Replies

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Analysis

Operation TORCH gave the Allies substantial beachheads in North Africa at rather modest cost, considering the size of forces committed. One hundred twenty-five thousand soldiers, sailors, and airmen participated in the operation, 82,600 of them U.S. Army personnel. Ninety-six percent of the 1,469 casualties were American, with the Army losing 526 killed, 837 wounded, and 41 missing. Casualties varied considerably among the three task forces. Eastern Task Force lost the fewest Americans killed in action, 108, Western Task Force, with four times as many American troops, lost 142 killed; Center Task Force lost almost twice as many killed, 276. But without the British-sponsored RESERVIST disaster at Oran, the Center Task Force killed-in-action total would have been in the same range as that of the other task forces.

On the Moroccan and Algerian coasts the United States Army executed operations for which its history offered no preparation: large-scale amphibious landings under hostile fire. While those operations ended in victory, any evaluation of U.S. Army performance must allow for the generally inept resistance offered by French and colonial forces. Only isolated artillery batteries and infantry units proved formidable; a better-equipped and more determined opponent could have easily capitalized on the many Allied landing problems. Obviously, the U.S. Army and its Allies would have to overcome these problems before undertaking more ambitious amphibious operations.

Most of the Army's problems during TORCH occurred in the ship-to-shore phase of landings, when amphibious forces are most vulnerable. The whole idea of night landings had to be reexamined. While the transfer of troops and equipment from transports to landing boats could be accomplished with only moderate difficulty in darkness, the shuttling of boats between transports and beaches after their first trip ashore became a source of delays. Boats returning to transports had great difficulty avoiding subsequent boat waves and finding the right transport in the darkness.

A more serious problem concerned transport of vehicles to shore. Because vehicles required deeper-draft landing craft than troops, sandbars that light troop-carrying boats overrode became obstacles to heavier tank and truck lighters. Even on beaches without sandbars, lighters frequently bottomed some distance from the shoreline and had to discharge vehicles into several feet of water, disabling electrical systems. Problems such as these provoked a spiral of unloading delays and forced troops ashore into a tactical disadvantage during the crucial early hours of the landings. Reaching shore sooner than tanks and artillery, infantry units on D-day often found themselves attacking French coastal batteries and armored units with little more than rifles and hand grenades. Most other problems relating to navigation and handling of hazardous items such as gasoline could be corrected with training and experience. But one phenomenon affecting movement to shore remained beyond human reach: the weather.

Arriving at Fedala to negotiate at armistice, 1I November 1942. General Auguste Paul Nogues, left, is met by Col. Hobart R. Gay, representing General Patton.

Operational fires (large-caliber supporting fire) proved generally satisfactory to all landings. The assignment of an aircraft carrier to each landing site gave the task forces a great advantage: Allied aircraft could prevent reinforcement of enemy garrisons, but the French could not prevent Allied buildups ashore. Only at Safi and Algiers did lone sorties of French aircraft inflict damage, and both were quickly driven off.

Naval gunfire provided essential support in neutralizing coastal batteries. In coordinating with friendly troop movements ashore, however, problems arose. Most landings took place near urban areas, which placed troops in civil-military minefields. Since Allied leaders looked forward to eventual French cooperation against the Axis, gunnery officers aboard ships and field commanders ashore had to exercise great care to avoid civilian housing as well as port facilities and oil supplies they hoped to use. With surface units ten or more miles offshore, naval gunfire margins of error could not be ignored. Such considerations forced Army units to operate without some of the large-caliber support that could have shortened the duration—and reduced the casualty total—of some battles.

For advancing units ashore, a more immediate tactical problem with naval gunfire occasionally arose. In the Fedala area a conflict in calls for support almost caused the tragedy of American fire landing among American troops. As troops of the 7th Regimental Landing Group neared an objective they requested continuation of naval gunfire. At the same time, 30th Regimental Landing Group officers asked the ships to hold fire for the moment, since their troops were nearing the impact zone. Safety concerns dictated a halt of fire support missions but at the cost of delay in the advance ashore.

The Center and Eastern Task Force landings highlighted several operational differences between the two leading Western Allies. Most striking was the British preference for antisabotage thrusts directly into objective areas, a tactic Americans considered suicidal. The failure of Operations RESERVIST and TERMINAL confirmed fears of those American planners who were wary of some British operational concepts, a suspicion dating from World War I. On the American side, much work remained to be done before airborne operations could exercise decisive influence on the battlefield.

Despite the problems it exposed, Operation TORCH gave the U.S. Army a hopeful sign for the future: American troops would soon close the experience gap with their British comrades and enable the Allies to field well-coordinated forces of overwhelming power.

Today's Educational Sources and suggestions for further reading:
http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/torch3.html

The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Operation Torch - Casablanca (Nov-1942) - Apr. 27th, 2003

Blumenson, Martin. Patton: The Man Behind the Legend 1885-1945. New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1985.

Breuer, William. Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa. New York: St. Martins Press, 1985.

Browning, Jr., Robert M. "Operation Torch: The Coast Guard and the Invasion of North Africa," U.S. Coast Guard, July 2000.

Comtois, Pierre. "First Fire of Operation Torch," World War II Magazine. November 1996, Volume II, Issue 4, p. 54.

