Khartoum, Sudan in 1995 preempted preparations of the Osama bin Laden's thugs to kill me.
Six years later, Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaida are the killers of 9/11. You need to appreciate fully three factors. There were choices made for us. These choices were made for the Central Intelligence Agency and they were made for the counterterrorism Center. These involve the numbers of people, money and operational flexibility.
I'd like to talk about people for a minute. Before 9/11 the CIA counterterrorism Center has as many people as maybe three Army infantry companies. Three infantry companies can be expected to cover a front of a few kilometers. Our counterterrorism Center is responsible for the entire world and all the terrorist threats. It was not only Al Qaida that we engaged, until 9/11 Hizbollah had killed more Americans than any other terrorist group, Hizbollah is also our responsibility as are all the others. We work through the director of operations, which is deployed overseas.
The head of operations directed will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that at the end of the 1990s, he had 25 percent less covert operations officers than he had at the beginning.
The director of central intelligence, George Tenet did all that he could to help us out. We, of all his interests, had the highest priority. Prior to my arrival there had been a substantial increase in our personnel. We still struggled. While all the other operating components were being cut, the counterterrorism Center received what small increases were available.
My second point, cash, this is what we use to pay for operations. At the beginning of each of my three fiscal years as chief the counterterrorism Center had enough money to purchase about two modern jet fighter aircraft. When I became the chief in 1999, I had a fiscal reality. We had less money to support operations than we had the year before. As a result, I cut all of my subordinate units except for one, more than 30 percent. We survived because the director of Central Intelligence support and the supplemental fundings that we received.
My third point, operational flexibility, this is a very highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to know there was a before 9/11 and there was an after 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off. Nearly 3,000 Al Qaida and their supporters have been arrested or detained.
In Afghanistan the Al Qaida who refused to surrender have been killed. The hunt is on. At your hearing last Friday my colleague, referred to only as CIA Officer behind the screen, was a witness before you and spoke. I think the significant point that he raised was an unprepared remark saying that he was overwhelmed. He was overwhelmed by limitless work and he was overwhelmed by a lack of resources. Perhaps now we can say why he said this instinctively.
However, even a fully staffed and supported intelligence effort will not provide comprehensive, 100 percent defense. We must constantly intensify our offensive while at the same time supporting law enforcement and its work.
I'll leave you again with the three points: resources, people, operational flexibility.
I'd like to talk a little bit about working with the FBI. Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned that your hearings last week left you with a substantial misunderstanding about communications between the CIA and the FBI regarding investigation of the attack on the USS Cole. In that case we were supporting the FBI's investigation. The two agencies wanted to find out who killed our sailors and bring these terrorists to justice.
We are an intelligence organization. We are in the business of collecting and providing intelligence. We are not in the business of withholding intelligence information. I want to be clear that FBI agents and analysts had access to information we acquired about the Cole attack. For example, we ran a joint operation with the FBI to determine if a Cole suspect was in a Kuala surveillance photo. Joint means together.
The FBI had access to the information from the beginning. Our records establish that. The special agents from the FBI's New York field office, who were investigating the USS Cole attack, reviewed the information about the Kuala Lumpur photo in late January 2001. I also want to be clear that according to the CTC analyst who attended the June 2001 FBI/CIA meeting in new York City, the FBI analyst brought the photos to New York and showed them to the FBI.
I want to repeat that. An FBI analyst brought the photos to New York. Furthermore, the CIA analyst was not permitted to provide all of the information FBI criminal investigators wanted because of laws and rules against contaminating criminal investigators with intelligence information. My statement for the record will provide more details about Kuala Lumpur.
We learned of some of Al Qaida's plots in time to provide the warning that law enforcement and intelligence services needed to stop them. Examples of many of the successful operations would include: 1998, plans to attack the U.S. embassy in Teoranta, Albania, were thwarted when we identified the plotters. 1999-2000 millennium plot, Al Qaida efforts to blow up hotels and other terrorist sites in Jordan would have resulted in hundreds of casualties. Our global effort was the largest operation in the history of counterterrorism, 2000, Ramadan threat, defeated. Summer, 2001 threat, this also included planned attacks on U.S. embassies in Yemen and France, saved lives. In addition, we rendered scores of terrorists to law enforcement.
