Posted on 08/28/2002 5:12:19 AM PDT by Valin
ARABIC-SPEAKING ARMIES have been generally ineffective in the modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the 1960s. Syrians could only impose their will in Lebanon during the mid-1970s by the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers. Iraqis showed ineptness against an Iranian military ripped apart by revolutionary turmoil in the 1980s and could not win a three-decades-long war against the Kurds. The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war was mediocre. And the Arabs have done poorly in nearly all the military confrontations with Israel. Why this unimpressive record? There are many factors economic, ideological, technical but perhaps the most important has to do with culture and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing an effective military force.
False starts
Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful thinking, and mythology. Thus, the U.S. Army in the 1930s evaluated the Japanese national character as lacking originality and drew the unwarranted conclusion that that country would be permanently disadvantaged in technology. Hitler dismissed the United States as a mongrel society and consequently underestimated the impact of Americas entry into the war. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated our own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees. Three days of aerial attacks were thought to be all the Serbs could withstand; in fact, seventy-eight days were needed.
As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. Or the opposite: to view the potential enemy through the prism of ones own cultural norms.
It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies evolve and so does the military subculture with it. The dismal French performance in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war led the German high command to an overly optimistic assessment prior to World War I. Then tenacity and courage of French soldiers in World War I lead everyone from Winston Churchill to the German high command vastly to overestimate the French armys fighting abilities. Israeli generals underestimated the Egyptian army of 1973 based on Egypts hapless performance in the 1967 war.
Culture is difficult to pin down. It is not synonymous with an individuals race nor ethnic identity. The history of warfare makes a mockery of attempts to assign rigid cultural attributes to individuals as the military histories of the Ottoman and Roman empires illustrate. In both cases it was training, discipline, esprit, and élan which made the difference, not the individual soldiers origin. The highly disciplined and effective Roman legions, for example, recruited from throughout the Roman Empire, and the elite Ottoman Janissaries (slave soldiers) were Christians forcibly recruited as boys from the Balkans.
The role of culture
These problems notwithstanding, culture does need to be taken into account. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare. John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. In contrast to the usual manner of European warfare, which he terms face to face, Keegan depicts the early Arab armies in the Islamic era as masters of evasion, delay, and indirection. Examining Arab warfare in this century leads to the conclusion that the Arabs remain more successful in insurgent, or political, warfare what T. E. Lawrence termed winning wars without battles. Even the much-lauded Egyptian crossing of the Suez in 1973 at its core entailed a masterful deception plan. It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in personal relationships.
Along these lines, Kenneth Pollock concludes his exhaustive study of Arab military effectiveness by noting that certain patterns of behavior fostered by the dominant Arab culture were the most important factors contributing to the limited military effectiveness of Arab armies and air forces from 1945 to 1991. These attributes included over-centralization, discouraging initiative, lack of flexibility, manipulation of information, and the discouragement of leadership at the junior officer level. The barrage of criticism leveled at Samuel Huntingtons notion of a clash of civilizations in no way lessens the vital point he made that however much the grouping of peoples by religion and culture rather than political or economic divisions offends academics who propound a world defined by class, race, and gender, it is a reality, one not diminished by modern communications.
But how does one integrate the study of culture into military training? At present, it has hardly any role. Paul M. Belbutowski, a scholar and former member of the U.S. Delta Force, succinctly stated a deficiency in our own military education system: Culture, comprised of all that is vague and intangible, is not generally integrated into strategic planning except at the most superficial level. And yet it is precisely all that is vague and intangible that defines low-intensity conflicts. The Vietnamese communists did not fight the war the United States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight the war the Russians prepared for. This entails far more than simply retooling weaponry and retraining soldiers. It requires an understanding of the cultural mythology, history, attitude toward time, etc.; and it demands a more substantial investment in time and money than a bureaucratic organization is likely to authorize.
Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessments of the role of culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking officers. I confine myself principally to training for two reasons:
First, I observed much training but only one combat campaign (the Jordanian Army against the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1970).
Secondly, armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors. General George Patton was fond of relating the story about Julius Caesar, who in the winter time. . . so trained his legions in all that became soldiers and so habituated them to the proper performance of their duties, that when in the spring he committed them to battle against the Gauls, it was not necessary to give them orders, for they knew what to do and how to do it.