Gelb, Norman. Desperate Venture: The Story of Operation Torch, The Allied Invasion of North Africa. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992.

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In September of 1942 the German Army was at Stalingrad and Gen. Rommel was at the gates of Egypt with his touted Afrika Corp. The Allies desparately needed a second front to reverse the eastern assault of the Axis armies. Operation Torch was devised to be that second front.

The invasion plan called for three naval task forces to in invade Northern Africa. The USS Augusta under the command of Rear Admiral H.K. Hewitt1 and embarking Western Task Force, US Army General George S. Patton, Jr. commanding was selected to be the flagship for the Western Naval Task Force (WNTF) for Operation Torch.

The plan for the WNTF was to land a force of about 9,000 at Port Lyautry which was north of Casablanca to capture the airport. At the same time 18,000, supported by 80 tanks was to land at Fedala and march on Casablanca from the north. A third force of 6,000 with a hundred heavy tanks, having landed at Safi, was to advance on the city from the south.

"PLAY BALL"

With the initial element of surprise, at 0000 GMT on November 8,1942 the Augusta reached the shores off Casablanca and the Task Force commenced disembarking the invasion troops which were under the command of Gen. George S. Patton who at the time was directing the assault from the Augusta. The ship's war diary contains the following entry for that morning:

The landing of our boats was heavily opposed by both shore installations and French troops and at 0617 the order to "Play Ball" was received - this meant that we were to carry out our Attack Plan and destroy to the best of our ability all resistance encountered.

At 0700 in Casablanca Harbor five Vichy French submarines were preparing to stand out of the harbor to go on patrol. Merchantmen were beginning loading and unloading their cargos, and on board the cruisers and destroyers the crews were at work scrubbing decks.

Jean Bart

At 0730 the aircraft carrier USS Ranger launched her first strike of bombers with Wildcat escorts. Ten minutes later they were intercepted by French fighters, and in a dogfight 5 American and 7 French planes were shot down.

At 0804 as the Ranger's bombers were releasing their loads the battleship USS Massachusetts opened up with salvoes of her 16 inch guns on Casablanca's quays and ships. In the commercial harbor 10 cargo and passenger ships were sunk in 10 minutes, 40 crew killed and 60 wounded. Alongside the breakwater 3 Vichy submarines went down at their moorings their crews cut to pieces by flying stones.

El Hank and Oukacha returned fire along with Jean Bart one turret. Wreckage hurled aboard from the quayside landed down on the turret.

At 0900 the Vichy 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral Gervais de Lafond raised sufficient steam to put to sea to head for Fedala. His flagshp, Primauguet, undergoing minor engine repair, de Lafond hoisted his flag in the superdestroyer Milan. He steamed northwards at full speed hoping that the smoke and rising sun would blind the American naval forces. At 0920 Wildcats from Ranger strafed her decks. Every man on bridge including LeFond was wounded. In the Vichy Boulonnais, was severly damaged. The commanding officer, Lt.-Comdr Martinant de Preneuf was killed on the Albatross. The Brestois anti-aircraft battery was put out of action.

Thereafter the Primauguet was off Fedala in the cross hairs of Augusta, Brooklyn to the north and Massachucetts, Tuscaloosa and Wichita from the northeast The first Vichy ship to sink was the Fougueux, which was struck by Massachusetts and Tuscaloosa. The Vichy Milan's bow shattered and forward turret wrecked and she beached.

The Boulonnais was sunk by 8 16" guns while carrying out a torpedo run, she turned turtle, and sunk with all hands.

Primauguet holed below her water line, with half of her engine room crew dead, dropped anchor near Milan.

Brestois and Frondeur got back to harbor but capsized during the night.

Vichy destroyer Alcyon left harbor for survivors but was attacked by bombers and navy guns when she cleared the Casablanca breakwater. The Albatross and Primauguet were hit again while trying to transfer 100 dead and 200 hundred wounded.

For the next three days the Augusta was engaged in protecting the transport ships and the invasion troops, and combating enemy naval and coastal resistance. On November 10, 1942 the Augusta helped turn back the French units sortieing from Casablanca who were attempting to disrupt the landings. The ship's scout observation planes played an active role in spotting the accuracy of the ship's gunfire against the enemy ships and coastal batteries. As depicted in the photo at right during this battle the Augusta (in the background) was straddled by shells from the Vichy French battleship, Jean Bart, which had been earlier mistakenly reported to Hewitt to have been out of commission. The Jean Bart was subsequently put out of action by return ship and carrier plane bombardment.

The invasion was successful and the ship and crew had the good fortune of being able to celebrate Thanksgiving Day 1942 with a special dinner with cuisine ala North Africa. A copy of the ship's program issued to the crew for that day is reproduced here. The message to the crew for that day summed up the feelings of all:

In its five engagements, one against a shore battery and four against enemy naval forces, the ship rendered a good account of itself and contributed in a large degree to the final defeat of the opposing forces and the establishing of a second front, in North Africa.

In the course of each engagement the ship was subjected to accurate and heavy fire by the opposing forces. And yet, although bracketed many times by the projectiles of the enemy, the ship miraculously escaped without damage to herself or injury to the crew. It should be apparent to all that consistent escape from harm was due not alone to skill, or to good luck, but unquestionably to the intervention of divine providence.