Mr. Chairman, it would be my greatest wish to bring classified holdings of our successes and use them in an open format. There are sources to protect. There are methods to protect and there are foreign relationships to protect. The complete list of our successes was reported in closed session to oversight committees. We're happy to meet with you at any time and I must leave it at that.
How do we get successes? The men and women of the counterterrorism Center and those in the CIA who work counterterrorism are the finest Americans this country can produce. They are smart. They are quick. They are patriotic. They are loyal. They are brave and they are hardworking. Fourteen, 16, 18, 24-hours a day, six, seven days a week, week after week, month after month for the entire time that I was there.
Our people fought with what we provided them and turned back defeat. Leading up to 9/11 CTC conducted intense intelligence war measured by constant threats, emerging, engaged and defeated. We were also the first on the ground in Afghanistan before the month of September of 2001 was out. We're able to support the military and their success.
I would like to take this opportunity, because these days you never can really tell who is going to speak for the people that do their best and do the work. I want to thank all the people in the intelligence community and in law enforcement and in CIA, those that do counterterrorism, and particularly, in the CIA case, our field personnel.
Now, I want to speak to each man and woman in the counterterrorist center. I want their families, their neighbors and the American people to hear this. I was proud of them when I led them. I'm proud of them now and I will be proud of them as long as I live.
Mr. Chairman, I'll submit the remainder of my statement for your record. Thank you, sir.
(Excerpt) Read more at cooperativeresearch.org ...
If you had a rat senator or congressit present at this hearing, send them a copy of this and ask them why they have been so silent on these severe budget cuts to the Counter-Terrorist Center in the CIA.
Here are some items re the funding cuts revealed at this meeting:
My name is Cofer Black. I'm a case officer of the director of operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. I served as the director of the counterterrorism center from the 29th of July 1999 until May 2002.
Everything we do in this global war and the very real risks that we take have only one objective and that's to defend America and to defend innocents. In this long fight my CIA colleagues, operating with me in Khartoum, Sudan in 1995 preempted preparations of the Osama bin Laden's thugs to kill me.
Six years later, Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaida are the killers of 9/11. You need to appreciate fully three factors. There were choices made for us. These choices were made for the Central Intelligence Agency and they were made for the counterterrorism Center. These involve the numbers of people, money and operational flexibility.
I'd like to talk about people for a minute. Before 9/11 the CIA counterterrorism Center has as many people as maybe three Army infantry companies. Three infantry companies can be expected to cover a front of a few kilometers. Our counterterrorism Center is responsible for the entire world and all the terrorist threats. It was not only Al Qaida that we engaged, until 9/11 Hizbollah had killed more Americans than any other terrorist group, Hizbollah is also our responsibility as are all the others. We work through the director of operations, which is deployed overseas.
The head of operations directed will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that at the end of the 1990s, he had 25 percent less covert operations officers than he had at the beginning.
The director of central intelligence, George Tenet did all that he could to help us out. We, of all his interests, had the highest priority. Prior to my arrival there had been a substantial increase in our personnel. We still struggled. While all the other operating components were being cut, the counterterrorism Center received what small increases were available.
My second point, cash, this is what we use to pay for operations. At the beginning of each of my three fiscal years as chief the counterterrorism Center had enough money to purchase about two modern jet fighter aircraft. When I became the chief in 1999, I had a fiscal reality. We had less money to support operations than we had the year before. As a result, I cut all of my subordinate units except for one, more than 30 percent. We survived because the director of Central Intelligence support and the supplemental fundings that we received.
| Rank | Location | Receipts | Donors/Avg | Freepers/Avg | Monthlies | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 27 | Arizona | 225.00 |
7 |
32.14 |
|
|
145.50 |
12 |
Thanks for donating to Free Republic!
Move your locale up the leaderboard!
Thanks, Grampa!September 26, 2002 Committee Hearing: Cofer Black
(More data re Clarke's lying!)
Please let me know if you want ON or OFF my General Interest ping list!. . .don't be shy.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