Information as power
In every society information is a means of making a living or wielding power, but Arabs husband information and hold it especially tightly. U.S. trainers have often been surprised over the years by the fact that information provided to key personnel does not get much further than them. Having learned to perform some complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature.
On one occasion, an American mobile training team working with armor in Egypt at long last received the operators manuals that had laboriously been translated into Arabic. The American trainers took the newly minted manuals straight to the tank park and distributed them to the tank crews. Right behind them, the company commander, a graduate of the armor school at Fort Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds ordnance school, promptly collected the manuals from those crews. Questioned why he did this, the commander said that there was no point in giving them to the drivers because enlisted men could not read. In point of fact, he did not want enlisted men to have an independent source of knowledge. Being the only person who could explain the fire control instrumentation or bore sight artillery weapons brought prestige and attention.
In military terms this means that very little cross-training is accomplished and that, for instance in a tank crew, the gunners, loaders and drivers might be proficient in their jobs but are not prepared to fill in should one become a casualty. Not understanding one anothers jobs also inhibits a smoothly functioning crew. At a higher level it means that there is no depth in technical proficiency.
(Excerpt) Read more at unc.edu ...
I would argue the same about most Arab groups in modern society. Not only the military but also industrialists have a hard time. Arabs are fantastic businessmen and traders, but they have a very difficult time with manufacturing and complex processes. This is to say, Arabs lack organizational skills necessary to manage industrial or military campaigns.
In America we have 100 years of industrial skills and the WW2 when military skills were largely developed.
The challenge for the Arabs is to see if the cadres of western educated young men can use their education to bring about change. They are opposed by formidable conservative opponents who allow no change at all.
The current situation is the result of the battle between the future and the past. This thought is the basis for the discussions between W and Bandar.
The 'eathen in his foolishness
must end where he began,
but the backbone of the army
is the non-commissioned man.
The current situation is the result of the battle between the future and the past. This thought is the basis for the discussions between W and Bandar.
America and the West would not be well-served to educate cadres of young Arabs so long as Islam is a force in the Middle East and multiculturalism is a force in our universities.
We do not need to see the Industrialization of the Jihad.
True, but if these people could change their society to one that leaves the middle ages behind it would be a very good thing.
Of course I am more than a little skeptical that they could get any ideas about freedom, progress, the marketplace of ideas,....at most American universities.
Matched against any western power they are doomed to failure because they are fighting for what they are told or indoctrinated to believe or directed to do, not for what they personally believe, what they own, or what they have experienced first hand as worthwhile.
I have to agree. Arab culture punishes individualism, creativity and leadership development. Once you start acting out of line with the rest of the herd, the mullahs put a fatwa on your butt. Being a good muslem means doing what you're told by the regional self-appointed gangster in-charge.
Having gone to graduate school with Arab and Persian students alike, and then worked in an industry that does a lot of business in the Mideast, much of this rings dead-true.
Freepers, if you read nothing else today, read both parts of this article. Twice.
This statement indicates the complete misunderstanding of the forces of change that are underway. That is, a misunderstanding of the conflict and of the parties involved. The statement is an oxymoron.
Industrialization is already well underway and has been for let's say 30 years. Those who favor jihad oppose any change in the preindustrial status quo. They especially oppose an industrial society and all the sinful baggage that comes with it.
There are many American educated Arabs who are not Islamic zealots and who are attempting to use their education and Western contacts to improve their society at all levels. There are many who shun education and who have problems in a changing society because they can't compete. They respond by retreating to Islamic zealotry to stop the change.
That's a bit oversimplified. Saddam Hussein is fairly industrialized as Arab despots go, particularly with weapons systems. Despite being secular, he'll use jihad when it suits him.
The Iranian theocracy is hardly dogmatically opposed to industrialization, particulary of its military.
There's not a Holy Warrior alive who wouldn't want the industrial infrastucture to make their own nuclear weapons.
Islam is religious fascism, and far more motivated by antisemitism and antichristianity than by anti-industrialization. European fascism in the 20th Century was hardly incompatible with industry. To suggest that Islam and jihad are inherently incompatible with industrialization misses the mark.
"It obviously makes a big difference, however,
when the surrounding political culture is not only avowedly
democratic (as was the Soviet Unions), but functionally so. "
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